The Dark Ages. David Hume

enlarged.71 But the problem of sterile lands appears now to have become more acute than ever. This grave difficulty perpetually solicited the care and defied the statesmanship of the Imperial government. Farms were constantly falling out of cultivation through the impoverishment of their owners or the deficiency of labour. The heavy public burdens, aggravated by the oppression of officials, reduced many of the small struggling farmers to bankruptcy. This would have meant a considerable loss to the revenue, in the natural course of things, and the problem for the government was to avoid this loss by making others suffer for the unfortunate defaulters. For this purpose the small properties of the free farmers of a commune were regarded as a fiscal unity, liable for the total sum of the fiscal assessments of its members;72 and when for any cause one property ceased to be solvent, the others were required to make good the deficiency. This addition to their proper contributions was known as an epibole.73 In the case of larger estates, which were not included in a commune, if one part became unproductive, the whole estate remained liable for the tax as originally estimated.74 But a difficulty rose when parts of such an estate were sold or when it was divided among several heirs. Notwithstanding the division it was still treated as a fiscal unity, and if one of the proprietors became insolvent the government was determined that the deficiency should be made good by other portions of the original estate.75 But there was a considerable difference of opinion as to the apportionment of the epibole in such a case. Should the whole estate be liable, or should the sterile property be annexed, along with its obligations, to the productive land in its immediate neighbourhood? The former solution would have assimilated the treatment of these estates to the lands of the communes. It is not clear what method was applied before the sixth century. We only know that the epibole in the two cases was not the same. In the reign of Anastasius an attempt seems to have been made to break down the distinction, and to have been successfully opposed by the Praetorian Prefect Zoticus (A.D. 511-512).76 Perhaps he defined the general method of dealing with sterile lands which was developed in the following reign by the Praetorian Prefect Demosthenes (A.D. 520-524).77 The most important points in this ruling were, that the provincial governor was empowered to decide in each case on whom the epibole should fall; that the unproductive land, with all that appertained to it, including the colons, should be transferred to those who were made liable for its burdens; and that this liability should be determined not by proximity, but by the history of the property.

      The result of the economical policy of Anastasius and his financial reforms was that he not only saved the State from the bankruptcy which had threatened it, but, at his death, left in the treasury what in those days was a large reserve, amounting to 320,000 pounds of gold (about £14,590,000).78 His strict control of expenditure made him extremely unpopular with the official classes whose pockets suffered, and his saving policy, which probably included a great reduction of the expenses of the court, did not endear him to the nobles and ladies accustomed to the pageants and pleasures of Byzantine festivals. He was accused of avarice and stinginess, vices for which the men of Dyrrhachium, his native place, had a bad repute.79 This accusation was unjust, and can be refuted by the admissions of one of the writers who report it.80 Personally Anastasius was generous and open-handed; he seldom sent any petitioners empty away; and several instances of his liberality to individuals are recorded. His “parsimonious resourcefulness,” stigmatised by his successor Justin,81 was entirely in the interests of the State; and the general tenor of his policy was to finance the Empire by economy in expenditure, and not to increase, but rather to reduce, the public burdens.82 This feature of his administration corresponded to his character. Though resolute and energetic, he was distinguished, like Nerva, by his mildness.

      Et mitem Nervam lenissima pectora vincunt.83

      If he had not held heretical opinions, historians would have had little but praise for the Emperor Anastasius.

      It remains to mention his useful monetary reform. For a long time past the general public had suffered great inconvenience through the bad quality of the copper money in circulation. It consisted of coins of very small denomination with no marks of value. Anastasius introduced a large copper follis, equivalent to forty sesterces, with smaller coins of the value of twenty, ten, and five sesterces, each clearly marked by a letter showing the value.84 This mintage was a great practical benefit, and must have been highly appreciated by the poorer citizens.

      He was always ready to spend money on useful public works. Besides the Long Wall of Thrace, he constructed a canal in Bithynia connecting the Gulf of Nicomedia with Lake Sophon, and thus realised an old project of the younger Pliny. Liberal sums were always forthcoming to repair injuries caused by war, to assist towns which were damaged by earthquake, to cleanse harbours, to build aqueducts or baths.85

      § 4. The Rebellion of Vitalian86 and the Death of Anastasius (A.D. 513-518)

      Partly through his religious policy and partly through his public economy Anastasius failed to secure the goodwill of various classes of his subjects; his unpopularity increased in the later years of his reign; and it was not surprising that an ambitious soldier should conceive the hope of dethroning him. Vitalian held the post of Count of the Federates, who were stationed in Thrace, and these troops now consisted chiefly of Bulgarians.87 The immediate pretext for his revolt was the conduct of Hypatius, the Master of Soldiers in Thrace, whom the Federates regarded as responsible for depriving them of the provisions to whom they were entitled. But Vitalian claimed to be more than merely the leader of aggrieved soldiers.88 He pretended to represent the religious discontent, to voice orthodox indignation at the new form of the Trisagion, and to champion the cause of the deposed Patriarch Flavian who was his personal friend, and the deposed Patriarch Macedonius. Vitalian was a man of exceptionally small stature and afflicted with a stammer; his enemies acknowledged his courage and cunning in war.

      Hypatius seems to have been unpopular with the army. In A.D. 51389 Vitalian, by stratagem, compassed the death of two of the chief officers of the general’s staff; gained over to his side the Duke of Lower Moesia; and then, capturing Carinus, a trusted friend of Hypatius, granted him his life on condition that he should help him to seize Odessus. Hypatius, unable to cope with the situation, withdrew to Constantinople. The rebel reinforced his Federate troops by a multitude of rustics, and, at the head of 50,000 men (it is said), advanced to Constantinople, hoping that the populace of the capital would rally to him as the champion of orthodoxy.

      The Emperor commanded bronze crosses to be set up over the gates of the city, with inscriptions setting forth his own view of the cause of the rebellion.90 He reduced by one-quarter the tax on the import of live stock for the inhabitants of Bithynia and Asia, in order to secure the loyalty of these provinces. The military authorities made what arrangements they could to meet the sudden crisis. When Vitalian occupied the suburbs and appeared before the walls, Patricius, Master of Soldiers in praesenti, who had won distinction in the Persian war and had considerably helped the advancement of Vitalian, was sent to confer with the rebel. Vitalian explained the purpose of his resort to arms. He was determined to rectify the injustices committed by Hypatius, and to obtain the ratification of the orthodox theological creed. He and his chief officers were invited into the city to discuss the matters at issue. He refused to accept the invitation himself, but his chief officers went on the following day and had an audience of the Emperor. Anastasius won them over by gifts and promises that the soldiers would receive all that was due, and by undertaking that the Church of Rome would be allowed to settle the religious questions in dispute. Vitalian had no option but to yield to the unanimous opinion of his officers, and he returned with his army to Lower Moesia to bide his time and mature new schemes.

      The Emperor deposed the unpopular Hypatius and appointed in his stead Cyril, an officer of some experience, who immediately proceeded to Lower Moesia, perhaps with the purpose of capturing Vitalian by guile. But Vitalian was on the alert, and Cyril was assassinated. This act made it clear that the rebel was still a rebel, and a decree of the Senate was passed, in old Roman style, that Vitalian was an enemy of the republic. Alathar, a soldier of Hunnic origin, was appointed to succeed Cyril, but the supreme command of the Imperial army was assigned to another