The Nuremberg Trials: Complete Tribunal Proceedings (V. 5). International Military Tribunal. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

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which I now put in as Exhibit GB-151. That is a discussion of a meeting at the Führer’s headquarters on the 6th of June 1944. If I might read the first paragraph:

      “Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner informed the Deputy Chief of Operations Staff”—WFSt—“in Klessheim on the afternoon of the 6th of June that a conference on this question had been held shortly before by the Reich Marshal”—the Defendant Göring—“the Reich Foreign Minister”—the Defendant Von Ribbentrop—“and the Reichsführer SS.”—Himmler—“Contrary to the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister, who wished to include every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, including bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks carried out with aircraft armament aimed directly at the civilian population and their property should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to be the rule, there was no mention of trial by court-martial or handing over to the police.”

      That is, this defendant was pressing that even where there was an attack on a German city, the airmen should be handed over to be lynched by the crowd. The others were saying that that should be restricted to cases where there were attacks by machine guns, and the like, on the civilian population.

      I do not think we need trouble with Paragraph (a) of the statement of the Deputy Chief of WFSt. The importance of (a) goes because Kaltenbrunner says that there were no such cases as were mentioned.

      If you look at (b):

      “The Deputy Chief of the WFSt pointed out that, besides the lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for segregating such enemy aviators who are suspected of criminal action of this kind by sending them to the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel and, if the suspicion was confirmed, handing them over to the SD for special treatment.”

      As I understand that, it is that if they were not lynched under the first scheme, by the crowd, then they were to be kept from prisoners of war, where they would, of course, be subject to the protecting power’s intervention. And if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD to be killed.

      Then in Paragraph 3 we have what was decided to justify the lynch law. Paragraph 3 says:

      “At a conference with Colonel Von Brauchitsch (Colonel of the Air Force) on the 6th of June, it was settled that the following actions are to be regarded as terror actions justifying lynch law:

      “Low-level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population, single persons as well as crowds.

      “Shooting in the air our own (German) men who had bailed out.

      “Attacks with aircraft armament on passenger trains in the public service.

      “Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals, and hospital trains, which are clearly marked with the red cross.”

      These were to be the subject of lynching and not, as this defendant had suggested, a case where there was the bombing of a city.

      Then on the next page, the last page of this document, we have a somewhat curious comment from the Defendant Keitel:

      “Remarks by the Chief of the OKW on the agenda dated 6 June 1944.”

      The number is that of the document at which the Tribunal has just been looking.

      “Most secret; Staff officers only.

      “If one allows the people to carry out lynch law, it is difficult to enforce rules.

      “Ministerial Director Berndt got out and shot the enemy aviator on the road. I am against legal procedure. It doesn’t work out.”—Signed—“Keitel.”

      Then the Defendant Jodl’s comment appears:

      “This conference is insufficient. The following points must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:

      “1. What do we consider as murder? Is the Foreign Office in agreement with point 3b?

      “2. How should the procedure be carried out? a. By the people? b. By the authorities?

      “3. How can we guarantee that the procedure will not be also carried out against other enemy aviators?

      “4. Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?”—Signed—“Jodl.”

      It is important, I respectfully submit, to note that this defendant and the Foreign Office were fully in on these breaches of the laws and usages of war, and indeed the clarity with which the Foreign Office perceives that there were breaches of the laws and usages of war, is shown by the next document, which is 728-PS, which I now put in as GB-152. That is a document from the Foreign Office, approved of by the Defendant Ribbentrop and transmitted by one of his officials called Ritter; and the fact that it is approved by this defendant is specifically stated in the next Document 740-PS, which I put in as GB-153. I do not think this Document 728-PS has been read before, and therefore, again, I would like to read just one or two passages in it. It begins:

      “In spite of the obvious objections, based on international law and foreign policy, the Foreign Office is basically in agreement with the proposed measures.

      “In the examination of the individual cases a distinction must be made between the cases of lynching and the cases of special treatment by the SD.

      “I. In the cases of lynching, the precise establishment of the facts involving punishment, according to points 1 through 4 of the communication of 15 June, is not very essential. First, the German authorities are not directly responsible, since the death will have occurred before a German official becomes concerned with the case. Furthermore, the accompanying circumstances will be such, that it will not be difficult to represent the case in an appropriate manner upon publication. Hence, in cases of lynching it will be of primary importance correctly to handle the individual case upon publication.

      “II. The suggested procedure for special treatment by the SD, including subsequent publication, would be feasible only if Germany would at the same time openly repudiate the commitments of international law, at present in force and still recognized by Germany. When an enemy aviator is seized by the Army or by the Police and is delivered to the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel, he has acquired by this very fact the legal status of a prisoner of war.

      “The Prisoner-of-War Agreement of 27 July 1929 established definite rules for the prosecution and sentencing of prisoners of war and the execution of the death penalty, as for example in Article 66: Death sentences may be carried out only 3 months after the Protecting Power has been notified of the sentence. In Article 63: A prisoner of war will be tried only by the same courts and under the same procedure as members of the German Armed Forces. These rules are so specific that it would be futile to try to cover up any violation of them by clever wording of the publication of an individual incident. On the other hand, the Foreign Office cannot recommend on this occasion a formal repudiation of the Prisoner-of-War Agreement.

      “An emergency solution would be to prevent suspected enemy fliers from ever attaining a legal prisoner-of-war status, that is, that immediately upon capture they be told that they are not considered prisoners of war but criminals, that they would not be turned over to the agencies having jurisdiction over prisoners of war, hence not go to a prisoner-of-war camp, but that they be delivered to the authorities in charge of the prosecution of criminal acts, and that they be tried in summary proceedings. If the evidence at the trial should reveal that the special procedure is not applicable to a particular case, the fliers concerned may subsequently be given the status of prisoner of war by transfer to the reception camp for aviators at Oberursel.

      “Naturally, not even this expedient will prevent the possibility of Germany’s being accused of violation of existing treaties or even the adoption of reprisals upon German prisoners of war. At any rate this solution would enable us to follow a clearly defined course, thus relieving us of the necessity of openly having to renounce the present agreements or of the need of having to use excuses which no one would believe, upon the publication of each individual