When Myanmar Wanbao tried to start the project in December 2014, they faced vocal protests from the villagers again. Finally, the tension reached the highest point, after the police opened fire, and one villager, Daw Khin Win died on the spot. It received attention from international and local activists [Kivimäki, 2016]. According to Amnesty’s research paper, there was preannounced lack of environmental concern and management in the mine. In May 2016, Myanmar Wanbao announced that they had started to producing copper from the Letpadaung Mine for the first time [Amnesty, 2016. P. 4].
Effects in Sino-Myanmar Relations
Every Myanmar government has believed that China is the paramount partner for domestic and foreign interests [Toh Han Shih, 2014]. Until the Myanmar’s democratization period, China was the leading investor in Myanmar. However, after a series of protests in Letpadaung Copper Mine Project took place, Beijing investments dropped rapidly [Yun Sun, 2012. P. 75]. In the first year of Thein Sein’s administration, 2011-2012, Chinese FDI in Myanmar reached US$ 4345.7378 million, and it was the second-highest amount in two countries trade since 1988, according to the Myanmar State Directorate of the Investment and Company Administration’s figures. However, in 2013-2014, FDI from China to Myanmar visibly dropped to the US$ 56.16 million, becoming the lowest since 1988 [DICA’s annual report].
In March 2016, the NLD government came into power. They continue focusing on the “China’s role in the region” and “Logic of geopolitic” when comstructing their foreign policy and Sudha Ramachandran has also illustrated symmetric idea in his work [Ramachandran, 2016]. However, the relations between the two countries have not improved as it was expected by both sides. The FDI from China never reached its highest pre 2011 point. On the other hand, the anti-Chinese sentiments are still festering in the Myanmar community.
Conclusion
Since 1988, Myanmar political activists had been trying to develop democracy in the country. However, they were suppressed by the Military government for over two decades, from 1988 to 2011. Therefore, majority of Myanmar people did not support the junta. They considered the government supporters and partner countries as traitors. Whenever the military government was under international pressure, China always stood by their side and supported with loans and investments [U Myo-Thit, 2017]. It has resulted in the development of the Sinophobia in Myanmar. The citizens did not trust Chinese investments because of their lack of duties for social responsibilities. Beijing understood for those sentiments and, therefore, tried to smooth every process for their investments in Myanmar with the Junta
However, the Chinese policies backfired when President Thein Sein’s government listened to their follow people’s voices. Consequently, the Beijing became concerned when the opposition was elected in the general election in 2015 [BBC, 2019]. In his trip, Wang Yi expressed hopes to his counterpart, Daw Aung San Su Kyi that Chinese interests in Myanmar will continue to be expected. The present situation of Sino-Myanmar relations, however, has many unresolved problems such the Chinese role in the Myanmar cease-fire, Myitsone Dam General Project and border issues.
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