From Jail to Jail. Tan Malaka

which was open to them whether they were owned by Filipinos, Chinese, or Americans. Products such as tobacco, sugar, and hemp were able to compete with American goods since Filipino workers were paid less than their American counterparts, either in America proper or in Hawaii and Cuba. But Philippine goods would not have been able to compete with Indonesian goods on the Chinese market, for example. The wages earned by Filipino workers were, on the average, higher than those received by Indonesian workers, and so the cost-price of Philippine tobacco, sugar, or hemp was higher than that for comparable goods from Indonesia. For this reason, Philippine products were tied to the American market, which was open to exports from its protectorate but which imposed heavy import duties on goods from other countries.

      [142] A result of the tying of Philippine exports to the American market was that, in order to establish a balance of trade, the Philippines was compelled to import American goods such as machinery, autos, pharmaceuticals, and electrical equipment. And this meant, first, that American banks and transport enterprises had a monopoly of Philippine goods directed toward the Philippine market, giving a complete monopoly of Philippine export and import trade to American bankers and traders.⁶³ A second result of this arrangement was that such industries as machinery, chemicals, and electrical equipment could not develop in the Philippines. Although it is said that its iron resources exceed those of China or India in both quantity and quality and that other minerals to form alloys (nickel, gronium, bauxite for aluminum and so on) are plentiful, heavy industry has not yet been able to appear in the Philippines.⁶⁴ Industry is nipped in the bud and never develops to the stage of steel and heavy industry.⁶⁵ The University of the Philippines is capable only of churning out thousands of lawyers (abogado) who, due to their excess number, are forced to work as horse-and-cart drivers (cuchero). The third result of the economic ties forced onto the Philippines by Uncle Sam over a period of fifty years is that the “political independence” later granted as a mark of American “goodwill” is an empty independence, filled by the Americans with loans and atom-bomb bases, supposedly to protect the independence of the Philippines.⁶⁶

      The iron hand of Spain produced people of steel like Rizal, Bonifacio, and Mabini, who were able to bring about the destruction of Spanish imperialism. But the rubber hand of American imperialism produced leaders who, even if let fall by their makers, will bounce right back into their hands. The Philippines, whose independence was proclaimed by America in 1946, was forced to accept money and atom bombs from America immediately after it became independent.

      The above picture was drawn from my impressions of some twenty years ago, when I was fortunate enough to obtain information from young and old. But it is clear that the picture does not have its finishing touch, has many weaknesses, and could be improved here and there. I shall leave that task to future historians who shall have more opportunities and more definite information.

      I have forgotten to state what pushed me into going to the Philippines in the first place. It was the climate, which I hoped would restore my health. Finally, with treatment from doctors and the aid of the climate, my health was partially restored. However, a call from the movement in South Indonesia caused me to cut short my efforts to regain my health completely.

      [143] At first I intended to give only a brief outline of what forced me to go to Singapore in spite of my continued ill health. Because of the slanders being broadcast right and left, and the back-stabbing being engaged in by several people, including Alimin, I am forced to add a little (?) to previous explanations.⁶⁷ As before, I shall only be defending myself. I consider that all persons, even those in jail, have the right to combat slander. As the proverb goes: “Words should be answered and blows returned.”⁶⁸ I hope, then, that I shall not exceed my intention of adding this explanation solely in order to defend myself and repulse the slander and lies being spread behind my back.

      After being in Manila several months, I received a letter from Alimin, who asked me to help him come to the Philippines. He felt that the Dutch were about to arrest him. He wanted to stay with me and deepen his knowledge, and I was happy at the thought of living with him. I had met him on two occasions since I had been exiled, and I was looking forward to this third time since I knew he was sociable and cheerful and that he had considerable experience in the (Sarekat Islam) movement.⁶⁹ I discussed this question with friends in the Philippines so that we could make the appropriate secret arrangements. Remember that I myself was living illegally in the Philippines and might have been arrested at any moment.

      In short, Alimin finally arrived safely in the Philippines and was able to stay with friends of mine. After some time the first letter arrived from Singapore, calling me back to assist in obtaining “equipment” in connection with the Prambanan decision.⁷⁰

      I considered that decision to be incorrect for the following reasons:

      1. It was taken hurriedly, without careful consideration;

      2. It resulted from provocation by our enemies and did not correspond to our own strength;

      3. It could not be defended either to the masses or to the Comintern;

      4. It did not correspond to communist strategy and tactics, that is, mass action;

      5. It would result in great harm being done to the movement in Indonesia.

      [144] I showed the letter to Alimin, asking: “Is it true or not that the masses are ready?” He answered: “At most only the masses of Bekasi will come out.” That was indeed the case. Alimin himself had just witnessed the failure of the Semarang strike, which—apart from spreading for a brief moment to the ironworks in Surabaya—had been limited to the printing workers, the ferry-boat operators, and the nurses in Semarang.⁷¹ As for the half million sugar workers and peasants, the workers at the tea, coffee, quinine, rubber, fiber, and other plantations, the coal, cement, tin, and oil workers as well as those in the railways, tramways, shipping, and auto transport, they were all as yet unorganized and still quiescent. In terms of organization, discipline, and politics, they had no weight at all.

      From Manila I proposed that the Prambanan decision be rediscussed in Singapore by a more complete group of leaders. I considered that I had to do this, because of my responsibilities to the Comintern. If the decision were reaffirmed, then at least I had discharged my obligations and, as a section of the Comintern, the PKI could not simply ignore my proposal.⁷²

      Singapore apparently did not really understand me and sent several more letters asking me to come. Finally, in the printing workers’ building in Manila, Alimin proposed that he be authorized to go to Singapore to make the arrangements for a conference such as I had proposed.⁷³ He believed that he would be able to call together the responsible comrades while I continued my treatment in Manila. When everything was ready, he would send word from Singapore for me to come.

      We worked out a code: what he would say if they agreed with the proposal, if they disagreed, or if they were undecided. In addition I wrote a short sketch of what I considered the situation in Indonesia to be and the strategy and tactics I proposed. Alimin himself typed it all—the code, the analysis, and my proposals.

      My analysis was in accordance with what I had written in Thesis.⁷⁴ Briefly, it included such points as the following:

      1. The party was not yet disciplined;

      2. The workers and peasants were insufficiently organized;

      3. The masses and the other parties (Budi Utomo, NIP, Sarekat Islam, Perserikatan Minahasa, etc.) were not yet close to the PKI;⁷⁵

      4. The imperialist world outside Indonesia (Britain, France, and America) was still strong and united.

      My proposals were in line with what I had written two years earlier (1923) in Naar de ‘Republiek Indonesia’ [Towards the Republic of Indonesia], with what I had recently written in Semangat moeda [Young spirit], and with what I was to write and have printed hurriedly in Singapore under the title of Massa actie [Mass action].

      In brief, I proposed to achieve an independent Indonesia through mass action. And the development of this mass action, if all conditions were right, would be approximately