A protracted drag on external trade?
Prior to the crisis, globalisation was at a standstill. The reasons for the halt in the ascent of globalisation are numerous: fears stemming from the global financial crisis, the trade war between the United States and China, the maturing of the Chinese economy, the limits to manufacturing growth and the stronger development of services, and receding multilateralism. As a result, the GDP-to-external-trade ratio had flattened somewhat since 2008, as shown in Figure 4.
The COVID-19 crisis may further dampen the long-term prospects for external trade. With the crisis, firms have taken on-board the need to increase the resilience of their production chains. They have started rethinking their global value chains, no longer focusing simply on maximising returns but also looking at how they can reduce risks by increasing the strength of their networks. Governments are also likely to take on greater weight in the post-pandemic economy with increased public spending, partly to reinforce healthcare systems (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2020b). Finally, countries may reallocate the production of products deemed strategic to guarantee national independence (medicines and health equipment for instance).
What impact will the pandemic have on globalisation vs. regionalisation? How will the rethinking of resilience vs. cost change global supply chains? Bonadio et al. (2020) estimate that the impact of foreign lockdowns accounted for one-third of the total pandemic-related contraction in global GDP. However, the immediate impact of the crisis on the redefinition of supply chains appears to be limited, as it takes a lot of time and effort to find different suppliers of comparable quality. Car manufacturers, for example, cannot simply move from China to another country with low labour costs and expect to find manufacturers of, say, airbags that can meet the same quality standards quickly.
The COVID-19 crisis, however, will have a permanent impact. It is magnifying the effects of existing mega-trends: the new industrial revolution, growing economic nationalism and the drive for sustainability. The extent of the COVID-19 crisis’s disruption to working practices and behaviour patterns seems substantial. Companies have accelerated the digitalisation of their supply chains and customer channels, and many are moving faster in adopting artificial intelligence and automation. Other changes in the workforce are also afoot.
The pandemic may accelerate longer-term shifts toward shorter and less fragmented value chains (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2020b). Industry 4.0 is pushing the move towards automation and smart technologies in manufacturing and industrial processes (Baldwin, 2019), along with growing economic nationalism and the need to make human activity more environmentally sustainable and less resource dependent. These trends are set to reduce gross trade in the global value chain, limiting the circulation of intermediate inputs and final products in the medium term. These trends will also lead to further concentration in the value added in certain geographic areas. As another consequence, production will shift from global to regional and sub-regional value chains. Automation and reshoring will see an upswing to increase flexibility and reduce the risks that firms face during a global shock. These trends are driven by considerations related to the resilience and robustness of supply chains, not national protectionism.
Maintaining cross-border transport infrastructure is key to ensuring good conditions for the economic recovery. Much-reduced mobility has put transport infrastructure at risk. The air transport of passengers and goods is a core component of the world’s economy. According to Airport Council International, traffic at Europe’s airports decreased by 73% in September 2020 compared to a year earlier. More than one-quarter of Europe’s airports are at risk of insolvency if passenger traffic does not start to recover by the end of 2020. While these airports are mainly regional, larger airports are affected too. The sudden spike in their debt levels – an additional EUR 16 billion for the top 20 European airports – represents 60% of their average debt in a given year. Internal transport infrastructure is also at risk. According to Eurostat, the number of rail passengers was cut in half in the majority of EU Member States in the second quarter of 2020, compared with the same quarter a year earlier.[1]
Protecting the single market and reducing the spillover of negative effects
European economies are more open than other advanced economies. Export dependence, defined as the share of exports and imports to GDP, is above 66% in Germany and higher than 40% in France (Figure 5). Overall, external trade in goods and services accounts for 27% of euro area GDP, a share that rises to 45% when including trade among EU members. The European economy is therefore highly integrated and maintaining cross-border movement is key to its functioning, more so than elsewhere in the world. Regions located close to borders also rely heavily on commuting foreign workers to function (Figure 6). Taking into account the implications of cross-border mobility restrictions is therefore of paramount importance, and the corresponding policies must be developed at the European, and not just the local, level. A major risk is that uncoordinated lockdowns lead to repeated virus outbreaks and, in turn, further lockdowns across Europe, resulting in steeper declines in GDP (Kohlscheen et al., 2020).
Figure 5
External trade in goods in EU economies (% GDP, 2019)
Source: EIB Economics Department calculations based on Eurostat.
Note: Last record 2019.
Guaranteeing a level playing field and preventing increased divergence within Europe are essential. Given asymmetries in financial conditions, the European single market is at risk and widening disparities should be avoided. In Figure 7, we correlate the decline in GDP with GDP per capita for EU economies. While EU countries have been affected to different extents – the decline in GDP following the first wave ranged from zero to 14% – the impact is unrelated to countries’ relative wealth. It would have been reasonable to expect the capacity of hospitals and health services to be related to income per capita, with poorer countries less able to provide medical assistance and therefore implementing longer and more stringent lockdown policies to prevent the rapid saturation of the medical system. While this factor may have played a role, many others were also at issue. Ultimately, and fortunately, the magnitude of the shock was unrelated to the level of economic development. Preventing a widening of divergences in Europe after the pandemic will be critical.
Figure 6
Cross-border workers (country of work, thousands, 2018)
Source: European Commission, 2019 Report on intra-EU Labour Mobility.
Figure 7
EU economies: Income per capita and ouput decline during the first wave
Source: Eurostat and EIB calculations.
Note: Last record, October 2020.
A strong EU response is needed to avoid second-round effects and negative spillovers.