On the Scottish side, during the spring of that year Bishop Lamberton attempted to keep the Bruce and Comyn factions from breaking apart completely by persuading John Comyn and Ingram Umfraville to resign in favour of a single ‘neutral’ guardian. The proposed candidate was Sir John Soules, related by marriage to the Comyns but a close neighbour of the Bruces. Soules assumed his post in the spring of 1301 in time to meet the next English invasion. A strong indication that Soules was in fact a nominee of John Balliol came through the new procedure that was adopted for documents sent under the seal of Scotland. These were issued under the name of King John, or of Edward Balliol as his heir, with the guardian standing as witness.
For his 1301 campaign which again aimed at destroying Scottish resistance in the southwest Edward I split his invading forces in two. One detachment under his command was to advance from Berwick on the east coast towards Stirling, while his son, Edward Caernarvon, Prince of Wales, was to move along the western side of Scotland; the intention was to close the pincers near Stirling and catch the defenders in a great net. However the strategy failed, largely because Soules slowed the king by threatening his lines of communication, while in the west Robert Bruce, who had built up his forces in Carrick, succeeded in holding on to Turnberry Castle until September. As a result the Prince of Wales got no further than Whithorn on Galloway’s southern coast and eventually returned to Carlisle before joining his father, who decided to spend the winter at Linlithgow.
Edward I chose Linlithgow as a convenient base in readiness for a further campaign during the spring of 1302 but in the face of French pressure he agreed to a nine-month truce which, in fact, meant there could be no further invasion of Scotland until early 1303. Throughout 1301 political events had swung in the Scots’ favour: at the papal court their brilliant advocate, Master Baldred Bisset, effectively demolished Edward’s arguments over his right to occupy Scotland and in the summer of the same year John Balliol was released from papal custody and allowed to return to his estates at Bailleul in Picardy. There was even talk of a French army being sent to reinstate him in Scotland.
These events were not to the liking of the English king nor Robert Bruce. While as a patriot he had demonstrated he would do everything possible to oppose English invasions, the restoration of John Balliol promised to bring Balliol’s son, Edward, to Scotland who would effectively block Bruce’s claim to the throne. In any case, while Bruce had fought for Scotland since 1297 he had arguably not exercised the influence in affairs he considered his position warranted. He had been unable to exercise his due powers as joint guardian through the hostility of his fellow titleholder towards him and his supporters. His Scottish estates had been devastated and the chance of John Balliol resuming power not only threatened his ambitions for the throne but endangered his chances of inheriting Annandale on the imminent death of his sick father. The prospect of the country being run by Comyns along with French forces committed to holding in trust any lands of nobles who, like himself, had opposed Edward I, was his worst nightmare. His best chance of securing his rightful estates lay with Edward I and because the Scottish patriots had turned to the Balliol family as their regal leaders, any chance Bruce might have with regard to the Scottish throne also seemed to lie in the hands of the English king. On the basis of such reasoning Bruce left the Scottish patriots and joined his father in the service of Edward I.
Despite their undoubted successes during 1301 the loss of Bruce, a leader of outstanding potential and de facto leader of his powerful family, was a major setback in Scotland’s struggle for independence and a great bonus for Edward. The importance of Bruce’s change of allegiance can be seen in the wording of the open memorandum drafted by the English king upon Bruce’s submission. By it Bruce’s titles and claims were acknowledged, including the key one to the Scottish crown – although how much Edward would have supported the latter in reality is open to question – ‘… (if) the Kingdom of Scotland may be removed from out of the King’s hands (which God forbid!) and handed over to Sir John Balliol or to his son or that the right may be brought into dispute, or reversed and contradicted in a fresh judgement, the King grants Robert that he may pursue his right and the King will hear him fairly and hold him to justice in the King’s court.’2
Along with Bruce’s defection the Scots suffered other serious setbacks during 1302. On 11 July the French cavalry were defeated by Flemish peasant soldiers at Courtrai and the importance of France’s support for Scotland was weakened proportionately. At about the same time relations between France and the papacy broke down and by August Pope Boniface was writing to the Scottish bishops ordering them to recognise Edward I as their legal ruler.
Notwithstanding, military resistance continued to be mounted against the English. In November 1302, immediately after the expiration of the truce between the two countries, the English king despatched a large reconnaissance force into the countryside southwest of Edinburgh to gather information for his projected expedition the next year. The Scots, under John Comyn and Simon Fraser, with William Wallace a likely addition to their ranks, fell upon the leading elements and at Roslin inflicted heavy casualties upon them. However, no such reverse could prevent Edward I’s full-scale invasion in the following spring. In early 1303 the Scots took the field first and succeeded in capturing Selkirk Castle but the English appeared unstoppable; Edward was determined to conquer Scotland once and for all, whatever men and resources it required. Using prefabricated pontoon bridges (built at enormous expense) he moved across central Scotland and from there to Kinloss on the Moray Firth, which he reached in September. Returning to southern Scotland he stayed at Dunfermline Abbey while his forces were kept in the field until, on the 22 December, the Scots signalled they were willing to negotiate for peace.
On 19 January, 1304, terms were agreed between the two sides. The senior Scottish leaders were treated leniently but Edward summoned a parliament to meet at St Andrews to commence discussions on the full incorporation of the country. This time he determined to bring Scottish nobles into the process and in September 1305 ten Scottish representatives joined twenty-one English officials to draft a new constitution. In accordance with a new legal code, the land – no longer a realm – was to be ruled by a lieutenant appointed by the English king aided by a chancellor and chamberlain.
From the time of his submission early in 1302 Bruce was used by Edward I to help him conquer Scotland, but although Bruce was careful to convince the English king of his loyalty, in reality he offered little more than lip service and displayed scarcely anything of the military brilliance evident in his later years. He seemed determined to contribute nothing more than was absolutely necessary against his native country. For instance, in March 1302 he assured the monks of Melrose Abbey that he would not bring out his ‘army of Carrick’ again for his own purposes ‘unless the whole realm is raised for its defence, when all inhabitants are bound to serve’. In other words he would not bring his men out in support of Edward I.3 During Edward’s twin-pronged invasion of Scotland in 1303 Bruce’s role was limited to serving as Sheriff of Lanark and Ayr and acting as keeper of the castle there, hardly a demanding one for a gifted young leader.4 During the spring of 1304, when the English king asked him to forward siege engines for Edward’s planned assault on Stirling Castle he did so, but omitted to send a vital piece of machinery without which they could not function.5 Following an order from the king to provide troops for the siege he wrote to him explaining his difficulties in doing so.6
In March 1304 Bruce, together with Sir John Seagrave, was ordered to lead a mounted raid on William Wallace and Simon Fraser in Selkirk forest, which was singularly unsuccessful, for while some of their followers were taken, both leaders were alerted to the raid and escaped. This earned Bruce a surprisingly gentle scolding from the king with the words, ‘as the cloak is well made, also make the hood’.7
Shortly afterwards on 21 April Bruce’s father died and there was now no question that the Bruce claims to the throne depended upon him. With his past record and strong ambitions he was playing a highly dangerous role but until late 1305 it appeared to be working. In spite of a secret compact to help Bruce gain the crown of Scotland made between him and Bishop William Lamberton at Cambuskenneth Abbey during the siege of Stirling Castle from May to July 1304, Bruce succeeded in remaining Edward’s favoured son. The written