Military Art of People's War. Vo Nguyen Giap

Japanese putsch was of singular importance: it was to provide the thoi co, or critical moment, of the Vietnamese revolution. Vietnamese strategists have always attached great importance to timing, stressing the need both to develop a long-term perspective and to recognize the crucial moment when decisive action is required. Giap’s work in the border regions had developed steadily, and by the summer of 1944 the Party was moving toward a decision to launch a general insurrection. The Central Committee met in December 1944 and outlined such a perspective. On Ho’s return from China immediately thereafter, he insisted on a more cautious approach, mainly in terms of timing. He ordered the creation of Tuyen truyen Giai phong quan (Armed Propaganda and Liberation Detachments) under Giap’s command. These detachments lay somewhere between military and political organizations. Their objectives were of both kinds: to make known the objectives of the Vietminh and to establish a secure line of communication between the highlands and the delta. The first official military unit dates from December 22, 1944. This platoon, in the Dinh Ca Valley, consisted of only thirty-four men, but it succeeded in liquidating two French garrisons along the Chinese border two days later. Ho continued to stress that the general insurrection must await that moment when conditions are ripe both nationally and internationally. The Japanese putsch produced such a conjuncture.²⁴

      The entire Indochinese situation was transformed overnight. The Japanese set out to dismantle the French administration and security structure and to establish a more reliable replacement for the duration of the war. Psychologically, the Japanese crumbled the myth of French omnipotence and invulnerability. At a more practical level, the Japanese were obliged to encourage Vietnamese participation on every level of administration and even to establish local militia forces. Japanese propaganda (under the general rubric “Asia for the Asians”) openly encouraged nationalism, and the unprecedented responsibilities delegated to the Vietnamese gave the local people confidence in their own capabilities. At the same time, Japan’s failure to accord a full measure of independence to the colony only strengthened the position of the political forces which had opposed the Axis from the start: the Vietminh.²⁵

      Outside the cities, the impact of the Japanese coup came in the rapid disintegration of the French intelligence network and the imprisonment of their security forces. These forces had been built up over many decades, and their efficiency in crushing insurrections has already been noted. When they were removed from the scene, the Japanese had no comparable network to replace them. The result was an altogether new opportunity for political and military organizing and recruitment among the Vietnamese peasantry. Vo Nguyen Giap and his comrades took full advantage of this opportunity: they were able to build an army of ten thousand men by the middle of 1945. The Japanese could not afford to send troops to attack Giap’s base areas in Tonkin. By May 1945 the seven northern-most provinces—Cao Bang, Lang Son, Ha Giang, Bac Can, Tuyen Quang, Thai Nguyen, and Bac Giang—had been liberated.²⁶

      Throughout the spring and summer, the guerrilla campaign against the Japanese mounted. In early summer, a military conference was held at Hiep Hoa. As a result of the deliberations at this conference, the Armed Propaganda Detachments merged with the National Salvation troops (born in the Bac Son guerrilla area) to form the Liberation Army. The units at its disposal were substantial. On July 17, for example, they were able to deploy a force of five hundred men against the Japanese garrison in the mountain resort of Tam Dao. Politically, the Vietminh consolidated its position throughout the country. Japanese-sponsored organizations, including militias and youth brigades, were heavily infiltrated. The Vietminh anticipated another thoi co at the moment of Japan’s surrender to the Allies and moved to be in a position to receive the Japanese surrender and fill the power vacuum. Revolutionary committees were set up everywhere to provide a de facto provisional government.²⁷

      In August the revolution was unleashed. On the fifteenth, General Giap and his troops marched into Hanoi, greeted by massive demonstrations. Between August 19 and August 25, the Vietminh moved to power from the Red River to the Mekong. On August 26, Bao Dai, descendant of the ancient emperors, head of the Japanese-approved government in Hue, abdicated in favor of the revolutionary government. At this point, the complicated positions of the Allied powers came to bear on Vietnam. No one felt the conflicting pressures so acutely as Giap. At the head of a people’s army, he knew the dynamism of the revolutionary forces. As minister of the interior in the provisional government, he had daily contact with Western diplomats and officials of every stripe, ready to impose by force what the Vietnamese would refuse to negotiate. In these crucial months, Giap’s political understanding matured swiftly.²⁸

      On August 27, the French made their awkward return to Tonkin: the new French commissioner, Jean Sainteny, arrived hastily in Hanoi by parachute. Giap led the delegation of the Liberation Committee which went to meet him. Significantly perhaps, the head of the American OSS mission, Maj. Archimedes Patti, presented Sainteny to Giap. Major Patti was regarded as sympathetic to the Vietminh, and Sainteny appears to have resented Patti’s matchmaking efforts. In this chaotic situation, the Vietminh declared their nation’s independence on September 2. Ho Chi Minh’s famous declaration began with a long quotation from the American Declaration of Independence and carried on with references to the ideals of the French Revolution of 1789. As a whole, it was calculated to appeal to the victorious Allies.²⁹

      When Ho finished, Giap spoke. Even more than Ho, in his speech Giap took account of all the conflicting forces at work and noted the latent dangers in the immediate situation. He spoke passionately of the felt desire for independence, but his words were heavy with admonitions. Giap knew that the revolution had arrived swiftly and that its organizational strength had not been adequately tested. He understood the divisions, both political and social, which might reach the surface and render the struggle more difficult in the coming period. Hence, his speech stressed unity again and again. He also emphasized the need to curtail excesses in order to foster the progress of peaceful bargaining. Turning to international questions, he stated:

      As regards foreign relations, our public opinion pays very much attention to the Allied missions … at Hanoi, because everyone is anxious to know the result of the foreign negotiations of the government.

      He gave no evidence of hope concerning the French. His meetings with Sainteny must have only confirmed his expectations regarding French intentions. His speech continued:

      They [the French] are making preparations to land their forces in Indochina. In a word, and according to latest intelligence, France is preparing herself to reconquer our country…. The Vietnamese people will fight for independence, liberty and equality of status. If our negotiations are unsuccessful, we shall resort to arms.³⁰

      The position of the United States government was less ambiguous than the unofficial conversations of the Americans in Hanoi at that time. The senior United States official in Tonkin, Brig. Gen. Philip Gallagher, informed Washington on September 20 that Ho Chi Minh “is an old revolutionist … a product of Moscow, a communist.”³¹ The Allies never had the intention of permitting the Vietminh to take the Japanese surrender and receive their arms. As early as the Potsdam Conference, it was agreed that Kuomintang troops would enter the northern half of the country and British forces from the Burmese theater would supervise the surrender in the South. This arbitrary Allied demarcation at the sixteenth parallel served to reinforce the tendencies of power concentration already established by the Vietminh in the last months of Japanese rule.³²

      The most secure Vietminh strongholds in northern Tonkin were scarcely affected. At an official level, the Kuomintang had been effectively neutralized in Ho’s ongoing negotiations with the Vietnamese nationalists who enjoyed their backing. The Vietminh had respected the commitments entered into by Ho at the time of his release from prison and had allotted the VNQDD’s representatives more posts in the new government than their strength within the country would have commanded. At the practical level, the Kuomintang were in no position to intervene significantly with effective troops. (Although some three hundred Chinese divisions existed on paper at the end of the war, Gen. Albert Wedemeyer estimated that only five were militarily effective units—and three of these were in India under American command!) Some 185,000 Kuomintang troops are reported to have reached Vietnam, but many merely paused at the border to sell their arms to the Vietminh. Large numbers of those who entered Vietnam were actively