Foreign Butterflies. James Matthews Duncan. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: James Matthews Duncan
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evidence, because he might otherwise imagine that we had merely omitted the illustrations for the sake of brevity; but the plain truth is, that there were no examples to be found, and when Lamarck talks of ‘the efforts of internal sentiment,’ ‘the influence of subtile fluids,’ and the ‘acts of organization,’ as causes whereby animals and plants may acquire new organs, he gives us names for things, and with a disregard of the strict rules of induction, resorts to fictions, as ideal as the ‘plastic virtue,’ and other phantoms of the middle ages.

      “It is evident, that if some well authenticated facts could have been adduced to establish one complete step in the process of transformation, such as the appearance in individuals descending from a common stock, of a sense or organ entirely new, and a complete disappearance of some other enjoyed by their progenitors, that time alone might then be supposed sufficient to bring about any amount of metamorphosis. The gratuitous assumption, therefore, of a point so vital to the theory of transmutation, was unpardonable on the part of its advocate9.”

      The transmutability of species is a point which has been maintained by many naturalists besides Lamarck, and the reasons they have adduced in support of their opinions are so various, that the full consideration of them would be inconsistent with our present purpose. It may be assumed as capable of most satisfactory proof, that the mutations which species undergo in accommodating themselves to a change of external circumstances, have a definite limit, and are regulated by constant laws; and that the capability of so varying, forms part of the specific character. Indefinite divergence from the original type is guarded against, in the case of intermixture of distinct species, by the sterility of the mule offspring; circumstances which show that species were designed to retain the individuality of character with which they were endowed at the time of their creation, and that they have a real existence in nature10.

      The intellectual faculties of animals, Lamarck regards as entirely the result of organization. Even in the case of the most perfect of them, the human species, there is no distinct recognition of a spiritual substance derived from heaven; and all intellectual phenomena whatever, are ascribed to some physical cause. Nature, he conceives, offers nothing cognizable by us but body; the movements, changes, and properties of bodies, form the only field open to our observation, and the only source of real knowledge and useful truths11. The place of the soul seems to be usurped by a certain interior sentiment, to which he continually refers, as exercising a most powerful influence over all the faculties, and giving rise to all the passions and affections12. Thus the noblest faculties of the mind, “the capability and godlike reason,” by which we are distinguished from other animals, ——and this spirit, This all-pervading, this all-conscious soul, This particle of energy divine, Which travels nature, flies from star to star, And visits gods, and emulates their powers; are made to emanate from a certain relation of parts and organs—a particular conformation of material substances, just as a desired result is obtained by arranging in a certain order the parts of a piece of mechanism.

      “But who can believe that such a faculty, so divine, so godlike and spiritual, can be the mere result of organization? That any juxta-position of material molecules, of whatsoever nature, from whatever source derived, in whatever order and forms arranged, and wherever placed, could generate thought, and reflection, and reasoning powers, could acquire and store up ideas and notions, as well concerning metaphysical as physical essences, may as safely be pronounced impossible, as that matter and spirit should be homogeneous. Though the intellectual part acts by the brain and nerves, yet the brain and nerves, however ample, however developed, are not the intellect, nor an intellectual substance, but only its instrument, fitted for the passage of the prime messenger of the soul, its nervous fluid or power to every motive organ. It is a substance calculated to convey instantaneously that subtile agent, by which spirit can act upon body, wherever the soul bids it to go and enables it to act. When death separates the intellectual and the spiritual from the material part, the introduction of a fluid, homogeneous with the nervous, or related to it by a galvanic battery, can put the nerves in action, lift the eyelids, move the limbs; but though the action of the intellectual part may thus be imitated, in newly deceased persons, still there are no signs of returning intelligence, there is no life, no voluntary action, not a trace of the spiritual agent that has been summoned from its dwelling. Whence it follows, that though the organization is that by which the intellectual and governing power manifests its presence and habitation, still it is evidently something distinct from and independent of it13.”

      With opinions having such a decided tendency to materialism, it is not surprising that Lamarck seldom makes allusion to a Deity, and when he does so, he nearly confines himself to the bare acknowledgment of his existence. In his earlier works, there is no mention made of a Supreme Being whatever; and even when his existence is admitted, He is divested of the attributes which belong to him. The glory of forming the works of creation, in which His beneficence and power are so signally manifested, is ascribed to nature, or a certain order of things. This power to which the Deity has delegated his prerogatives, and which he has appointed his vicegerent, Lamarck defines as “An order of things composed of objects independent of matter, which are determined by the observation of bodies, and the whole amount of which constitutes a power, unalterable in its essence, governed in all its acts, and constantly acting upon all the parts of the physical universe14.” This blind power, which acts necessarily, has not, indeed, called matter into existence, but it has formed all bodies of which matter is essentially the base; and as it exercises no power except on the latter, which it modifies and changes in every possible manner, producing all its various aggregates and combinations, we may be assured that it is it which has made all bodies such as we now behold them, and that it is Nature which confers on some their properties, and on others the faculties which they exercise15. All this power Lamarck distinctly admits has been delegated to Nature by the Deity, and among other errors which he conceives to have attached to the ideas which have been entertained regarding Nature, he refutes the notion that Nature is the Deity himself. “Strange occurrence! that the watch should have been confounded with its maker, the work with its author. Assuredly this idea is illogical and unfit to be maintained. The power which has created Nature, has, without doubt, no limits, cannot be restricted in its will or made subject to others, and is independent of all law. It alone can change Nature and her laws, and even annihilate them; and although we have no positive knowledge of this great object, the idea which we thus form of the Almighty Power, is at least the most suitable for man to entertain of the Divinity, when he can raise his thoughts to the contemplation of him. If Nature were an intelligence, it could exercise volition, and change its laws, or rather there could be no law. Finally, if Nature were God, its will would be independent, its acts unconstrained; but this is not the case; it is, on the contrary, continually subject to constant laws, over which it has no power: it hence follows, that although its means are infinitely diversified and inexhaustible, it acts always in the same manner in the same circumstances, without the power of acting otherwise16.”

      While thus admitting the existence of the Deity, any direct interference in the affairs of the universe is wholly denied to him. His sovereignty is reduced to a mere nominal supremacy, as he is supposed to take no care or thought for the worlds which he authorized or permitted to be created, and can have no sympathy for the creatures which inhabit them. As with La Place, and so many other philosophers of the French school, every thing is ascribed to secondary causes, which are made to usurp the place and attributes of the Divinity. Lamarck’s deity, therefore, is the exact counterpart of the god of Epicurus, whose being is allowed seemingly more for the purpose of giving consistency to a theory, or a compliance with generally received opinions, than from any urgent conviction of his reality; and we may justly apply to him what was said of the Grecian philosopher; Re tollit, oratione relinquit Deum.

      It has been already mentioned, that Lamarck’s attention was early directed to meteorology, and it seems long to have continued to form one of his most favourite studies. So comparatively limited is our positive knowledge of atmospheric phenomena, that a careful investigation of them afforded the prospect of new and important discoveries; while the endless variety of appearances which they present, and the complicated influences which operate in producing them, offered a wide and interesting field for the exercise of that speculative kind of inquiry which Lamarck loved to indulge. With his usual facility in such matters, he was not long in