The American War in Vietnam. John Marciano

tyrannical Communist powers, aiming to expand throughout the world, were behind the Vietnamese independence struggle. “The Communist powers did not even attempt to use the Geneva Accords as a framework” to work out a “creative diplomatic compromise” with the United States that might have “avoided the use of force in South Vietnam.” They knew that as the dominant power, the United States would resist any compromise. Over the next twenty years, Washington was to prove this contention true, as it refused to engage in serious negotiations regarding the war in Vietnam until forced to do so after the Tet Offensive in early 1968. It is now clear, Porter argues, that Secretary of State Dulles’s “hard line against any diplomatic compromise in Geneva … [was] aimed primarily at reinforcing Soviet and Chinese fears that the U.S. might continue the war if the Geneva settlement was not acceptable to Washington.”⁴¹

      When it came to the critical years of the Geneva Agreements and aftermath, including the rise of the brutal Diem regime set up by the United States, the following summary by Noam Chomsky bears repeating and reflection: “The record is quote clear that the Viet Minh … accepted the Geneva Accords in good faith and made a serious effort to initiate discussions that would lead to the elections promised in 1956.” Diem’s regime, however, “took advantage” of this effort and engaged in “an extensive repression in which thousands were killed and tens of thousands imprisoned. By 1959 a good part of the former Viet Minh political structure had been wiped out.”⁴²