46Ibid., pp. 25, 178.
47Ibid., p. 13.
48Ibid., p. 26.
49Ibid., p. 29.
50Ibid., p. 29.
51Ibid., p. 39.
52Ibid., p. 2.
53Ibid., p. 17
54Ibid., p. 37. Similarly, on p. 48 Robinson talks about ‘the demise of the pretense of a God’s-eye point of view in Wittgenstein’s world’ and on p. 160 he says that ‘Wittgenstein and, more famously, Beckett, work from a street-level where no God’s-eye point of view is possible, though we may find ourselves waiting for it’.
55Ibid., p. 160.
56Ibid., p. 171.
57Ibid., pp. 49–50.
58Ibid., p. 50.
59Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §109.
60Robinson, Wittgenstein and Political Theory, p. 26.
61Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §103.
62Ibid., §109.
63Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.111. In remark 4.1121 Wittgenstein also says that psychology is no closer to philosophy than any other natural science.
64Ibid., 4.112.
65Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books, p. 18.
66Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §109.
67Ibid., PPF xii.
68I should acknowledge here that there is some foundation in Wittgenstein’s work for understanding his philosophy as being therapeutic and that Wittgenstein is sometimes interpreted in this light. For example, in The Big Typescript Wittgenstein describes his philosophical approach as analogous to psychoanalysis (433e) and in Philosophical Investigations, §133, Wittgenstein compares philosophical methods to therapies. However, I think too much can be made of the comparison with psychoanalysis or with therapy. Peter Hacker makes this case well in his response to Gordon Baker’s late interpretation of Wittgenstein (see ‘Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein’, in Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian, and Oskari Kuusela (eds), Wittgenstein and His Interpreters, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
69Ibid., §109.
70P. M. S. Hacker gives an excellent account of the nature of philosophy and contrasts it with other disciplines in his ‘Philosophy: Contribution Not to Human Knowledge but to Human Understanding’, which has been published in a collection of his essays – Wittgenstein: Comparisons & Context, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
71Such as S. Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, Oxford: Clarendon, 1979; and S. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
72I will discuss Pitkin’s work in my chapter on justice. Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice.
73J. W. Danford, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: A Reexamination of the Foundations of Social Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
74Crary and Read, The New Wittgenstein.
75Temelini also categorizes other contributors to Heyes’s volume The Grammar of Politics as democratic/liberal Wittgensteinians. Heyes, The Grammar of Politics.
76See, e.g. G. Pohlhaus and J. Wright, ‘Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy’, Political Theory, vol. 30, no. 6, 2002, pp. 800–27.
77See P. O’Connor, Oppression and Responsibility: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Social Practices and Moral Theory, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, as well as her book Morality and Our Complicated Form of Life, which is discussed above.
78See, e.g. A. Tanesini, Wittgenstein: A Feminist Interpretation, Cambridge: Polity, 2004.
79Juliette Harkin and Rupert Read argue that it is a mistake to categorize Winch in this way in their review of Temelini’s book. See J. Harkin and R. Read, ‘Book Review – Michael Temelini: Wittgenstein and the Study of Politics’, Review of Politics, vol. 78, no. 2, 2016, p. 331.
80Temelini says of therapeutic/sceptical readings that ‘the politics that necessarily derives from this is conservative, negative, or contingent’ (Wittgenstein and the Study of Politics, p. 95).
81Ibid.,