The global politics of the post-Cold War world illuminated a general trend of new communication patterns: civilizations with similar cultures were coming together, and those with different cultures were coming apart. Alliances were built across similar cultural lines, and conflicts emerged because of cultural and ideological differences that seemed to be amplified with the passage of time.25 In this context, the on-going conflict between Russia and Ukraine has highlighted the differences between these two civilizations that appear to be substantial and, thus, their clash seems to be logical and inevitable. As a militarily competitor that is stronger than Ukraine, Russia attempts to redraw political boundaries that should coincide with its cultural boundaries, real or imagined. This can only be accomplished from a position of force, as regionalism has never been an accurate term that would ultimately assume or condition the cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. “Regions are geographical not political or cultural entities,”26 and volatile and turbulent relations between these two states have been shaped by shared geography but different histories, having produced a phenomenon of two different cultures and civilizations that contest shared geography and reject volitional cooperation.
Putin’s 2014 attack against Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and Russian intense non-conventional warfare largely dissolved multiple identities in Ukraine and crystallized the most important and meaningful identity among the Ukrainians, associated with concepts such as solidarity and unity necessary for the defense of Ukraine against Russian aggression. Putinism exacerbated the identity differences between these two states, pulling them further apart and creating the foundation for a multi-generational enduring conflict and the human casualties it causes.
Huntington’s civilizational approach helps us better understand the vector and the severity of Russian active measures in Ukraine and beyond. Most importantly, checking the blind spot and learning more about the cultural and often irreconcilable differences among civilizations might enhance our ability to recognize a narrative that motivates “subverters” to launch a hybrid or disinformation war against those who advance competing narratives and discourses. In other words, for diagnostic purposes, it is necessary to learn in depth the cultural histories of entities involved in a conflict and to go beyond an analysis of the intelligence aspect of their national and transnational histories, international relations, and foreign policies.
This volume is a step in this direction. This collection of essays written by scholars and specialists in intelligence studies and Soviet/Russian history, culture, and politics illuminates the multifaceted nature and the broad geographic mosaic of Russian active measures. The focal point is Ukraine. The violent lawlessness of Russia’s 2014 covert operation in Crimea, “accompanied by a blizzard of Russian denials and false flags,” opened a “new era of global information warfare, in which countries and non-state actors use social media and disinformation to create their own narratives and undermine anyone who opposes them.”27 Ukraine’s case is most instructive and classic for those who would like to study Soviet/Russian active measures and political warfare in its terrain and beyond.28 The range of Soviet/Russian special operations and subversive practices in Ukraine has been all-encompassing since the Cold War era. Historical studies and analyses of the most current events in Ukraine, including its territories occupied by Russia-backed separatists, such as the Donbas, will offer readers a glimpse into Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns that prepare the space for potential covert operations and a military take-over. They reveal a wide array of tactics and practices used by Russian intelligence, from disinformation to memory wars, and the use of paramilitary forces (the “little green men” in Crimea who were Russian Spetsnaz) and cyber technology. Many scholars have emphasized that “re-historicizing interpretations of active measures through the lens of Russian/Soviet history is a necessary prerequisite to contemporary analysis of similar Russian activities,”29 and this volume is an attempt to observe Russian psychological warfare through historical and philosophical lenses.
The studies included in this collection demonstrate with absolute clarity that Russia’s historical and philosophical traditions, and its new nationalist ideology underpin and inform a variety of influence campaigns in contemporary Ukraine, Italy, Sweden, France, and Estonia, accentuating the evolution of Russian active measures and revealing that today they target not only people’s minds but also technologies and the state’s governmental infrastructure.30 The proactive nature of these campaigns and Putin’s expansionism (a desire to extend Russia’s influence and its borders) are analyzed by exploring the extent of Russia’s cultural connections overseas and its infiltration of Western academia and cultural establishments. Through thorough research, the contributors of this collection have shown that, building a cyber and conventional army and coopting Russian and foreign journalists, scholars, and politicians, Putin ultimately has built a reputation of a powerful and invincible leader of a new Russian state, a supersized KGB/FSB/SVR/GRU entity that solves foreign policy and diplomacy issues through force, bullying, and intimidation. The most frequently used rhetoric emanating from the Kremlin offices, such as the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, include an emphasis on Russian “mirror actions” in response to the “aggressive Western alliances’ behavior.” A Russian narrative with a traditional binary model encompassing “us” vs “them” which is instrumental in Russian disinformation campaigns (Russia as a victim that resists Ukrainian nationalists and neo-fascists, as well as Western pressure) is effectively deconstructed and exposed by several authors in this collection.
Ironically, Russian history that helps us better understand the nature and the roots of active measures is being actively rewritten in the Russian Federation under Putin and by Putin himself.31 On 18 June 2020, The National Interest published an essay written by Putin in which he reassesses the meaning of the 1938 Munich conference, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the Yalta Conference. The studies included in this collection highlight the toxic nature of Russian memory politics that is capable of obscuring narratives other than Russian and of coopting Russian and Western historians. In this context, it became clear that one has to learn Russian history through more objective sources and studies, conceived and published outside the heavily censored and ideologically guarded space of the Russian Federation, not under the patronage of its current political leadership. Importantly, as several studies in this collection argue, Russian history should be studied through national historical narratives produced in Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, and other states of post-Soviet space. They help observe a shared goal of Russian active measures and memory wars that create a space for uncertainty and doubt about the truth, discouraging and preventing individuals and states from pursuing it. This space is unattended, unregulated, and ungoverned. As Shane Harris has noted, ungoverned spaces eventually fall apart,32 or are filled by another force that typically establishes its own regulations and rules that help control its narrative. Whoever controls information and whoever controls the narrative has power, and as Soviet/Russian history has demonstrated, power is a paramount consideration and concern in the Russian civilization.
Today, the world cannot complain that there is a lack of information. On the contrary, an ordinary consumer is crushed by information from all sides. Richard Stengel reminded us that the U.S. Library of Congress alone has 39 million books.33