The rules in this connection upon which the Commons insisted have been summarized as follows: (1) The Lords ought not to initiate any legislative proposal embodied in a public bill and imposing a charge on the people, whether by taxes, rates, or otherwise, or regulating the administration or application of money raised by such a charge, and (2) the Lords ought not to amend any such legislative proposal by altering the amount of a charge, or its incidence, duration, mode of assessment, levy or collection, or the administration or application of money raised by such a charge.[152] These rules, although not embodied in any law or standing order, were through centuries so generally observed in the usage of the two houses that they became for all practical purposes, a part of the constitutional system—conventional, it is true, but none the less binding. From their observance it resulted (1) that the upper chamber was never consulted about the annual estimates, about the amounts of money to be raised, or about the purposes to which those amounts should be appropriated; (2) that proposals of taxation came before it only in matured form and under circumstances which discouraged criticism; and (3) that, since the policy of the executive is controlled largely through the medium of the power of the purse, the upper house lost entirely the means of exercising such control. In 1860 the Lords, as has been mentioned, made bold to reject a bill for the repeal of the duties on paper; but the occasion was seized by the Commons to pass a resolution reaffirming vigorously the subordination of the second chamber in finance, and the next year the repeal of the paper duties was incorporated in the annual budget and forced through. Thereafter it became the invariable practice to give place to all proposals of taxation in the one grand Finance Bill of the year, with the effect, of course, of depriving the Lords of the opportunity to defeat a proposal of the kind save by rejecting the whole of the measure of which it formed a part.[153]
112. The Finance Bill of 1909 and the Asquith Resolutions.—The rejection of the Finance Bill in 1909,[154] following as it did the rejection of other important measures which the Liberal majority in the Commons had approved, raised in an acute form the question of the power of the Lords over money bills and precipitated a crisis in the relations between the two houses. On the one hand the House of Commons adopted, by a vote of 349 to 134, a memorable resolution to the effect that "the action of the House of Lords in refusing to pass into law the provision made by the House of Commons for the finances of the year is a breach of the constitution, and a usurpation of the privileges of the House of Commons"; and, on the other, the Asquith ministry came instantly to the decision that the situation demanded an appeal to the country. In January, 1910, a general election took place, with the result that the Government was continued in power, though with a reduced majority; and at the convening of the new parliament, in February, the Speech from the Throne promised that proposals should speedily be submitted "to define the relations between the houses of Parliament, so as to secure the undivided authority of the House of Commons over finance, and its predominance in legislation." The Finance Bill of the year was reintroduced and this time successfully carried through; but in advance of its reappearance the premier laid before the House of Commons a series of resolutions to the following effect:[155] (1) that the House of Lords should be disabled by law from rejecting or amending a money bill; (2) that the power of the chamber to veto other bills should be restricted by law; and (3) that the duration of a parliament should be limited to a maximum period of five years. During the course of the debate upon these resolutions it was made clear that the Government did not desire the abolition of the Lords, but wished merely to have the legislative competence of the house confined to consultation, revision, and, subject to proper safeguards, delay. April 14, 1910, the resolutions were adopted in the Commons by substantial majorities,[156] and with them as a basis the Government proceeded with the framing of its bill upon the subject.
Meanwhile, March 14, there had been introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Rosebery an independent series of resolutions, as follows: (1) that a strong and efficient second chamber is not merely a part of the British constitution but is necessary to the well-being of the state and the balance of Parliament; (2) that such a chamber may best be obtained by the reform and reconstitution of the House of Lords; and (3) that a necessary preliminary to such a reform and reconstitution is the acceptance of the principle that the possession of a peerage should no longer of itself involve the right to sit and vote in the House. The first two of these resolutions were agreed to without division; the third, although vigorously opposed, was carried eventually by a vote of 175 to 17.
113. The Unionists and the Referendum.—The death of the king, May 6, halted consideration of the subject, and through the succeeding summer hope was centered in a "constitutional conference" participated in by eight representatives of the two houses and of the two principal parties. A total of twenty-one meetings were held, but all effort to reach an agreement proved futile and at the reassembling of Parliament, November 15, the problem was thrown back for solution upon the houses and the country. November 17 there was carried in the Lords, without division, a new resolution introduced by Lord Rosebery to the effect that in future the House of Lords should consist of Lords of Parliament in part chosen by the whole body of hereditary peers from among themselves and by nomination of the crown, in part sitting by virtue of offices held and qualifications possessed, and in part designated from outside the ranks of the peerage. A few days subsequently, the Government's Parliament Bill having been presented in the second chamber (November 21), Lord Lansdowne, leader of the Opposition in that chamber, came forward with a fresh series of resolutions designed to clarify the Unionist position in anticipation of the elections which were announced for the ensuing month. With respect to money bills it was declared that the Lords were "prepared to forego their constitutional right to reject or amend money bills which are purely financial in character," provided that adequate provision should be made against tacking, that questions as to whether a bill or any provision thereof were purely financial should be referred to a joint committee of the two houses (the Speaker of the Commons presiding and possessing a casting vote), and that a bill decided by such a committee to be not purely financial should be dealt with in a joint sitting of the two houses. With respect to all measures other than those thus provided for the resolutions declared that "if a difference arises between the two houses with regard to any bill other than a money bill in two successive sessions, and with an interval of not less than one year, and such difference cannot be adjusted by any other means, it shall be settled in a joint sitting composed of members of the two houses; provided that if the difference relates to a matter which is of great gravity, and has not been adequately submitted for the judgment of the people, it shall not be referred to the joint sitting, but shall be submitted for decision to the electors by referendum." It will be observed that these resolutions were hardly less drastic than were those carried through the Commons by the ministry. Their adoption involved the abolition of the absolute veto of the second chamber and might well involve the intrusting of interests which the peers held dear to the hazards of a nation-wide referendum.[157] None the less, the resolutions were agreed to without division, and, both parties having in effect pronounced the existing legislative system unsatisfactory, the electorate was