Brazil and the River Plate in 1868. Hadfield William

melancholy occurrences in that city have shown what excesses can be committed from party spirit, and how difficult it was at the period I allude to, to avoid an armed intervention. How these acts affected the interests of Paraguay it is not easy to conceive. Brazil agreed to recognise the independence of Uruguay, and she left it in that condition, stronger than it had been for some years previously. It is true that about this time Lopez had given notice to Brazil that any interference in the affairs of Uruguay, or the entry of Brazilian troops into Uruguayan territory, would be considered by him as a casus belli—a piece of impertinence that Brazil might well disregard, as the rights of nations allowed reprisals for injuries received, and this was all Brazil carried into effect. Up to the point mentioned Lopez had, therefore, no real or ostensible cause of war against Brazil, but she stood in the way of the consummation of his ambitious designs, and so he made what he termed an interference in Uruguay the pretext for setting his legions in motion. Without any declaration of war, he seized and took forcible possession of the steamer Marquis de Olinda whilst on a peaceable errand up the River, with Carneiro de Campos, the President of Matto Grosso on board, and has retained him prisoner ever since; he marched a division into Brazil, and occupied the frontier town of Uruguayana, simultaneously sending his fleet down, no doubt to co-operate with his troops, but this was prevented by the gallant action of the Riachuello, in which the Paraguayan navy was nearly destroyed by the Brazilians. The proceedings of Lopez towards Brazil were, therefore, offensive and insulting in the highest degree, and still more so towards the Argentine Republic, which had really given him no cause of offence beyond daring to remain neutral, and consequently refusing to allow the passage of troops through its territory. Upon the refusal of General Mitre to grant such permission, he crossed the Parana and invaded Corrientes, seizing two Argentine vessels as well as the persons and property of Argentine subjects, on whom he levied black mail. These extreme measures taken by Lopez towards both countries were in pigmy imitation of the first Napoleon, whose tactics Lopez affected to follow by seizing the persons, property, and territory of his neighbours before it was possible for them to offer any opposition. Such an offence against the laws of nations could lead only to an alliance against him as a common enemy, with the condition that the aggrieved nations would not lay down their arms until the offender was punished by expulsion from Paraguay. In Europe this course was adopted against Napoleon I. and in South America, under nearly identical circumstances, an equally strong measure was rendered necessary for the future peace and security of the allies. If a case in point was required on the spot, Paraguay itself had joined in the expulsion of Rozas, because no security existed for any one so long as that tyrant dominated at Buenos Ayres. That neither Brazil nor the Argentine Republic anticipated such conduct on the part of Lopez is evident from the unprepared state of both, the latter being at the time literally without army or navy; indeed, the first check given to the advance of Lopez was by the late General Flores, at the head of a gallant little band of Oriental troops in conjunction with those of Brazil. No impartial person can question, therefore, that Lopez has been the sole cause of this long and bloody war, and that he committed a glaring act of violence towards his neighbours, who were compelled in self-defence to enter into a league for the expulsion of so dangerous a character. To have made peace on any other terms would have been only playing with a firebrand.

      It is not my purpose in this chapter to criticise the manner in which the war has been conducted, or to point out mistakes which may have been made. Intelligent Brazilians believe that, instead of sending a large army by sea, it would have been better to have made a diversion by marching across the country to the interior of Paraguay, direct to Asuncion, leaving Humaita blockaded. Thus a large amount of money would have been expended in Brazilian territory. Whether this would have hastened the conclusion of the war it is difficult to say, but the direct advantages in other ways would no doubt have been considerable. However, Brazil is not the only country that has blundered in carrying on a distant war, as we know to our cost. That they did not anticipate so vigorous a resistance is certain, nor was it possible to suppose that any section of the Argentine people, whose nationality had been grossly insulted, would have been lukewarm, or have desired to make peace until the object of the struggle was accomplished.

THE PROVINCE OF SAN PAULO.

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      Availing of an opportunity to accompany a friend to this province, we left Rio on Tuesday, the 18th of February, on board the steamer Ptolemy, with a remarkably smooth sea, and a light, but cool breeze. We reached Santos early the following morning. The steamer was at once moored alongside an iron wharf, facing the Custom House, and Mr. Miller, one of the railway officials, came on board with the unpleasant information that the railway was stopped, owing to the heavy rains, which appeared to have prevailed here as at Rio. The town did not look very inviting under the influence of a hot sun, but Mr. Miller kindly offered us rooms at the station, where he himself lived, and made us very comfortable. There was every prospect of our being obliged to walk up to the top of the Serra, but fortunately, on the 20th, a telegram came to announce that the line would be opened to San Paulo the next morning, when we started with a small train, arrived at 2.33, and drove to the Hotel d'Italia, where rooms had been engaged for us.

      The province of San Paulo has played a distinguished part in the history of Brazil, and has latterly attracted much notice from its production of cotton, in addition to the large quantity of coffee grown and shipped from the port of Santos, both of which articles are expected to be greatly increased by the railway facilities. There can be no doubt that the province offers splendid scope for emigration, if properly applied, and this important subject will be specially treated of after I have collected together the requisite materials. Certainly the size, extent, and evident prosperity of the city of San Paulo surprised me, no less than its superiority in most of the comforts and luxuries to places more favourably situated by their proximity to the sea; but the large number of old churches, convents, colleges, and public institutions date its origin from the time of the Jesuits, who must have been very industrious and wealthy to have found the means for building such huge places, with the object of perpetuating their order, and for the spread of the Roman Catholic religion. I much regretted that the stoppage of the railway, and very unfavourable weather—constant thunder storms, with deluges of rain—prevented me travelling some distance into the interior, where the coffee and cotton plantations lie, but the accounts received from others, who possess a thorough knowledge of the localities, enable me to speak most highly of its resources.

      His Excellency, Saldanha Marinho, the President of San Paulo, and who by his affability and business habits has won the esteem and affection of the people, received me kindly during my stay here. He is a determined supporter of every practical measure having for its object the improvement of the city and of the province. Respecting the great work of the railway, on which so much of the future welfare of the province depends, I will endeavour to give a tolerably ample description; but to begin with, it may not be out of place to quote as follows from the work of Mr. Scully, entitled “Brazil and its Chief Provinces”:—

      “Passing over the Mugy river you arrive quickly at the foot of the gorge formed by the two out-jutting spurs of the buttress-like mountain, and the black defiant ravine is suggestive of anything but a railway course. Here the line climbs boldly up the side of the Mugy spur, at a usual ascent of one in ten, crossing mountain torrents, leaping gloomy chasms, cutting through solid rocks, holding hard on to every foot gained, until it attains a resting-place upon the table land, 2,600 feet high, after five miles of gigantic excavations, removing 1,100,000 cubic yards of granite rock and earth.

      “Here we must give a slight idea of how this daring plan is utilised, which was at one time laughed at as an engineering impossibility, and which even yet stands pre-eminent among similar works.

      “This entire and almost straight ascent of upwards of five miles is divided into four “lifts” of about a mile and a quarter each, having a level platform of some 400 feet in length between them. On these lifts, as in general on all the line, the track is single, except at the upper half, where it is doubled to admit of the ascending and descending trains passing each other. At the upper end of each platform is placed a powerful stationary engine of 200 horse-power, whose two cylinders are 26 inches diameter and 5 feet stroke, calculated to haul up 50 tons at the rate