Civil Society. Michael Edwards

through an active and democratic public sphere which enables common ground to be negotiated across the lines of difference, but when the structures of communication are themselves privatized and fractured, this is obviously more difficult. One of the most alarming features of politics and organizing in the United States today (and to a lesser extent elsewhere) is that public spheres have ceased to operate, or perhaps even exist, as people of different views imprison themselves in mutually exclusive social media bubbles and information sources. Traditionally independent and citizen-controlled media have also been outcompeted by much larger and wealthier commercial platforms such as Facebook which have contributed to the problem.

In the third edition of this book I took the view that the “digital age” was both a threat and an opportunity for civil society in equal measure, but during the last five years I think the “negatives” have started to outweigh the “positives.” The rise of authoritarianism and state surveillance, increasing polarization and the widespread closing of open minds, and the speed and superficiality that seem to go along with digital cultures are in danger of closing off the opportunities that exist to use information technology to promote greater unity, equality, and thoughtfulness in civic interaction, as well as greater innovation in modes of organizing and association. The revisions to this edition therefore take a more critical view, arguing for a rediscovery of face-to-face engagement while remaining open to the advantages that virtual connections can bring.

      Face-to-face engagement is important for another reason too: the need to re-democratize the world of associational life so that it becomes less dominated by technocrats, bureaucrats, and wealthy donors and more responsive to the concerns and priorities of ordinary citizens. The decline of membership-based organizations and the rise of professional advocacy and service-providing groups has been an important feature of recent civil society history. This process has produced mixed results in the struggle against inequality and discrimination, but one development is clear and unambiguously damaging: the disappearance of opportunities within civil society for people of different political views and identities to debate, strategize, and organize together. This is a significant factor behind the rise of cultural and political polarization.

      It would be unfair to say that this problem has been caused by the “professionalization” of the nonprofit sector and the rise of billionaire philanthropists with unprecedented spending power like Bill Gates and the Koch brothers, but it is certainly true that popular influence over the direction of the voluntary sector has waned over the last 30 years, and that the ecosystems of the nonprofit sector in most countries have become increasingly unbalanced as resources have flowed overwhelmingly to larger charities and more established causes.⁷ There is a pressing need to rebuild broad-based, nationally federated, independent, and internally democratic networks and associations that can act as meeting grounds and conduits for grassroots voices, leadership development, and accountability from the bottom up.

The furore surrounding alleged sexual harassment and abuse at Oxfam, Save the Children, and other international charities that exploded in the United Kingdom in the spring of 2018 was seen by some commentators as evidence that large nonprofit bureaucracies cannot be trusted to live out their values just because they claim the mantle of civil society rather than government or business, especially when they see themselves as competitors in a global market for humanitarian assistance.⁸ Any human endeavor that is commercialized will lose its ability to reshape human beings and their relationships in any terms other than money, growth, and organizational self-interest. As with social media in chapter 4, therefore, I have revised the treatment of civil society and the market in chapter 3 to take account of a growing body of research and experience which suggests that the costs of internalizing market values and practices are starting to outweigh the benefits.

      Taken together, these four trends pose major challenges to the theory and practice of civil society in all of its guises, though they also open up some important opportunities – in the shape, for example, of new social movements that have arisen in response to the strengthening of nationalist political forces, or the increasing dissatisfaction with the condition of associational life that one sees among many younger activists. I explore these opportunities in chapter 2. It is also clear that these trends feed off each other: authoritarianism and polarization are natural bedfellows which both benefit from and accentuate the fracturing of the public sphere. The decline of voluntary associations which bring people of different views and backgrounds together is a consequence of that fracturing but also another cause. The more civil society is eroded, the less it can do its job; and the less it does its job, the weaker it becomes. Faced by these interlocking and deeply entrenched problems and developments, what can be done?

If civil society isn’t “the problem,” it cannot be “the solution,” at least in any simple or straightforward sense. But all of the issues outlined above contain an important civil society dimension, and adopting a tripartite analysis of associational life, the good society and the public sphere can help us to understand how these different dimensions interact with one another to bring solutions closer. Take rising cultural and political polarization as an example. Theorists who follow the associational school of civil society look to the decline and revival of certain kinds of organization as the key to understanding and addressing this problem – particularly groups that bring together people of different backgrounds and ideologies in common projects. But organizations are usually reflections of much deeper loyalties that are anchored in contrasting visions of social and political values and priorities. Unless those deeper divisions can be aired and mediated in some way, changes in the physical infrastructure of civil society are unlikely to have much effect. And the only way to mediate them – to sort through such differences and reach some common ground as the basis for policy and action – is by protecting and enhancing the communications structures of the public sphere so that people can talk honestly to each other. In isolation, no one school of thought is satisfactory, but taken together they can build on each other’s strengths and weaknesses to reveal opportunities for action of a kind that might actually produce results. Chapter 6 explores these opportunities, and each of my other chapters has been adjusted to take account of contemporary developments. As in previous editions, I have also updated the examples and references used throughout.

Carried over from 2003, however, when the first edition of the book was written, is a strong element of advocacy for civil society as something that is philosophically and practically distinct from government and business. Indeed, it is this difference that makes the difference to democracy and social change. There must be spaces and opportunities that are not dedicated to making money or accumulating power if civic values and relationships are to take root and flourish – places where we can meet each other for conversation and shape a collective course of action in line with our own democratically derived priorities. It is that possibility that is threatened by current trends. It may seem a truism to say that the future of civil society depends on us – on the members or constituent parts of the civil sphere and not on wealthy donors or politicians. But this observation is important: prioritizing democracy and mass participation over bureaucracy and oligarchic dominance is a vital step forward in recovering a more powerful vision of civil society and its possibilities. This doesn’t mean standing still or pretending that we can go back in time to a romanticized civic past, but it does require that we hold onto some foundational principles even as we search for new ways to put them into practice.

      Reviving civil society in the face of repression, polarization, and inequality is both a personal and a political (or institutional) challenge. Do we want to build an authentic civil society or not? If we disagree on what that means, do we want to be part of a democratic dialogue to find out? And since dialogues at present are neither civil nor democratic, are we at least committed to building the conditions in which everyone can participate so that we can start a different conversation with each other instead of shouting from our separate bunkers? Anything that brings people closer together rather than forcing them apart will help; anything that generates honest conversation instead of fake news and propaganda can move us