Knowing that the invasion of Nam Bo was only the prelude to a plan of aggression by the French imperialists, our Party guided the whole nation toward preparing a long-term resistance. In order to assemble all the forces against French imperialism, the Party advocated uniting all the elements that could be united, neutralizing all those that could be neutralized, and widening the National United Front by the formation of the Lien Viet* (Vietnam People’s Front). It urgently organized general elections with universal suffrage in order to form the first National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was responsible for passing the Constitution and forming a widely representative resistance government grouping the most diverse elements, including even those of the Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (the Vietnamese Kuomintang). At that time, we avoided all incidents with the Chiang Kai-shek troops.
The problem then before the French Expeditionary Corps was to know whether it would be easy for them to return to North Vietnam by force. It was certainly not so, because our forces were more powerful there than in the South. For its part, our government intended doing everything in its power to preserve peace so as to enable the newly created people’s power to consolidate itself and to rebuild the country devastated by long years of war. It was thus that negotiations which ended in the preliminary agreement of March 6, 1946,* took place between the French colonialists and our government. According to the terms of this convention, limited contingents of French troops were allowed to station in a certain number of localities in North Vietnam in order to cooperate with the Vietnamese troops in taking over from the repatriated Chiang Kai-shek forces. In exchange, the French government recognized Vietnam as a free state, having its own government, its own national assembly, its own army and finances, and promised to withdraw its troops from Vietnam within the space of five years. The political status of Nam Bo was to be decided by a referendum.
Relations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and France were then at a crossroads. Would there be a move toward consolidation of peace or a resumption of hostilities? The colonialists considered the preliminary agreement as a provisional expedient enabling them to introduce part of their troops into the North of Vietnam, a delaying stratagem for preparing the war they intended to continue. Therefore, the talks at the Dalat Conference† led to no result, and those at the Fontainebleau Conference‡ resulted only in the signing of an unstable modus vivendi. During the whole of this time, the colonialist partisans of war were steadily pursuing their tactics of local encroachments. Instead of observing the armistice, they continued their mopping-up operations in Nam Bo and set up a local puppet government* there; in Bac Bo they increased provocations and attacked a certain number of provinces, pillaging and massacring the population of the Hon Gai mining area, and everywhere creating an atmosphere of tension preparatory to attacks by force.
Loyal to its policy of peace and independence, our government vainly endeavored to settle conflicts in a friendly manner, many times appealing to the French government then presided over by the SFIO (Socialist Party) to change their policy in order to avoid a war detrimental to both sides. At the same time, we busied ourselves with strengthening our rear with a view to resistance. We obtained good results in intensifying production. We paid much attention to strengthening national defense. The liquidating of the reactionaries of the Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang was crowned with success, and we were able to liberate all the areas which had fallen into their hands.
In November 1946 the situation worsened. The colonialists in Haiphong seized the town by a coup de force. After engaging in street fights, our troops withdrew to the suburbs. In December the colonialists provoked tension in Hanoi, massacred civilians, seized a number of public offices, sent an ultimatum demanding the disarming of our self-defense groups and the right to ensure order in the town, and finally provoked armed conflict. Obstinately, the colonialists chose war which led to their ruin.
On December 19, resistance broke out throughout the country. The next day, in the name of the Party and the government, President Ho Chi Minh called on the whole people to rise up to exterminate the enemy and save the country, to fight to the last drop of blood, and whatever the cost, to refuse re-enslavement.
At the time when hostilities became generalized throughout the country, what was the balance of forces? From the point of view of materiel, the enemy was stronger than us. Our troops were thus ordered to fight the enemy wherever they were garrisoned so as to weaken them and prevent them spreading out too rapidly, and thereafter, when conditions became unfavorable to us, to make the bulk of our forces fall back toward our rear in order to keep our forces intact with a view to a long-term resistance. The most glorious and most remarkable battles took place in Hanoi, where our troops succeeded in firmly holding a huge sector for two months before withdrawing from the capital unhurt.
The whole Vietnamese people remained indissolubly united in a fight to the death in those days when the country was in danger. Replying to the appeal by the Party, they resolutely chose the path of freedom and independence. The central government, having withdrawn to bases in the mountainous region of Viet Bac, formed military zones, soon united in interzones, and the power of local authorities was strengthened for mobilizing the whole people and organizing the resistance. Our government continued appealing to the French government not to persist in their error and to reopen peaceful negotiations. But the latter, under the pretext of negotiation, demanded the disarming of our troops. We replied to the colonialists’ obstinacy by intensifying the resistance.
In fact, the French High Command began regrouping forces to prepare a fairly big lightning offensive in the hope of ending the war. In October 1947, they launched a big campaign against our principal base, Viet Bac, in order to annihilate the nerve center of the resistance and destroy our regular forces. But this large-scale operation ended in a crushing defeat. The forces of the Expeditionary Corps suffered heavy losses without succeeding in causing anxiety to our leading organizations or impairing our regular units. It was a blow to the enemy’s strategy of a lightning war and a rapid solution. Our people were all the more determined to persevere along the path of a long-term resistance.
From 1948, realizing that the war was being prolonged, the enemy changed their strategy. They used the main part of their forces for “pacification” and for consolidating the already occupied areas, in Nam Bo especially, applying the principle: fight Vietnamese with Vietnamese, feed war with war. They set up a puppet central government, actively organized supplementary local units, and indulged in economic pillage. They gradually extended their zone of occupation in the North and placed under their control the major part of the Red River delta. During all these years, the French Expeditionary Corps followed a procedure of great dispersion, scattering their forces in thousands of military posts to occupy territory and control localities. But ever growing military and financial difficulties gradually induced the French imperialists to let the American imperialists interfere in the conflict.
The enemy altered their strategy, and we then advocated the wide development of guerrilla warfare, transforming the former’s rear into our front line. Our units operated in small pockets, with independent companies penetrating deeply into the enemy-controlled zone to launch guerrilla warfare, establish bases, and protect local people’s power. It was an extremely hard war generalized in all domains: military, economic, and political. The enemy mopped up; we fought against mopping-up. They organized supplementary local Vietnamese troops and installed puppet authorities; we firmly upheld local people’s power, overthrew straw men, eliminated traitors, and carried out active propaganda to bring about the disintegration of the supplementary forces. We gradually formed a network of guerrilla bases. On the map showing the theater of operations, besides the free zone, “red zones,” which ceaselessly spread and multiplied, began to appear right in the heart of the occupied areas. The soil of the fatherland was being freed inch by inch right in the enemy’s rear lines. There was no clearly defined front in this war. It was wherever the enemy was. The front was nowhere, it was everywhere. Our new strategy created serious difficulties for the enemy’s plan to feed war with war and to fight Vietnamese with Vietnamese and finally brought about their defeat.