Since Android 5, SELinux has been used to harden the operating system with mandatory access controls, so as not only to protect core system functions from attack but also to separate processes strongly and log violations. SELinux was developed by the NSA to support MAC in government systems; we'll discuss it further in chapter 9. The philosophy is actions require the consent of three parties: the user, the developer and the platform.
As with iOS (and indeed Windows), the security of Android is a matter of the whole ecosystem, not just of the access control mechanisms. The new phone ecosystem is sufficiently different from the old PC ecosystem, but inherits enough of the characteristics of the old wireline phone system, that it merits a separate discussion in the chapter on Phones in Part Two. We'll consider other aspects in the chapters on Side Channels and Surveillance.
6.2.9 Windows
The current version of Windows (Windows 10) appears to be the third-most popular operating system, having achieved a billion monthly active devices in March 2020 (until 2016, Windows was the leader). Windows has a scarily complex access control system, and a quick canter through its evolution may make it easier to understand what's going on.
Early versions of Windows had no access control. A break came with Windows 4 (NT), which was very much like Unix, and was inspired by it, but with some extensions. First, rather than just read, write and execute there were separate attributes for take ownership, change permissions and delete, to support more flexible delegation. These attributes apply to groups as well as users, and group permissions allow you to achieve much the same effect as suid programs in Unix. Attributes are not simply on or off, as in Unix, but have multiple values: you can set AccessDenied, AccessAllowed or SystemAudit. These are parsed in that order: if an AccessDenied is encountered in an ACL for the relevant user or group, then no access is permitted regardless of any conflicting AccessAllowed flags. The richer syntax lets you arrange matters so that everyday configuration tasks, such as installing printers, don't have to require full administrator privileges.
Second, users and resources can be partitioned into domains with distinct administrators, and trust can be inherited between domains in one direction or both. In a typical large company, you might put all the users into a personnel domain administered by HR, while assets such as servers and printers may be in resource domains under departmental control; individual workstations may even be administered by their users. Things can be arranged so that the departmental resource domains trust the user domain, but not vice versa – so a hacked or careless departmental administrator can't do too much external damage. The individual workstations would in turn trust the department (but not vice versa) so that users can perform tasks that require local privilege (such as installing software packages). Limiting the damage a hacked administrator can do still needs careful organisation. The data structure used to manage all this, and hide the ACL details from the user interface, is called the Registry. Its core used to be the Active Directory, which managed remote authentication – using either a Kerberos variant or TLS, encapsulated behind the Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI), which enables administrators to plug in other authentication services. Active Directory is essentially a database that organises users, groups, machines, and organisational units within a domain in a hierarchical namespace. It lurked behind Exchange, but is now being phased out as Microsoft becomes a cloud-based company and moves its users to Office365.
Windows has added capabilities in two ways which can override or complement ACLs. First, users or groups can be either allowed or denied access by means of profiles. Security policy is set by groups rather than for the system as a whole; group policy overrides individual profiles, and can be associated with sites, domains or organisational units, so it can start to tackle complex problems. Policies can be created using standard tools or custom coded.
The second way in which capabilities insinuate their way into Windows is that in many applications, people use TLS for authentication, and TLS certificates provide another, capability-oriented, layer of access control outside the purview of the Active Directory.
I already mentioned that Windows Vista introduced trusted boot to make the operating system itself tamper-resistant, in the sense that it always boots into a known state, limiting the persistence of malware. It added three further protection mechanisms to get away from the previous default of all software running as root. First, the kernel was closed off to developers; second, the graphics subsystem and most drivers were removed from the kernel; and third, User Account Control (UAC) replaced the default administrator privilege with user defaults instead. Previously, so many routine tasks needed administrative privilege that many enterprises made all their users administrators, which made it difficult to contain malware; and many developers wrote their software on the assumption that it would have access to everything. According to Microsoft engineers, this was a major reason for Windows' lack of robustness: applications monkey with system resources in incompatible ways. So they added an Application Information Service that launches applications which require elevated privilege and uses virtualisation to contain them: if they modify the registry, for example, they don't modify the ‘real’ registry but simply the version of it that they can see.
Since Vista, the desktop acts as the parent process for later user processes, so even administrators browse the web as normal users, and malware they download can't overwrite system files unless given later authorisation. When a task requires admin privilege, the user gets an elevation prompt asking them for an admin password. (Apple's macOS is similar although the details under the hood differ somewhat.) As admin users are often tricked into installing malicious software, Vista added mandatory access controls in the form of file integrity levels. The basic idea is that low-integrity processes (such as code you download from the Internet) should not be able to modify high-integrity data (such as system files) in the absence of some trusted process (such as verification of a signature by Microsoft on the code in question).
In 2012, Windows 8 added dynamic access control which lets you control user access by context, such as their work PC versus their home PC and their phone; this is done via account attributes in Active Directory, which appear as claims about a user, or in Kerberos tickets as claims about a domain. In 2016, Windows 8.1 added a cleaner abstraction with principals, which can be a user, computer, process or thread running in a security context or a group to which such a principal belongs, and security identifiers (SIDs), which represent such principals. When a user signs in, they get tickets with the SIDs to which they belong. Windows 8.1 also prepared for the move to cloud computing by adding Microsoft accounts (formerly LiveID), whereby a user signs in to a Microsoft cloud service rather than to a local server. Where credentials are stored locally, it protects them using virtualisation. Finally, Windows 10 added a number of features to support the move to cloud computing with a diversity of client devices, ranging from certificate pinning (which we'll discuss in the chapter on Network Security) to the abolition of the old secure attention sequence ctrl-alt-del (which is hard to do on touch-screen devices and which users didn't understand anyway).
To sum up, Windows evolved to provide a richer and more flexible set of access control tools than any system previously sold in mass markets. It was driven by corporate customers who need to manage tens of thousands of staff performing hundreds of different job roles across hundreds of different sites, providing internal controls to limit the damage that can be done by small numbers of dishonest staff or infected machines. (How such controls are actually designed will be our topic in the chapter on Banking and Bookkeeping.) The driver for this development was the fact that Microsoft made over half of its revenue from firms that licensed more than 25,000 seats; but the cost of the flexibility that corporate customers demanded is complexity. Setting up access control for a big Windows shop is a highly skilled job.
6.2.10 Middleware
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