The official letters of Captains Hilyar and Porter agree substantially in all respects; the details of the fight, as seen in the Essex, are found in the "Life of Farragut." But although the British captain does full justice to his foe, British historians have universally tried to belittle Porter's conduct. It is much to be regretted that we have no British account worth paying attention to of the proceedings before the fight, when the Phoebe declined single combat with the Essex. James, of course, states that the Phoebe did not decline it, but he gives no authority, and his unsupported assertion would be valueless even if uncontradicted. His account of the action is grossly inaccurate as he has inexcusably garbled Hilyar's report. One instance of this I have already mentioned, as regards Hilyar's account of Porter's loss. Again, Hilyar distinctly states that the Essex was twice on fire, yet James (p. 418) utterly denies this, thereby impliedly accusing the British captain of falsehood. There is really no need of the corroboration of Porter's letter, but he has it most fully in the "Life of Farragut," p. 37: "The men came rushing up from below, many with their clothes burning, which were torn from them as quickly as possible, and those for whom this could not be done were told to jump overboard and quench the flames. * * * One man swam to shore with scarcely a square inch of his body which had not been burned, and, although he was deranged for some days, he ultimately recovered, and afterward served with me in the West Indies." The third unfounded statement in James' account is that buckets of spirits were found in all parts of the main deck of the Essex, and that most of the prisoners were drunk. No authority is cited for this, and there is not a shadow of truth in it. He ends by stating that "few even in his own country will venture to speak well of Captain David Porter." After these various paragraphs we are certainly justified in rejecting James' account in toto. An occasional mistake is perfectly excusable, and gross ignorance of a good many facts does not invalidate a man's testimony with regard to some others with which he is acquainted; but a wilful and systematic perversion of the truth in a number of cases throws a very strong doubt on a historian's remaining statements, unless they are supported by unquestionable authority.
But if British historians have generally given Porter much less than his due, by omitting all reference to the inferiority of his guns, his lost top-mast, etc., it is no worse than Americans have done in similar cases. The latter, for example, will make great allowances in the case of the Essex for her having carronades only, but utterly fail to allude to the Cyane and Levant as having suffered under the same disadvantage. They should remember that the rules cut both ways.
The Essex having suffered chiefly above the waterline, she was repaired sufficiently in Valparaiso to enable her to make the voyage to England, where she was added to the British navy. The Essex Junior was disarmed and the American prisoners embarked in her for New York, on parole. But Lieutenant McKnight, Chaplain Adams, Midshipman Lyman, and 11 seamen were exchanged on the spot for some of the British prisoners on board the Essex Junior. McKnight and Lyman accompanied the Phoebe to Rio Janeiro, where they embarked on a Swedish vessel, were taken out of her by the Wasp, Captain Blakely, and were lost with the rest of the crew of that vessel. The others reached New York in safety. Of the prizes made by the Essex, some were burnt or sunk by the Americans, and some retaken by the British. And so, after nearly two years' uninterrupted success, the career of the Essex terminated amid disasters of all kinds. But at least her officers and crew could reflect that they had afforded an example of courage in adversity that it would be difficult to match elsewhere.
The first of the new heavy sloops of war that got to sea was the Frolic, Master Commandant Joseph Bainbridge, which put out early in February. Shortly afterward she encountered a large Carthagenian privateer, which refused to surrender and was sunk by a broadside, nearly a hundred of her crew being drowned. Before daylight on the 20th of April, lat. 24° 12' N., long. 81° 25' W., she fell in with the British 36-gun frigate Orpheus, Capt. Pigot, and the 12-gun schooner Shelburne, Lieut. Hope, both to leeward. The schooner soon weathered the Frolic, but of course was afraid to close, and the American sloop continued beating to windward, in the effort to escape, for nearly 13 hours; the water was started, the anchors cut away, and finally the guns thrown overboard—a measure by means of which both the Hornet, the Rattlesnake, and the Adams succeeded in escaping under similar circumstances,—but all was of no avail, and she was finally captured. The court of inquiry honorably acquitted both officers and crew. As was to be expected James considers the surrender a disgraceful one, because the guns were thrown overboard. As I have said, this was a measure which had proved successful in several cases of a like nature; the criticism is a piece of petty meanness. Fortunately we have Admiral Codrington's dictum on the surrender ("Memoirs," vol. 1, p. 310), which he evidently considered as perfectly honorable.
A sister ship to the Frolic, the Peacock, Capt. Lewis Warrington, sailed from New York on March 12th, and cruised southward; on the 28th of April, at seven in the morning, lat. 17° 47' N., long. 80° 7' W., several sail were made to windward. 270 These were a small convoy of merchant-men, bound for the Bermudas, under the protection of the 18-gun brig-sloop Epervier, Capt. Wales, 5 days out of Havana, and with $118,000 in specie on board. 271 The Epervier when discovered was steering north by east, the wind being from the eastward; soon afterward the wind veered gradually round to the southward, and the Epervier hauled up close on the port tack, while the convoy made all sail away, and the Peacock came down with the wind on her starboard quarter. At 10 A.M. the vessels were within gun-shot, and the Peacock edged away to get in a raking broadside, but the Epervier frustrated this by putting her helm up until close on her adversary's bow, when she rounded to and fired her starboard guns, receiving in return the starboard broadside of the Peacock at 10.20 A.M. These first broadsides took effect aloft, the brig being partially dismantled, while the Peacock's fore-yard was totally disabled by two round shot in the starboard quarter, which deprived the ship of the use of her fore-sail and fore-top-sail, and compelled her to run large. However, the Epervier eased away 272 when abaft her foe's beam, and ran off alongside of her (using her port guns, while the American still had the starboard battery engaged) at 10.35. The Peacock's fire was now very hot, and directed chiefly at her adversary's hull, on which it told heavily, while she did not suffer at all in return. The Epervier coming up into the wind, owing somewhat to the loss of head-sail, Capt. Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, but they refused, saying "she's too heavy for us," 273 and then, at 11.05 the colors were hauled down.
Except the injury to her fore-yard, the Peacock's damages were confined to the loss of a few top-mast and top-gallant backstays, and some shot-holes through her sails. Of her crew, consisting, all told, of 166 men and boys, 274 only two were wounded, both slightly. The Epervier, on the other hand, had 45 shot-holes in her hull, 5 feet of water in her hold, main-top-mast over the side, main-mast nearly in two, main-boom shot away, bowsprit wounded severely, and most of the fore-rigging and stays shot away; and of her crew of 128 men (according to the list of prisoners given by Captain Warrington; James says 118, but he is not backed up by any official report) 9 were killed and mortally wounded, and 14 severely and slightly wounded. Instead of two long sixes for bow-chasers, and a shifting carronade, she had two 18-pound carronades (according to the American prize-lists; 275 Capt. Warrington says 32's). Otherwise she was armed as usual. She was, like the rest of her kind, very "tubby," being as broad as the Peacock, though 10 feet shorter on deck. Allowing, as usual, 7 per cent, for short weight of the American shot, we get the
That is, the relative force being as 12 is to 10, the relative execution done was as 12 is to 1, and the Epervier surrendered before she had lost a fifth of her crew. The case of the Epervier closely resembles that of the Argus. In both cases the officers behaved finely; in both cases, too, the victorious foe was heavier, in about the same proportion, while neither the crew of the Argus, nor the crew of the Epervier fought with the