Moreover, the principal reason why some foreign observers do not believe that the economic reforms undertaken by North Korea represent a fundamental transformation in Pyongyang’s thinking is precisely the military-first policy, the dominant role that the KPA still plays in the North Korean decision-making process, and the belief that the military-first policy precludes any constructive resolution in major diplomatic overtures such as the nuclear negotiations.
Military Doctrine. KPA military doctrine began as a hybridization of Chinese and Soviet concepts. North Korean military doctrine further evolved from lessons learned from global confrontations such as the ArabIsraeli conflicts, the Vietnam War, Kosovo, Operation DESERT STORM, and more recently, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Throughout the last 70 years, North Korea’s military has learned that it cannot necessarily depend on China or Russia to be there to assist with its development and operations. Although China and Russia provide some support today, they appear to support North Korea as a counterbalance to the U.S. presence in South Korea.
This is another primary tenet of the Juche ideology of self-sufficiency that North Korea has developed regarding all phases of its military from doctrine development to weapons and ammunition production. This doctrine has evolved through as many as four stages since the founding of the KPA in February 1948. North Korean military writings derive from Marxism-Leninism through the conduit of "Kim Il Sung Thought." Kim Il Sung is credited with virtually everything in North Korean military thought, from Lenin’s reformulation of Clausewitz’ classic definition of war to basic squad tactics. Reportedly, Kim Jong Il also is putting his name to several documents which credit him with military doctrine formulation.
North Korean military thinking began as a mixture of Soviet strategic and Chinese tactical influences tempered by guerrilla warfare. From 1951 to December 1962, North Korean military orthodoxy was a conventional warfare doctrine based on Soviet military doctrine and operational art modified on the basis of the Korean War experience. Soviet Stalinist factors that determine the course and outcome of war were incorporated directly into North Korean military doctrine.
In 1962, North Korea’s confidence in the Soviet Union was severely degraded after it witnessed the Soviet acquiescence to the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union voted in December 1962 to suspend military and economic assistance to the DPRK because of ideological differences. Kim Il Sung realized that North Korea’s hopes of stalwart Soviet support for any North Korean military endeavors would be minimal unless it served the well-being of the Soviet Union. Of course, Kim should have learned this from Stalin during World War II and the Korean War.
Thus, North Korean military doctrine shifted dramatically away from the doctrine of regular warfare to a doctrine that embraced people’s war. Kim Il Sung espoused the Four Military (guide) Lines: (1) to arm the entire population; (2) to fortify the entire country; (3) to train the entire army as a "cadre army"; and (4) to modernize weaponry, doctrine, and tactics under the principle of Juche in national defense. The adoption of this military line signaled a shift from a Sovietstyle strategy to a Maoist protracted war of attrition. Conventional warfare strategy was incorporated into and subordinated to the overall concept of the people’s war concept with the mobilization of the entire country through reinforcement of ideological training.
In 1965-67, Soviet military assistance was reinstated which allowed for the KPA to resume a delayed modernization program. In 1966, North Korea determined that a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula could not be attained without active guerrilla action in South Korea. Kim Il Sung announced the abandonment of the policy of seeking to unify Korea by peaceful means and the adoption of a new, more militant policy toward South Korea.
Combined Operations and “Two-Front War.” Kim’s speech formed the basis of two new doctrines, “combined operations” and “two-front war.” The combined operations doctrine called for the integration of guerrilla warfare operations with conventional KPA ground force operations. The two-front war doctrine called for close coordination of conventional frontline operations with guerrilla and special operations deep within South Korea.
In the early 1970s, the Soviet-trained officers of the KPA were developing the “Two Front War.” As they envisioned it, a very large conventional force — greatly reinforced with artillery, armor, and mechanized forces, employing surprise attack, speed, and a short violent campaign — would break through the DMZ, envelop and destroy South Korean forward forces, and rapidly overrun the entire peninsula. This operation would be facilitated by a second front composed of SOF infiltrated deep into the South Korean strategic rear to destroy, neutralize, or disrupt South Korean and U.S. air operations; command, control, and communications; and lines of communications. Throughout the 1970s, in the first of a two-phased force expansion plan, North Korea emphasized the commitment of scarce resources, development of industry, and military expansion and reorganization necessary to create such a force.
However, as time moved on, North Korea’s ability to conduct such a dual operation successfully becomes less and less viable. South Korean acquisition of military hardware (both quality and modern), significantly improved weapon and sensor technology, and urbanization, coupled with presence of U.S. forces, precision munitions, counter-battery fire, and bunkerbusting bombs has diminished North Korea’s chances of a military reunification with control under Kim Jong Il.
However, possibly to counter this, North Korea is developing asymmetric capabilities with its SOF and WMD (discussed later). There are no indications that North Korea does not intend to fully commit itself to occupying the peninsula, all the way to Pusan. Thus, North Korea may have reversed the roles of the massive conventional forces along the DMZ and the Second Front Special Purpose forces.
The 70 percent of the KPA forces massed along the DMZ may be a feint to “fix” South Korean forces along the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), while the SOF conducts its unconventional and guerrilla operations in the South. Only when North Korea deems the time right would expected conventional attacks by KPA ground forces over the DMZ occur. These forces also would have to secure South Korean logistics to sustain the main effort since North Korea’s ability to do this is suspect. North Korea would not commit its main effort if Kim Jong Il did not feel it would win a total victory. However, North Korean miscalculations could lead to a failed offensive into South Korea which could result in a limited option plan for North Korea.
Lessons learned from the Vietnam War and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 served as the foundation for the establishment of the KPA’s three pillared military strategy — surprise attack, quick decisive war, and mixed tactics. North Korea observed that during the Vietnam War, North Vietnam was able to counter a technologically superior force successfully, using aspects of special operations forces and psychological operations. The shift supplied the doctrinal basis for North Korea’s strategy of covert infiltrations into South Korea, assassinations, and attempts at fostering insurgencies in South Korea during the late 1960s. The 1966-69 period was characterized as a period of low-intensity conflict as scenes from an unfinished war.
During the 1970s, Soviet military thinking continued to dominate KPA strategy and doctrine development, especially the nature of modern warfare. This new concept adopted a three-dimensional aspect, with no distinction between front and rear, highly mobile, and increasingly dependent upon mechanization, task organization, and improved engineer capabilities.
During 1972, doctrine and strategy were refined further as “enabling North Korean forces to smash the enemy strategically and tactically by either integrating or combining the following: large unit and small unit operations; the experiences of the guerrilla units and modern military technology; guerrilla and modern war tactics; strong guerrilla activities and national popular resistance.” Kim Il Sung understood the power of insurgency as a lesson learned from the Vietnam war, and this probably has been reinforced by Kim Jong Il per observations of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Although the U.S. Intelligence Community has been concentrating on its analysis of SOF in recent years, often the enormity of the conventional KPA receives the emphasis of operational planning while the guerrilla or unconventional warfare aspect of North Korean military doctrine is overlooked.
Beginning in the early 1980s, North Korea began execution of its force expansion and reorganization