Dr. Mozley, with a haste very unlike his previous careful procedure, jumps at the following conclusions: "The constitution of nature, then, disproved the incredibility of the Divine suspension of physical law; but more than this, it creates a presumption for it."(l) The laws of life of which we have experience, he argues, are themselves in an ascending scale. First come the laws which regulate unorganized matter; next the laws of vegetation; then the laws of animal life, with its voluntary motion; and above these again, the laws of moral being. A supposed intelligent being whose experience was limited to one or more classes in this ascending scale of laws would be totally incapable of conceiving the action of the higher classes. The progressive succession of laws is perfectly conceivable backward, but an absolute mystery forward. "Analogy," therefore, when in this ascending series we arrive at man, leads us to expect that there is a higher sphere of law as much above him as he is above the lower natures in the scale, and "supplies a presumption in favour of such a belief."(2) And so we arrive at the question whether there is or is not a God, a Personal Head in nature, whose free will penetrates the universal frame invisibly to us, and is an omnipresent agent. If there be, Dr. Mozley concludes, then, every miracle in Scripture is as natural an event in the universe as any chemical experiment in the physical world.(3)
This is precisely the argument of Dr. Mansel, regarding the "Efficient Cause," somewhat elaborated, but, however ingeniously devised, it is equally based upon assumption and defective in analogy. The "classes of law" to which the Bampton Lecturer refers work harmoniously side by side, regulating the matter to which they apply. Unorganized matter, vegetation, and animal life, may each have special conditions modifying phenomena, but they are all equally subject to the same general laws. Man is as much under the influence of gravitation as a stone is. The special operation of physical laws is less a modification of law than that law acting under different conditions. The law of gravitation suffers no alteration, whether it cause the fall of an apple or shape the orbit of a planet. The reproduction of the plant and of the animal is regulated by the same fundamental principle acting through different organisms. The harmonious action of physical laws, and their adaptability to an infinite variety of forms, constitute the perfection of that code which produces the order of nature.(1) The mere superiority of man over lower forms of organic and inorganic matter does not lift him above physical laws, and the analogy of every grade in nature forbids the presumption that higher forms may exist which are exempt from their control.
If in animated beings, as is affirmed, we had the solitary instance of an "efficient cause" acting among the forces of nature, and possessing the power of initiation, this "efficient cause" produces no disturbance of physical law. Its existence is as much a recognized part of the infinite variety of form within the order of nature as the existence of a crystal or a plant; and although the character of the force exercised by it may not be clearly understood, its effects are regulated by the same laws as govern all other forces in nature. If "the laws of matter are suspended by the laws of life" each time an animated being moves any part of its body, one physical law is counteracted in precisely the same manner, and to an equivalent degree, each time another physical law is called into action. The Law of gravitation, for instance, is equally neutralized by the law of magnetism each time a magnet suspends a weight in the air. In each case, a law is successfully resisted precisely to the extent of the force employed. The arm that is raised by the animated being falls again, in obedience to law, as soon as the force which raised it is exhausted, quite as certainly as the weight descends when the magnetic current fails. This, however, is not the suspension of law in the sense of a miracle, but, on the contrary, is simply the natural operation upon each other of co-existent laws. It is a recognized part of the order of nature,(1) and instead of rendering credible any supernatural suspension of laws, the analogy of animated beings distinctly excludes it. The introduction of life in no way changes the relation between cause and effect, which constitutes the order of nature, and is the essence of its law. Life favours no presumption for the suspension of law, but, on the contrary, whilst acting in nature, universally exhibits the prevalence and invariability of law. The "laws of life" may be subtle, but they are an integral portion of the great order of nature, working harmoniously with the laws of matter, and not one whit more independent of them than any one natural law is of another.
The supposed "Efficient Cause," is wholly circumscribed by law. It is brought into existence by the operation of immutable physical laws, and from the cradle to the grave it is subject to those laws. So inseparably is it connected with matter, and consequently with the laws which regulate matter, that it cannot even become conscious of its own existence without the intervention of matter. The whole process of life is dependent on obedience to natural laws, and so powerless is this efficient cause to resist their jurisdiction, that, in spite of its highest efforts, it pines or ceases to exist in consequence of the mere natural operation of law upon the matter with which it is united, and without which it is impotent. It cannot receive an impression from without that is not conveyed in accordance with law, and perceived by an exquisitely ordered organism, in every part of which law reigns supreme; nor can it communicate from within except through channels equally ordered by law. A slight injury may derange the delicate mechanical contrivances of eye, ear, and vocal chords, and may further destroy the reason and paralyze the body, reducing the animated being, by the derangement of those channels to which physical law limits its action, to a mere smouldering spark of life, without consciousness and without expression. The "laws of life" act amongst the laws of matter, but are not independent of them, and the action of both classes of law is regulated by precisely the same principles.
Dr. Mozley's affirmation, that antecedently one step on the ground and an ascent to heaven are alike incredible, does not help him. In that sense it follows that there is nothing that is not antecedently incredible, nothing credible until it has happened. This argument, however, while it limits us to actual experience, prohibits presumptions with regard to that which is beyond experience. To argue that, because a step on the ground and an ascent to heaven are antecedently alike incredible, yet as we subsequently make that step, therefore the ascent to heaven, which we cannot make, from incredible becomes credible, is a contradiction in terms. If the ascent be antecedently incredible, it cannot at the same time be antecedently credible. That which is incredible cannot become credible because something else quite different becomes credible. It is apparent that such an argument is vicious. Experience comes with its sober wisdom to check such reasoning. We believe in our power to walk because we habitually exercise it: we disbelieve in bodily ascensions because all experience excludes them. The step is part of the recognised order of nature, and has none of the elements in it of the miraculous. But if we leap into the air on the brink of a precipice, belief in an ascent to heaven is shattered to pieces at the bottom to which the law of gravitation infallibly drags us.
There is absolutely nothing in the constitution of nature, we may say, reversing Dr. Mozley's assertion, which does not prove the incredibility of a Divine suspension of physical laws, and does not create a presumption against it. There is no instance producible, or even logically conceivable, of any power whose effects are opposed to the ultimate ruling of the laws of nature. The occurrence of anything opposed to those laws is incredible. Dr. Mozley has himself shown that miracles cannot be explained either by unknown connection with known law, or by reference to unknown law; and he renounces the explanation of "higher law." His distinction between the laws of nature and the "laws of the universe,"(1) by which he nevertheless endeavours to make a miracle credible, is one which is purely imaginary, and cannot affect us in our present position within the order of nature. We know of no laws of the universe differing from the laws of nature. So far as human observation can range, these laws alone prevail. For all practical purposes, therefore, such a distinction is futile, and belief is necessarily limited to the actual operation of natural laws. The occasional intervention of an unknown "efficient cause," producing the effects called "miracles"—effects which are not referrible to any known law—is totally opposed to experience, and such a hypothesis to explain alleged occurrences of a miraculous character cannot find a legitimate place within the order of nature.
2.
The proposition with which Dr. Mozley commences these Bampton Lectures, and for which he contends to