[Sidenote: Excitements of military life.]
[Sidenote: Smallness of the Roman armies.]
[Sidenote: How battles were decided.]
From what has come down to us of Roman military life, it appears to have been full of excitement, toil, danger, and hardship. The pecuniary rewards of the soldier were small. He was paid in glory. No profession brought so much honor as the military. And from the undivided attention of a great people to this profession, it was carried to all the perfection which could be attained until the great invention of gunpowder changed the art of war. It was not the number of men employed in the armies which particularly arrests attention, but the spirit and genius which animated them. The Romans loved war, but so reduced it to a science that it required comparatively small armies to conquer the world. Sulla defeated Mithridates with only thirty thousand men, while his adversary marshaled against him over one hundred thousand; and Caesar had only ten legions to effect the conquest of Gaul, and none of these were of Italian origin. At the great decisive battle of Pharsalia, when most of the available forces of the empire were employed, on one side or the other, Pompey commanded a legionary army of forty-five thousand men; and the cavalry amounted to seven thousand more, but among them were included the flower of the Roman nobility. The auxiliary force has not been computed, although it was probably numerous. Caesar had under him only twenty-two thousand of legionaries and one thousand cavalry. But every man in both armies was prepared to conquer or die. The forces were posted on the open plain, and the battle was really a hand-to-hand encounter, in which the soldiers, after hurling their lances, fought with their swords chiefly. And when the cavalry of Pompey rushed upon the legionaries of Caesar, no blows were wasted on the mailed panoply of the mounted Romans, but were aimed at the face alone, as that alone was unprotected. The battle was decided by the coolness, bravery, and discipline of veterans, inspired by the genius of the greatest general of antiquity. Less than one hundred thousand men, in all probability, were engaged in one of the most memorable conflicts which the world has seen.
[Sidenote: Gradual organization of military power.]
[Sidenote: Magnanimity of the early generals.]
Thus it was, by unparalleled heroism in war, and a uniform policy in government, that Rome became the mistress of the world. The Roman conquests have never been surpassed, for they were retained until the empire fell. I wish that I could have dwelt on these conquests more in detail, and presented more fully the brilliant achievements of individuals. It took nearly two hundred years, after the expulsion of the kings, to regain supremacy over the neighboring people, and another century to conquer Italy. The Romans did not contend with regular armies until they were brought in conflict with the king of Epirus and the phalanx of the Greeks, "which improved their military tactics, and introduced between the combatants those mutual regards of civilized nations which teach men to honor their adversaries, to spare the vanquished, and to lay aside wrath when the struggle is ended." In the fifth century of her existence, the republic appears in peculiar splendor. Military chieftains do not transcend their trusts; the aristocracy are equally distinguished for exploits and virtues; the magistrates maintain simplicity of manners and protect the rights of the citizens; the citizens are self-sacrificing and ever ready to obey the call to arms, laying aside great commands and retiring poor to private stations. Marcus Valerius Corvus, after filling twenty-one curule offices, returns to agricultural life; Marcus Curius Dentatus retains no part of the rich spoils or the Sabines; Fabricius rejects the gold of the Samnites and the presents of Pyrrhus. The most trustworthy are elevated to places of dignity and power. Senators mingle in the ranks of the legions, and eighty of them die on the field of Cannae. Discipline is enforced to cruelty, and Manlius Torquatus punishes with death a disobedient son. Soldiers who desert the field are decimated or branded with dishonor. Faith is kept even with enemies, and Regulus returns a voluntary prisoner to his deadly enemies.
[Sidenote: Results of different wars.]
After the consolidation of Roman power in Italy, it took one hundred and fifty years more only to complete the conquest of the world—of Northern Africa, Spain, Gaul, Illyria, Epirus, Greece, Macedonia, Asia Minor, Pontus, Syria, Egypt, Bithynia, Cappadocia, Pergamus, and the islands of the Mediterranean. The conquest of Carthage left Rome without a rival in the Mediterranean, and promoted intercourse with the Greeks. The Illyrian wars opened to the Romans the road to Greece and Asia, and destroyed the pirates of the Adriatic. The invasion of Cisalpine Gaul, now that part of Italy which is north of the Apennines, protected Italy from the invasion of barbarians. The Macedonian War against Philip put Greece under the protection of Rome, and that against Antiochus laid Syria at her mercy; and when these kingdoms were reduced to provinces, the way was opened to further conquests in the East, and the Mediterranean became a Roman lake.
[Sidenote: Effect of Roman conquests on society.]
[Sidenote: Degeneracy of morals undermines military power.]
But these conquests introduce luxury, wealth, pride, and avarice, with arts, refinements, and literature. These degrade while they elevate. Civilization becomes the alternate triumph of good and evil influences, and a doubtful boon. Successful war creates great generals, and founds great families, increases slavery, and promotes inequalities. Demagogues arise who seduce and deceive the people, and they enroll themselves under the standards of their idols. Rome is governed by an oligarchy of military chieftains, and has become more aristocratic and more democratic at the same time. The people gain rights, only to yield to the supremacy of demagogues. The Senate is humbled, but remains the ascendant power, for generals compose it, and those who have held great offices. Meanwhile the great generals struggle for supremacy. Civil wars follow in the train of foreign conquests. Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Julius, Antony, Augustus, sacrifice the state to their ambition. Good men lament, and protest, and hide themselves. Cato, Cicero, Brutus, speak in vain. Degenerate morals keep pace with civil contests. Rome revels in the spoils of all kingdoms and countries, is intoxicated with power, becomes cruel and tyrannical, and, after yielding up the lives of citizens to fortunate generals, yields at last her liberties, and imperial despotism begins its reign—hard, immovable, resolute—under which genius is crushed, and life becomes epicurean, but under which property and order are preserved. The regime is bad; but it is a change for the better. War has produced its fruits. It has added empire, but undermined prosperity; it has created a great military monarchy, but destroyed liberty; it has brought wealth, but introduced inequalities; it has filled the city with spoils, but sown the vices of self-interest. The machinery is perfect, but life has fled. It is henceforth the labor of emperors to keep together their vast possessions with this machinery, which at last wears out, since there is neither genius to repair it nor patriotism to work it. It lasts three hundred years, but is broken to pieces by the Goths and Vandals.
* * * * *
The highest authority in relation to the construction of an army is Polybius, who was contemporary with Scipio, at a period when Roman discipline was most perfect. A fragment from his sixth book gives considerable information. A chapter of Livy—the eighth—is also very much prized. Salmasius and Lepsius have also written learned treatises. Smith's Dictionary, which is full of details in every thing pertaining to the weapons, the armor, the military engines, the rewards and punishments of the soldiers, refers to Folard's Commentaire, to Memoires Militaires sur les Grecs et les Remains, by Guischard, and to the Histoire des Campagnes d'Hannibal en Italie, by Vaudencourt. Tacitus, Sallust, Livy, Dion Cassius, Pliny, and Caesar reveal incidentally much that we wish to know. Gibbon gives some important facts in his first chapter. The subject of ancient machines is treated by Folard's Commentary attached to his translation of Polybius. Caesar's Commentaries give us, after all, the liveliest idea of the military habits and tactics of the Romans. Josephus describes with great vividness the siege of Jerusalem. The article on Exercitus, by Prof. Ramsay, in Smith's Dictionary, is the fullest I have read pertaining to the structure of a Roman army.
For the narrative of wars, the reader is referred to ordinary Roman histories—to Livy and Caesar especially; to Niebuhr, Mommsen, Arnold, and Liddell. See also Durny, Hist. des Romains; Michelet, Hist. de Rom. Napoleon's