Many of South Africa’s larger cities, secure with the prospects of hosting higher order matches in the 2010 tournament, proceeded to invest a great deal of resources on the development of flagship stadiums, but development of some of the more prominent (and expensive) ones was marked by unfettered cost escalation. For example, Johannesburg’s Soccer City, refurbished to increase its seating capacity to 94 700, and host to the headquarters of FIFA and the South African Football Association before and during the tournament, had by 2010 drawn cost overruns of about R1bn, meaning that its total cost was likely to be in the range of R3.2bn (The Guardian 3 March 2010). It was estimated that the construction of Cape Town’s stadium would cost R4.5bn, substantially more than the R2.4bn initially projected for it (Mail & Guardian 15 December 2009).
Similarly, some of the major transport developments related to the World Cup witnessed delays in schedule and excessive rises in cost. The Gautrain rapid rail system, at times linked by the Gauteng provincial government to the World Cup and at times detached by them from their wider tournament preparations, is probably most emblematic of this, with construction costs rising by the end of 2009 in excess of R25bn. But other host cities also saw delays in the development of new transport systems. The launch of Cape Town’s 2010 Integrated Rapid Transport System was delayed by several months and its costs more than tripled (Cape Times 9 November 2009). To alleviate some of the transport pressure in host cities during the tournament, a number of cities developed plans for Bus Rapid Transit Systems (BRT). The City of Johannesburg launched its own BRT in August 2009 amid threats of strikes and violence by the local taxi industry.
South Africa’s authorities regarded the tournament as a major international marketing and (re)branding opportunity for tourism. Indeed, the country’s early bid campaign for the World Cup was in part motivated by the prospect of dovetailing the hosting of the sports event with some international re-imaging, and boosting the tourism sector. In the post-apartheid era, tourism has developed as a major economic sector, with South Africa ranked as the top international tourism destination in Africa. Currently, the country’s annual international tourism market stands close to eight million arrivals.
Yet early on during the preparations for the World Cup, assessments by South Africa’s tourism authorities were to show that the country had a significant accommodation deficit, with the shortfall most marked in cities such as Johannesburg and Durban (DEAT 2005). During the lead-up to the Cup, host cities endeavoured to ensure that there was a sufficient supply of accommodation for visitors and spectators, but less than a year before the start of the tournament, some high-ranking FIFA officials voiced concern that this might not be the case. For instance, Jerome Valcke, FIFA’s secretary general, stated in an interview that, ‘I am not worried about ticket sales but instead about accommodation for the fans. It is our concern that every fan in the world who has bought a ticket also gets a flight and a room ... We need enough accommodation for the guests and a high and secure transport capacity’.2
Not surprisingly, therefore, questions of infrastructural development and capacity were to be uppermost in the discussions about South Africa’s state of preparedness for the 2010 tournament. Reporting in the international media meanwhile reflected a deep-seated sense of international scepticism over the country’s ability to host an event of that magnitude. As such, ‘getting it right’ as far as infrastructural developments for the tournament was concerned, was as essential for the long-term socio-economic legacies such developments could leave as it was for a successful tournament and positive assessments of the World Cup.
Added to this, the implementation of an appropriate World Cup security plan presented another challenge – and cost – to South African authorities. This is because in addition to the standard security measures that need to be undertaken for a tournament of this kind – directed against hooliganism and the prevention of potential terror attacks – authorities also needed to take measures against crime. South Africa has gained international notoriety for the depth of crime and social violence in the country (see the chapter by David Bruce in this volume); indeed, this reputation has widely been regarded as a deterrent to potential foreign visitors to the tournament. To a significant extent, therefore, the 2010 World Cup security plan also had to consist of an effective communication strategy to counter negative international perceptions of the country. Drawing on, inter alia, assistance from Germany and international bodies such as Interpol, the security blueprint for the tournament had to be approved by FIFA.
During June 2009 South Africa hosted the Confederations Cup which, although smaller in scale than the World Cup, was regarded as the dry run for the bigger tournament. It became clear during the Confederations Cup that the country’s World Cup security plans were in need of improvement. A few days before the start of the Cup, for instance, the Local Organising Committee (LOC) had failed to appoint a security company, necessitating the hasty deployment of an additional number of officers from the South African police force. A few incidents of crime occurred against Confederation Cup visitors (mainly robberies), which were widely reported in the international media. The LOC consequently indicated that they would deploy 41 000 new security staff and that the police force would provide 700 officers to patrol World Cup venues during 2010. Yet South Africa had much to do to counter widespread cynicism about the ability of overstretched security and policing infrastructure to deliver an effective World Cup anti-crime strategy. It is unclear, however, what the long-term financial implications of this would be.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the contemporary era sport mega-events have come to be regarded by many governments – increasingly those in the global South – as a critical pathway to development. In truth, however, the temporal and spatial characteristics of mega-events significantly determine the kinds of short- and long-term effects these events could have. In this, mega-events pose some major tests to the standard precepts of conventional development theory: extensive in scale, sectorally focused and concentrated in duration, these events clash with what are today widely accepted notions of inclusive and broad-based development. With reference to the Olympic Games, for instance, Frey et al (2007:2) note that:
(A)ctually, the high concentration implied by the Games in terms of time (a two-week event), space (one host city only, or even specific areas within the city) and investment (the operating and infrastructure costs of the Games are in billions) seems to conflict with the concept of sustainable development, that calls for the distribution and sharing of environmental, social and economic impacts across time and space for spreading benefits and minimising negative effects on the whole society.
There was much anticipation both within and beyond South Africa over the legacies of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and what South Africa’s hosting of the event could mean for a country in which levels of social inequality, violence and deprivation are high. While the event might leave an important political legacy, it was less clear what its long-term economic effects would be.
Further, in a gloomy current international economic environment, and given the fact that national growth prospects have been adversely affected by the country’s energy supply deficit, it is reasonable to expect that by the time the final totting-up has been done it will be found that the South African government ended up spending much more on the 2010 World Cup than it had initially anticipated, even though some might regard that as already exorbitant. On the other hand, some economists argued that the World Cup did have positive stimulatory effects which could help offset the deflationary path which the economy is expected to undergo over the next few years.
In the lead-up to the World Cup, the government of President Jacob Zuma had had to contend with growing social unrest, municipal strikes and demands for improved service delivery. Social protest had progressively grown in scale and violence during the course of 2009. While it was not directly related to the World Cup, it is noteworthy that there was an increasing spontaneous tide of civic action that questioned what