Several weeks later, Hermann Göring called all the Gauleiter to Berlin, in order to make clear his attitude regarding the incidents of the 9th and 10th. He was violently opposed to these individual acts of barbarism. He criticized them severely as unjust, as economically unreasonable and harmful to our prestige in foreign countries. The former Gauleiter, Dr. Uiberreither, who took part in this conference of Gauleiter, has already given further particulars on oath.
DR. STAHMER: Were you present at a conference which took place in the beginning of August 1939 at Soenke Nissen Koog near Husum?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes. I personally took part in that conference.
DR. STAHMER: Who was present there?
BODENSCHATZ: As far as I remember the following were present: Hermann Göring; Herr Dahlerus, from Stockholm; six to eight English economic experts, whose names I do not recall; I was present, and there was an interpreter, Ministerialrat Dr. Böcker.
DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us about the subject of this conference?
BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember it word for word, but as far as I can tell you Hermann Göring made the following statements . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, did the witness say where this conference took place?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you tell us where it was?
DR. STAHMER: [To the witness.] Please repeat where this conference took place.
BODENSCHATZ: The conference took place at the beginning of August at Soenke Nissen Koog near Husum, Schleswig-Holstein.
DR. STAHMER: Please continue. You were going to tell us about the subject of this conference.
BODENSCHATZ: I repeat, in substance, Göring made the following statement: At that moment relations between England and Germany were very tense. Under no circumstances should this tension be increased or peace be endangered. The welfare and the trade of our two countries could only flourish and prosper in peace. It was to the greatest interest of Germany and Europe that the British Empire should continue to exist. Göring emphasized that he himself would do his utmost for the maintenance of peace. He requested the British business leaders, on their return home, to use their influence in authoritative circles for that purpose.
DR. STAHMER: Did Göring give you his opinion on how the foreign policy of the Reich should be carried out? When and on what occasions did conversations take place?
BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring often discussed these topics with me, in 1938 and 1939, especially during the period following the Munich agreement. These conversations would take place perhaps in connection with a report, or perhaps in his special train. Hermann Göring was always of the opinion that the policy of the Reich must be directed in such a way as to avoid war if possible. Hermann Göring dealt with this topic at particularly great length in a conference with the Gauleiter in the summer of 1938 in Karinhall. Dr. Uiberreither, whom I have previously mentioned, has already given further sworn testimony to this effect.
DR. STAHMER: Did Field Marshal Göring speak to you before leaving for Munich in September 1938?
BODENSCHATZ: Before Hermann Göring left for Munich, he told me he would do everything within his power to effect a peaceful settlement. He said, “We cannot have war.” He exerted his influence on the Führer to this effect, and during the negotiations in Munich, he worked decisively for the preservation of peace. When he left the conference hall after the conference at Munich he said to us spontaneously, “That means peace.”
DR. STAHMER: Did he often discuss with you for what reason he was against a war, and on what occasions?
BODENSCHATZ: We talked about this topic very frequently. He always said to me:
“In the first World War as an infantry officer and as an air force officer I was constantly at the front. I know the horrors of a war, and, therefore, my attitude is to preserve the German people from these horrors if possible. My ambition is to solve conflicts peacefully.”
In general, his opinion was that war is always a risky and unsure business. Even if you win a war, the advantages are in no relation whatsoever to the disadvantages and sacrifices which have to be made. If you lose the war, then, in our position, everything is lost. Our generation has already experienced the horrors of a great World War and its bitter consequences. To expect the same generation to live through another war would be unthinkable.
I would like to add that Hermann Göring, according to his inner thoughts and character, was never in favor of war. Nothing was further from his mind than the thought of a war.
DR. STAHMER: Did Göring converse with you about what were, according to his wish, the aims to be accomplished by the rearmament which Germany had undertaken? When and on what occasion?
BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring spoke with me about these matters in the year 1935 after the Wehrfreiheit had been proclaimed. He described Germany’s rearmament, after vain attempts to achieve general limitation of armament, as an attempt at equality with the armament of other countries, in order to be able to collaborate with other powers in world politics with equal rights.
DR. STAHMER: Did conversations of this kind take place after 1935 also?
BODENSCHATZ: Yes. Now and then we resumed such conversations and he spoke in a similar vein.
DR. STAHMER: Did you find out through Reich Marshal Göring what purpose the Four Year Plan was to serve?
BODENSCHATZ: I happened to speak with Göring about this matter in the year 1936, and that was after the Four Year Plan had been announced. He explained it to me as follows: That in this plan he saw a means of securing for Germany those raw materials which she could not import in peacetime because of the lack of foreign exchange or whose import in an emergency might possibly be cut off.
DR. STAHMER: When and on what occasion did Göring give you his opinion on the Russian campaign?
BODENSCHATZ: Towards the end of 1941, after the first reverses in the Russian campaign, Hermann Göring talked with me about the fighting in the East. He said to me:
“Adolf Hitler foresaw a very hard battle in the East, but he did not count on such reverses. Before the beginning of this campaign I tried in vain to dissuade Adolf Hitler from his plan of attacking Russia. I reminded him that he himself, in his book Mein Kampf, was opposed to a war on two fronts and, in addition, I pointed out that the main forces of the German Luftwaffe would be occupied in the East, and England, whose air industry was hit, would breathe again and be able to recover.”
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off for 10 minutes?
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has observed that the witness is using notes whilst giving his evidence. The ruling which I announced this morning was confined to the defendants and did not extend to witnesses. Nevertheless, the Tribunal will allow the same rule to be applied to witnesses. But the evidence must not be read, the purpose of the rule being merely to assist recollection in giving evidence.
[Turning to Dr. Stahmer.]
Yes, Dr. Stahmer.
DR. STAHMER: Do you know whether people turned to the Reich Marshal with the request that their relatives should be freed from concentration camps or to help them in their difficulties with the Gestapo?
BODENSCHATZ: The Chief of Staff is the person who can answer that question. I myself only heard that such requests were made to the Reich Marshal.
DR. STAHMER: Did you not have to deal with such requests in the military section?
BODENSCHATZ: In the military section I had to deal with the requests which were concerned with the Luftwaffe. But they were only requests regarding the arrests of German citizens who stated that they had not been given the reason for their arrest. We also received communications regarding detention, grievances, and also regarding arrests of