More specifically, he argues that nomadic warriors are the only group capable of founding or conquering the new states. The social sources of their military might stem from their unique lifestyle: a generally frugal and disciplined existence, sturdy and functional military organisation, and intense bonds of kinship and solidarity. The rigours of nomadic life, perpetual involvement in the violent conflicts, loyalty to their chieftains and tight group attachments enable tribes not only to establish states, but also to maintain the stability of state rule. While the tribal cohesion generates military power and security, city life remains crucial for economic productivity, day-to-day governance, and social and cultural development. Although the nomadic warriors are good at conquering lands, protecting and policing towns, they are quite feeble at generating ‘luxury goods, clothing, sophisticated cuisine, refined pleasures, relatively sumptuous houses, and social accomplishment’ (Lacoste, 1984: 96). Hence a prosperous and stable civilisation entails a symbiotic relationship between the two principal social strata – tribal warriors and urban dwellers.
Nevertheless, as civilisations advance, they also sow seeds of their own demise. As Ibn Khaldun (2005: 296) emphasises: ‘The goal of civilization is sedentary culture and luxury. When civilization reaches that goal, it turns towards corruption and starts being senile, as happens in the natural life of living beings.’ Since the state’s stability is grounded in asceticism, moral purity, tribal solidarity and loyalty, once the tribal warriors settle in towns their frugality and social cohesion evaporate and they slowly, but surely, become corrupted by the luxuries of sedentary life. Hence all civilisations undergo cyclical transformations with periodic growth, expansion and inevitable decline.
For Ibn Khaldun the rise and fall of civilisations is determined by the complex social relationships rooted in the changing political dynamics. In his view the durable social order entails not only coercion, but also a substantial degree of group solidarity. Life outside the state is dependent on the social cohesion of lineage, kinship and deep friendships. The nomadic tribes living in inhospitable environments where there is a chronic shortage of food and water and constant dangers of raiders, carnivorous animals and natural disasters would not be able to survive without strong group attachments. In his own words: ‘Those who have no one of their own lineage feel affection for their fellows. If danger is in the air … such a man slinks away… Such people, therefore, cannot live in the desert’ (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 98).
Group Feeling
One of Ibn Khaldun’s central concepts is asabiya, meaning a strong group feeling, often associated with unity, group consciousness, social cohesion and intense solidarity. Although it is frequently rooted in kinship or tribal lineage, it is not reduced to ‘blood relations’. On the contrary, for Ibn Khaldun asabiya refers to a ‘capacity for collective will-formation and commitment to sustained action’, which is not necessarily linked with one’s family ties but can also include a sense of attachment that resembles blood relations (Arnason and Stauth, 2004: 34; Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 264). As Gellner (1981: 27) emphasises, ‘“blood” is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of cohesion; it is merely a way of talking about it’. This is explicitly stated in The Muqaddimah: ‘The affection everyone has for his clients and allies results from the feeling of shame that comes to a person when one of his neighbours, relatives, or a blood relation is in any way humiliated’ (Ibn Khaldun, 2005: 273). Asabiya is expressed as the intense, mutual interdependence, affection and willingness to help one’s comrades. It involves a close-knit group solidarity, unity and determination to sacrifice for one’s tribe, clan or a circle of friends and neighbours. As such it generates particular group dynamics often articulated as a superior organisational might: ‘Group feeling produces the ability to defend oneself, to protect oneself and to press one’s claims. Whoever loses his group feeling is too weak to do any one of these things’ (p. 289). Moreover, strong asabiya, often created and reinforced in war and military struggle, is the principal source of political power and authority.
As Ibn Khaldun makes clear in one of his most quoted sentences, ‘Leadership exists only through superiority and superiority only through group feeling.’ In other words, social cohesion generated on the battlefields and in the harsh living conditions of North African deserts fosters a unique form of solidarity, which is an essential prerequisite for political power. Ibn Khaldun identifies the strength of asabiya as a crucial reason why the various imperial armies had difficulty in conquering Maghreb lands. In contrast to the Spain and Egypt of his times, which provided little resistance as ‘they are now free of tribes and group feelings’ (p. 334), the Maghrebian Berber tribes who possess a high degree of asabiya were able to repel the imperial powers. Asabiya provided a mechanism for social cohesion, and hence military prowess, that no conqueror could easily destroy.
In this context, intense group feelings also tended to overpower other sources of identification, including religion. Although nearly all of the fourteenth-century North African tribes were pious Muslims, when directly confronted to choose between their tribal solidarity and the Islamic universalism of umma, the tendency was to opt for the former over the latter. Whereas the cities were the cradle of this civilising universalism, the countryside, was the beacon of diversity and civil virtue.
For Ibn Khaldun the tribal warrior vs. urban dweller dichotomy is at the heart of historical change. The urban centres generate economic growth, prosperity, civilisational refinement, religious and cultural development, but none of these advancements would be possible without the political stability and military protection provided by the tribal warrior groupings. Furthermore, unlike the tribal countryside, which is characterised by a defence-intensive egalitarianism of frugal and uncertain living, urban life is more comfortable but also deeply stratified and hierarchical. Paradoxically, the origins of this social stratification are to be found in the previous conquests of tribal warriors.
It is no coincidence that the cities were regularly established, conquered and ruled by dynasties of militarised tribes and clans. The rulers establish their legitimacy through lineage with the particular tribes, and maintain their power through their tribal links and group solidarities. In other words, asabiya is not only a form of group cohesion but also a means of political power exercised by the tribal chiefs. Relying on this social device of group unity, the rulers impose their power in the cities. Nevertheless, as social hierarchies develop and grow in the urban environment, they undermine the egalitarian principles that underpin tribal social cohesion. It is a strong asabiya that allows the warrior tribes to acquire military might and it is this same cohesive quality that fosters political domination. However, as social solidarity is built in the harsh conditions of the countryside, once the tribal warriors settled permanently in the cities, the building blocks of social cohesion gradually erode. As the ruling groups embrace a life of luxury, stability, certainty and abundance their moral principles tend to change. Once the rulers lose their tribal ties and become highly corrupt, their political and ideological power is destabilised, leading to internal dissent and ultimately providing conditions for those new tribal invaders who are eager to establish their own dynasty.
Contemporary Relevance and Applications
There is no doubt that Confucius’s teachings had much more impact on the state policies and the social behaviour of millions of people, than those of Ibn Khaldun. For one thing Confucianism was an official state doctrine of China for more than 2,000 years. From the second century bce (during the Han dynasty) until 1948, Confucian teachings were institutionalised as the principal state narrative and as such were integral to the system of education that reproduced the civil service structure of Mandarin