Alongside the indeterminate status of the world’s “outlaws” and refugees, late capitalism has intensified conditions of precarity in the working lives of people in ostensibly stable political environments. Marx highlighted the reserve army of unemployed that kept nineteenth-century capitalism ticking. But now, cheaper labor can easily be found elsewhere in the world. Mechanization often replaces the need for bodies at all. Weakening labor legislation, the growth of unpaid internships, “zero hour” contracts, and corrupt or emasculated trade unions all contribute to contemporary economic precarity. Even when work is available, it may be poorly paid, unreliable, part-time, and insufficient for a livelihood. Such flexible labor has been enabled by financial deregulation and the easy global movement of capital (Harvey 1987). The essential character of formal employment has been transformed, not only rendering previous working-class identities indeterminate but as Richard-Michael Diedrich suggests for unemployed Welsh former miners, “steadily dissolving what the individual had believed to be the stable core of his … identity” (2004: 117). The ethnographic emphasis here has been on how precariously employed persons experience their labor; studies show it is often felt as extreme vulnerability (Allison 2012; Genda 2005; Gill and Pratt 2008; Hann and Parry 2018; Millar 2014; Mole 2010; Munck 2013; Sanchez 2016; Standing 2011).
Indeterminacy has become the dominant condition of insecure work in many industries as “permanent impermanence” normalizes ostensibly temporary contracts within regular structures of production. Employment conditions and forms are thus seemingly predictable and fixed through time, yet are underpinned by profound insecurity, collapsing previously clear distinctions between regular and casual work (Sanchez 2018: 235).
In such a context of increasing political and economic indeterminacy, Hudson McFann suggests a chilling typology of how humans-as-waste (see Mbembe 2011; Yates 2011) have been produced, typically as a product of ordering regimes such as colonialism, modernity, and capitalism (McFann n.d.), which both depend on and produce surplus people, lands, and materials. Hudson McFann’s typology describes the symbolic deployment of the concept of waste (following Douglas’s 1966 structuralist account and Julia Kristeva’s 1982 notion of the abject); the biopolitical (such as Foucault’s accounts of state ordering) and the politico-economic, informed by a Marxist critique of capitalism that demands a surplus labor population and wastes human bodies (Gidwani 2013; Gidwani and Reddy 2011; Yates 2011). To this we add Zygmunt Bauman’s construction of late modernity as a fluid or liquid condition that seems to counter the rigidity of an ordering regime and yet rehearses expelling unwanted bodies as just so many wasted lives (2013).
Precarity and ambiguity can also generate strategies for living beyond, or in spite of, the state, as Ida Harboe Knudsen and Martin Demant Frederiksen and their contributors (2015) trace through their notion of the “grey zone,” where the informal, ephemeral, and ambiguous have become ordinary. Improvisation can intersect with forms of exclusion and regimes of governance based on legibility. The temporalities of indeterminate encounters with the state require attentiveness. It is not only in refugee camps, among asylum seekers, and on the margins of the state (Auyero 2012; Das and Poole 2004;) that suspension and waiting are ways of being and expressions of power hierarchies.12 Akhil Gupta reminds us of the chronic suspension of many giant infrastructure projects (2015), Timothy Choy and Jerry Zee of the chemical and other pollution suspended in the atmosphere that allows/damages life (2015). Samuel Beckett, of course, identified waiting as the human condition (1956).
Just as ordering regimes waste and devalue people, so too are landscapes marked with such regimes’ failures, byproducts, and cast-offs that give the lie to any notion of future-oriented improvement. The often unfulfilled promise of modernity’s grand projects become inscribed upon the landscape as half-built infrastructure and ruins, which point to forgotten futures (Gordillo 2014; Gupta 2015; Hussain 2013; Ringel this volume; Stoler 2013) and shape lives transfixed in a present, waiting either for the past or the future to return, as Paul Wenzel Geissler (2010) so movingly shows through a discussion of the people who continue to live and work in an abandoned colonial field station in Kenya. Both this and Thomas Yarrow’s (2017) account of Ghana’s incomplete Volta Dam project, suggest a different relationship to modernity’s march than suggested by the preceding pages. The failed promises of modernity can be mourned by people who live among the ruins.
Policies devised by such modernist states are typically linked to a specific mode of acting on the world to produce outcomes that are aimed at closure and containment (Hinchcliffe 2001). In the essentially limitless context of the environment and climate such aims are inherently flawed, since certitude can be misplaced and potentially damaging (see Alexander forthcoming; Wynne 1992, 1997). “Dealing with” the wastes of military and industrial extraction, consumption, and production is often only hopeful postponement, appealing to an imagined future state, when science will have caught up with its earlier incarnation and be better able to resolve the endless stream of byproducts and hybrid entities that have qualified “nature.” Buried shrapnel or lurking landmines can also be a source of profound indeterminacy (Henig 2012; Kim 2014), unmapping previously known landscapes. Compared with the relative localization of such military waste, chemical (like nuclear) contamination is “amorphous and invisible” (Broto 2015: 94), exacerbated by the inability to determine the temporal and spatial reach of leaks (Topçu 2008). Pollution and contamination are thus characterized by formlessness, excessiveness, and wayward movement (Strathern 1991: 61; Tsing 2015: 28), which resist neat narratives of containment or restoration. Such accounts of remediation, however, are confronted head on by a queer ethics of hybridity, personified by the figure of Nuclia Waste, a drag queen who exuberantly foregrounds the excess and permeability of the entire environment and herself to nuclear contamination (Krupar 2012). Guy Schaffer further reminds us that queer theory is concerned with “uneven remainders, things that don’t fit neatly into categories” (n.d.), that “trash” unites wastes and camp alike and that camp itself is “a mode of aestheticism devoted to excess, to failure, to ironic detachment” (ibid.), a refusal, we might say, to be integrated. Such practices align indeterminacy, unruly wastes, and queer theory, recasting indeterminacy as a mode of potentiality, resistance, escape, creativity, and improvisation (see Gonzalez-Polledo this volume; Morgensen 2016;).
In just such a light, recent scholarship in the social sciences, arts, and humanities has characterized indeterminacy as a necessary space for creativity and cultural improvisation (Hallam and Ingold 2007). Howard Becker describes artworks as fundamentally indeterminate, only existing within each moment of re-creation (2006: 23). Feminist and queer theories also invite us to consider mobility rather than stasis, processes of becoming rather than fixed categories, and the generative power of ambiguity. They also ask us to think how metaphors and performances of indeterminacy can be mobilized to resist social classification and control. Or indeed, how ritualized gender transgression, as in Gregory Bateson’s (1936) account of transvestism during Naven rituals among the Iatuml of Papua New Guinea, can establish/reaffirm hierarchical, gender binary relationships, thus highlighting again the complex relationship between indeterminacy and classificatory systems. Gilbert Herdt’s work on the imaginative possibilities of the “third gender” suggests another reading of Naven transvestism whereby such performances indicate the “abandonment of absolute contrast” (Herdt 1994: 41; see Halberstam 1999).
J. K. Gibson-Graham’s feminist approach to political economy echoes these moves in its criticism of what is called the overdetermination of spaces, a capitalocentric, analytical tunnel vision that fails to see spaces of opportunity and alternative imaginaries (2006). Debates on imagination’s preconditions again insist on the apparent freedom offered by indeterminacy (Rapport 2015; Sneath, Holbraad, and Pederson 2009). And just as imagination projects forward, so radical indeterminacy has also been described as a requirement for hope (Miyazaki 2005 following Bloch 1995) and the crucial conditio sine qua non for an ethical stance of openness. Roughly speaking then we are faced with analytical