Maintaining contact with the revolutionary underground, Kerensky was receiving information from illegal circles, and this bolstered his status in the eyes of his Duma colleagues who were desperate for up-to-the-minute intelligence on the popular movement. (He went out of his way on 27 February to show them how well informed he was, and may even have exaggerated.)
Kerensky’s role in those days at the end of February became a topic for the rumour mill. It was said that he and Chkheidze, hearing of unrest in the Reserve Battalion of the Volhynia Guards Regiment, had gone there on 26 February and fired up the soldiers, and that this had brought about the regiment’s mutiny the following day.155 In reality, Kerensky learned of the rebellion of the Volhynians early on 27 February.156 At about eight o’clock that morning Duma deputy Nikolai Nekrasov, a left-wing Constitutional Democrat and prominent Freemason, phoned him at home to say the Volhynians had mutinied and that the State Duma had been prorogued by royal decree. Kerensky hastened round to Nikolai Sokolov, who also lived near the Duma. After a brief conference with him and Alexander Galpern, he made for the Duma.157 Kerensky and other radical deputies tried to have the Duma continue in official session in defiance of the tsar’s decree and also urged that contact should be established between the Duma and the insurgents filling the streets of Petrograd.158
At the Tauride Palace, Kerensky found himself the centre of attention. He was both the best known of the left-wing deputies and the most left-wing of the deputies who were well known. His name was familiar to anyone who took an interest in politics, and the sociable and energetic Kerensky had already met a good number of the capital’s citizens. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that many activists who made for the Tauride Palace wanted to see Kerensky and were expecting him to tell them what to do next. Spontaneously arising groups of insurgents, breakaway groups from units of the armed forces and individual activists battled their way through to him from all over the city. Already in the morning many people who knew Kerensky had been coming to the Duma bringing him information, and they conveyed the mood of the revolutionary crowds in the streets. Kerensky’s position straddling the boundary between legal and illegal politics was crucially important in those days, not least because illegals, members of the underground opposition, were not individually known to the masses (and some were in no hurry to take the risk of coming out into the open). The position he came to occupy, however, was very much dependent on Kerensky himself and the feverish activity on which he now embarked. He phoned round political friends, demanding they should go to the barracks and get insurgent troops sent to the Duma. Other politicians were doing the same, but Kerensky was outstanding. Every ten or fifteen minutes he was receiving up-to-the-moment information on the situation in different parts of the city by telephone. Duma deputies approached Kerensky to hear the latest news about action on the streets from the leader of the left. Rather anticipating developments, he assured them that the insurgents were on their way to the Tauride Palace. Many deputies were alarmed by this, but Kerensky insisted that the revolution was already in progress and that the Duma should welcome the mutineers and support and lead the popular movement. Time passed, however, and the troops Kerensky had ‘promised’ were nowhere to be seen. Anxious deputies asked him, ‘Where are your troops?’ He was already being seen not only as the best-informed member of the Duma but also as the representative of an illegal centre of insurgents, if not their leader.159
Kerensky and the radical members of the Duma were demanding that a meeting of the Council of Elders, scheduled for twelve noon, should be brought forward, but Rodzyanko refused. At this a group of deputies arbitrarily convened a closed session of the council. Kerensky and several others demanded that the Duma should take power into its own hands, but not all those in attendance could support this. Rodzyanko protested against this meeting which he had not sanctioned but then convened an official meeting of leaders of the Duma groups in his office. Speaking on behalf of the Trudoviks, Social Democrats and Progressists, Kerensky again called for the tsar’s decree proroguing the Duma to be disregarded. This proposal openly to defy the monarch was rejected, opposed not only by Rodzyanko but also by Milyukov. The liberals were not prepared for this level of confrontation with the government. It was decided, nevertheless, that the Duma would not disperse, and the deputies were urged to remain where they were and, as planned, convene in the Semi-Circular Hall for an ‘unofficial’ meeting of such members of the chamber as were present. The choice of venue indicated that the Duma was not formally violating the tsar’s decree that it should dissolve, because official meetings were traditionally held in the Great Hall.160
Kerensky’s Odessan biographer exaggerates the importance of his speech. ‘After Kerensky’s fiery speech, the deputies decided not to disperse, but to remain where they were.’161 The journalist Vasiliy Vodovozov, who was on friendly terms with Kerensky, even claimed that to him belonged ‘the merit of the initiative for a session of the State Duma, in defiance of the tsar’s command that it should be prorogued.’162 Kerensky later wrote the same thing himself, but in fact, as we have said, the private meeting had already been scheduled and was not a reaction to the tsar’s subsequent decree.163
By one in the afternoon, groups of excited soldiers finally began to arrive at the Tauride Palace. One group introduced itself as representing the rebels, who wanted to know what the Duma’s position was.164 The appearance of insurgents at the parliament building had a considerable impact on wavering deputies and strengthened the hand of Kerensky, who demanded decisive action from the Duma deputies.
At 2:30 pm the closed meeting of Duma members began. Vladimir Zenzinov recalled that Kerensky ‘technically’ convened it himself, wantonly pressing the bell to summon the deputies. There may have been nothing technical about it: the bell was an invitation to the deputies to convene in the Great Hall, and Kerensky was attempting to call the deputies for an official rather than a closed meeting. Certainly that was how some of the deputies interpreted his act. Rodzyanko ordered the bell to be switched off, and a closed meeting assembled, as scheduled, in the Semi-Circular Hall. At 2:57 Kerensky appeared in the hall and expressed a desire to go out to the rebels and announce the Duma’s support for the movement of the people. He asked the meeting to grant him the necessary authority. His proposal did not meet with enthusiasm from a majority of the deputies, who were wary of revolutionaries. Some of the liberals suspected the uprising had been instigated by pro-German interests. Under the pressure of events, however, the Duma had little option but to shift to the left. No doubt the spread of the uprising would have forced the Duma deputies to become more radical, but the impact of Kerensky’s decisiveness cannot be disregarded. He harassed his Duma colleagues, encouraged them to adopt a radical stance, and was not averse to confronting them with a fait accompli. Kerensky and other left-wing deputies went out to the crowd, gave speeches, issued instructions, and returned to the meeting, urging their colleagues now to undertake positive action.165 This course of action accorded both with Kerensky’s views and with his temperament, given as he was to romanticizing and idealizing the revolutionary movement. It is also a fact that Kerensky reacted to the emotions of a crowd. He was infected by the elation of the rebellious people constantly arriving at the Duma.
A detachment of mutinous troops approached the Tauride Palace, there was a clash with the Duma sentries and the commander of the guard was wounded.166 This greatly agitated the deputies. Kerensky rushed out and welcomed the mutineers, thereby setting a precedent for speeches by Duma deputies to newly arriving soldiers becoming something of a ritual. The Social Democratic deputies Skobelev and Chkheidze also addressed the rebels, but it was the leader of the Trudoviks who was unquestionably the more lively and trenchant. ‘The Social Democrats were very reserved: Kerensky had a more authoritative tone,’ recalled Alexander Polyakov, a journalist. It is no surprise that contemporaries often remembered only speeches by Kerensky.167
Even conservative publications wrote enthusiastically about Kerensky’s doings in the early days of the revolution. Novoye vremya [New Time] reported:
In the Tauride Palace the deputies were in a state of shock. The Council of Elders had a meeting, not knowing what to do. The order proroguing the Duma was read out. They decided not to disperse, but had not the courage to declare themselves