Another time I intercepted a B-24 and fired into its fuselage. I was sure that my bullets hit home but to my utter surprise the bomber flew away as if nothing happened. I learned later that B-24s were protected by thick resin “armor” around the fuel tanks. We were advised that shooting at B-24s was virtually futile. Even so, whenever we had drinks in the barracks we discussed how to shoot down these giants. Somebody observed, “Their machine gun turrets spin around like this, so it’s useless hitting them from this direction. The best way must be to shoot underneath from the rear of the fuselage.…” Another pilot mentioned, “Wait for it from a higher position in front, fire at it as you dive and then fly under the fuselage to attack on the turnaround.…” These strategies were easier said than done. I was never able to get myself in a position to try them out.
The B-29 bombers (see photos) were bigger than the B-24s and superior in performance. These beasts also ventured into our skies on occasion but wouldn’t hang around long. I assumed that they were on recon missions taking aerial photos of Taiwan before returning to base in China. They flew higher and faster than B-24s. We tried to intercept them, but it took too long for Zeros to reach 8,000 or 9,000 meters. At 6,000 meters I would have to put on an oxygen mask while climbing at full throttle, but the propeller would spin meaninglessly at this altitude because the air was too thin. The speedometer needle fluttered near the bottom of the dial and we’d burn through the fuel. The B-29s soon disappeared above us so we no chance to engage them.
We never heard of any B-24s or B-29s being shot down around Taiwan. We were uneasy that Japan’s leaders were not developing better planes to match these airborne fortresses. It was all we could do to take off and save our planes when they came to bomb our bases. We attempted to engage if they came within a feasible range, but they mostly flew high in the sky leaving us as helpless spectators while they wreaked havoc on our airfields.
The Zero
The Zero was designed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Nakajima Aircraft Company as a carrier-based fighter for the Navy. It debuted in 1940. According to the “Imperial Calendar” in use in Japan at the time, this was the 2,600th year of the founding of Japan, so the Zero was named after the last numeral of this year. The Zero proved itself to be a highly capable fighter plane in the air battles over China, and it featured prominently in the Pacific from December 1941. Greatly respected by the enemy, it remained Japan’s most famous fighter to the end of war. Over 10,400 were produced with ten modified variants. By the end of the war, it was altered again to carry bombs in Kamikaze suicide missions.
The first mass-produced Zero was the Model 21. Its maximum speed was 533km/h, and had a cruising distance of up to 2,530km. It was powered by a 1,000 horsepower engine and was armed with two 7.7mm and two 20mm machine guns. Compared with fighters of other countries, the Zero’s cruising distance was relatively good, it had excellent turning ability, and daunting attacking capacity. These capabilities were enabled by a total weight of only 2.4 tons, almost 1 ton lighter than the Grumman F4F Wildcat (see photos). It was half the weight of the later Grumman F6F Hellcat. Its light weight, however, was only possible through compromises. Its defensive ability and the strength of the airframe was sacrificed making the Zero prone to catching fire when hit. There was no plating to protect the pilot, and if it dived at a velocity of 63040km/h, there was a very real danger of the plane disintegrating in mid-air.
Japan failed to develop a viable successor to the Zero, relying on minor tweaks here and there to bolster firepower. This led to gradual increases in weight which in turn decreased its turning ability. By contrast, U.S. fighter capabilities improved significantly with the development of aircraft like the Hellcat.
Solo and Team Combat
Air tactics began to change as the battle in the Pacific intensified. Before my time it was common for three fighters to make one unit. Japanese pilots would fly in formation until the enemy came into view then would break off to assail targets individually in dogfights. The early Zero pilots were very adept at this mode of attack and used a special “twisting-in” maneuver like a corkscrew loop called “hineri-komi.” When chased by the enemy, the standard Zero tactic was to climb suddenly at maximum speed then turnover at the highest point to steal the advantage. I heard of one situation where a Zero was chasing an American fighter, with another fighter chasing that Zero, and yet another Zero chasing that fighter all in a chain. This scenario suited Japanese pilot tactics. There was always banter of who shot down how many planes and we would celebrate the feats of “Shoot Down Kings” (aces).
The situation started to worsen for us from around the Battle of New Britain (Rabaul) in 1943, especially with the introduction of the new Grumman F6F Hellcats.10 They had double the horsepower of the F4Fs and were a superior machine to our Zeros. They hunted in packs of four and avoided individual dogfights focusing instead on team battles. U.S. pilots researched our strategies thoroughly and formulated maneuvers to take advantage of our weaknesses. For example, our famous sharp-turning hineri-komi defensive ploy had one major drawback in that the Zero’s speed would drop significantly for a few seconds at the point of turnover. One of the four American fighters waiting at altitude targeted this instant and unleashed a spray of lead just as the Zero was about to plunge into the dive. If the Zero was caught in this trap, there was no way to escape.
The Japanese pilots had to adapt to keep ahead of the game, so adopted a similar four fighter team and style of combat. These changes were already being implemented by the time I started my training. We were advised against individual combat and told instead to take the initiative, making concentrated bursts in first contact. This meant that good team-work was vital. The most effective method was to fly at altitude to spot enemy aircraft in advance, then make a rapid dive toward them and shoot at the crossing point. The difference between winning and losing came down to which side detected the enemy first.
When shooting, I would press the center stick trigger with my right thumb for a few seconds. Any longer and the bullets would run out too quickly. It was often impossible to tell whose bullets hit the target but there were occasions when I knew I had hit the mark. Still, the Hellcat never let on that it was hit as its airframe had been redesigned to mitigate the impact of enemy fire. The only way to shoot one down for sure was to make a direct hit on the pilot in the cockpit.
Rainy days were spent in the classroom. We sat cross-legged and listened to lectures outlining the latest American tactics and discussions led by vets who had survived close run-ins with the improved Hellcats. To hone maneuvers in our four-fighter teams, for example, we were told where the first and second aircraft needed to fly. “When the first turns away, the third must follow behind in cover. Then, the second and the fourth which were here must fly in behind the third.…” This was all life-saving advice, but inevitably required incredible discipline and nerve under extreme pressure to execute.
Some officers were still under the false impression that Zeros were superior to Hellcats. One of them asked an instructor, “Why can’t we engage in dogfights to take advantage of the Zero’s agility?” The instructor told him plainly: “That’s impossible. It’s all just empty theory now. Go ahead if you insist, but you’ll be the first one to buy it.”
Instead, we were repeatedly told, “When you face the enemy, fly straight at him like a game of chicken. Never turn away earlier than the enemy. Go in with the intention of letting your propellers bite into his plane. This is the only way they will show their bellies, and that’s when you shoot. They don’t have strong hearts like you boys. Go for their guts.”
Sliding Maneuver
It was often commented that if two fighters with the same capability and skill engaged in combat, the victor would be the one who takes the higher position. If we found ourselves at lower altitude and needed to take evasive action, the first thing we were taught to do was accelerate into a dive. As the enemy followed, the next move was to press hard on the left pedal while pulling the center stick strongly to the right. This would make the Zero slide forward to the diagonal left. I could also do it the opposite way.
The irregular sliding movement generated air turbulence around the Zero, and in turn affected the trajectory of the