Several aspects of Germany’s political culture may serve as pieces in the puzzle of the recent right-wing upheavals in the guise of Pegida and anti-asylum marches in East Germany as well as the overall rise of the populist AfD. However, there are at least just as many pieces that fail to fit in this puzzle: Although 25 years after unification Germans still lag behind their European neighbours when it comes to national pride, over the last few years they are constantly making up ground: Germany is currently becoming a typical EU state. What is more, trust in fellow citizens and in political institutions is growing, too – even though with differences between the “regulative” and “party-dominated sphere”. Third, democracy as a whole is considered to be highly legitimate, with genuinely autocratic alternatives being far from widely popular. Finally, considering all aspects, political-cultural differences between East and West are noticeably decreasing – particularly through generational change.
What, then, explains the recently growing unrest? We see stupendous knowledge gaps, misunderstandings, and unrealistic expectations concerning parliamentarian democracy (especially in view of the necessity of political bargaining, the principle of representation, the crucial role of interests and lobbying as a cornerstone of democratic pluralism). All this facilitates illegitimate normative yardsticks as well as reservations about the values and institutions of constitutional democracy – be it that political extremists (esp. from the right) are a priori denied their participation rights (whereas left-wing extremists are not); be it that political propositions, such as the rule of experts, that allure with allegedly rational and objective politics, grow in popularity (the same, by the way, holds true for direct democracy which is also frequently brought into position against the putative failures of representative democracy).
All this speaks for the continuous spreading of vehement reservations about several elements of constitutional democracy. Elections as well as checks and balances themselves are presumably excluded from this development, but the application of participation rights, the principles of the rule of law1 as well several democratic procedural functions are not. What is gaining ground is not the classical denial of the democratic constitutional core or “extremism”, as we know it from the 20th century, but a certain “democratic scepticism”. It accepts the democratic “skeleton” (institutions) but it is at odds with its “flesh” (several procedural principles): the free mandate, lobbying, candid political controversy, pressure-group politics, and compromise solutions.
In the long run this scepticism appears to be one of the major threats to democracy as we know it, as it could alter the institutions of constitutional democracy for the worse. In the short run, it is the perceived pressure of political conformity that could damage democracy as it profits parties such as the AfD, which create the image of a taboo-buster and ventilate dubious conceptions of democracy. What is the relationship of these political-cultural developments and the recent right-wing upheaval? To cut a long story short: The mentioned developments have paved their way in the East first – just where right-wing populism has gained a foothold.
This has, of course, to do with the past before 1989/90: the socialist-authoritarian legacy in the minds, the survival of paternalistic attitudes, the lack of democratic experience, the political, social, and economic side effects of East Germany’s transformation in the 1990s. At the same time, it would be an illegitimate oversimplification to exclusively blame the socialist past for making it hard for democratic values and tolerance to immigrants to strike roots in East Germany’s political culture. There is a second factor that comes in when we talk about the attitudes towards cultural diversity, xenophobia und pluralism. And that is the substantial lack of intercultural contacts in the East: Up to the present day the share of people with a migrant background is significantly lower in the East than in the West. The roots of this – again – trace back to the time before 1989. The democratic West not only allowed immigrants to settle in Germany but promoted this kind of labour migration already in the 1950s in order to stimulate what later has become the economic miracle of post-war Germany. The socialist East instead restricted migration to the ideologically necessary minimum with socialist countries (e. g. Vietnam). What is more, it made sure to rigorously segregate the autochthonous populace from the migrants and to provide for their outbound passage. As we know from a range of sociological studies, in the long run nothing reduces racist prejudices and resentments so sustainably as intercultural contacts. From another perspective: There is no better soil for xenophobia than the enduring absence of contacts with strangers.
All in all, this tells us that although a great deal has been achieved 25 years after re-unification, it will take some time before all political-cultural differences between East and West fade away, especially regarding attitudes towards immigrants. The current political challenges such as the rise of the AfD, Pegida and anti-asylum marches are nothing but a direct result of the clash of East German political culture with the current refugee crisis. This challenge will certainly not disappear overnight, which is why politicians would be well-advised not to rail against East Germany every time people rally against refugees and their camps. Such a strategy would strengthen their sentiment of being forgotten by the political class as well as their disenchantment with politics. Instead, politicians should try to seriously attend to the matters of the people, to their anti-immigrant claims, to their racism. That does not mean these demands should be implemented, but rather listened to. A people cannot be expected to become open-minded, pluralistic, and unprejudiced by choice from one day to another. A cursory look at the political elite’s reactions of the last months, however, does not put one in an overly optimistic mood. Pegida and AfD’s offerings close a representational gap in the political system: A considerable amount of citizens does not feel represented by “their” parties and politicians any longer. The recent refugee crises certainly did not evoke this gap, but it brought this gap into the minds of many and was the final straw.
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