The fusion took place on 7 November, the anniversary of the Russian revolution. The new party, announced as “anti-fascist, anticapitalist and anti-imperialist,” was called Partai Murba. Its office bearers were General Chairperson Sukarno, First Deputy Maruto Nitimihardjo, Second Deputy Sutan Dewanis, and Secretary-General Sjamsu Harya Udaya. Tan Malaka and Rustam Effendi (who had represented the Communist party of the Netherlands in the prewar Dutch parliament) were elected by the congress as “promoters” of the party, but were not given any official position within it.15
Partai Murba had both a minimum and maximum program. The Minimum Program followed that of the old Persatuan Perjuangan, with a few amendments to conform to current conditions. The Maximum Program was a completely new feature and charted a course towards construction of a socialist Indonesia. In structure, Partai Murba was to be democratic-centralist.16
There is some uncertainty about Tan Malaka’s precise role in the formation of Partai Murba. Most observers, at the time and subsequently, regarded it as “his” party, assuming that it was formed on his initiative.17 One of his close followers, Hasan Sastraatmadja, with whom he was staying after his release from prison, considers that Tan Malaka played a more passive role.18 Whether the party was formed on his initiative or not, the fact is that Tan Malaka strongly supported its formation, as can be seen from his articles of the time, which included a long explanation and defense of the Maximum Program.19
The Partai Murba did attract considerable support. On its formation it was estimated to have eighty thousand members, most of whom were originally members of Partai Rakyat.20 Two newspapers, Moerba and Massa, were considered to be official organs of the party, while Kedaulatan Rakyat (the largest paper in Yogyakarta) and Merdeka (from Solo) were regarded as pro-Partai Murba publications.21
The first mass action staged by the Partai Murba was planned for 15 November, the second anniversary of the Sjahrir-Amir government’s announcement that the Linggajati Agreement had been installed, to be commemorated as a “day of shame.” All party branches were instructed to hold meetings and, if possible, mass demonstrations. The provisional military governors of Solo, Madiun, Semarang, and Pati refused to allow mass demonstrations but did permit meetings, to be attended only by invited guests. However, even these were prevented at the last minute. In Yogyakarta a mass meeting was held with AKOMA leader Ibnu Parna as one of the main speakers, but he was arrested on 21 November as a result of that speech.22
Tensions between supporters of diplomasi and perjuangan rose as a result of reports that the republican government was prepared to “surrender key powers to the Dutch . . . during an interim period”23 and specifically that the republic would agree that the Dutch had the right to dispatch troops to an area that they unilaterally decided was becoming unstable—a right that the republic had previously adamantly opposed conceding.
The perjuangan forces were outraged by this ominous development and called for a political front against negotiations. Principal parties to this development were the left wing of the PNI, the Partai Murba, and the Partai Sosialis Islam Indonesia (PSII-the Indonesian Islamic Socialist Party). The formation was known as the Kongres Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People’s Congress), and on 14 December it issued a call for a national congress to be held in Solo 24-26 December 1948.24
In early December the news agency Aneta reported mounting unrest and commented on the circulation of leaflets predicting that the revolution would break forth in greater intensity on 1 January 1949. Specifically it reported, “2 km from Probolinggo a field police went into action against the notorious Patjar Merah gang on Monday evening. . . .”25
The seriousness with which this challenge to the government was regarded in mid-December can be gauged by the following quotation from a liberal Dutch newspaper. Commenting on the fact that foreign countries had supported Hatta because he had proved he could hold his own against communism, Algemeen Handelsblad added, “They forget, however, that Hatta is under the domination of Tan Malaka’s Trotskyist radical front, which is but communism under a different name.”26
Throughout October and November, Tan Malaka and the Partai Murba had stressed the likelihood that the Dutch would launch a second attack, expected around 20 November.27 The government was criticized for maintaining a position of absolute confidence in the Dutch, believing that they would not attack while negotiations were in progress.
Tan Malaka was not the only person to articulate these views. In particular, a number of army commanders had long dissociated themselves from the various governments’ policies of diplomasi, arguing, especially in the 1945-1946 period, for more reliance on perjuangan and popular resistance. Indeed, as shown in Volume III of the autobiography, even Supreme Commander General Sudirman had been a militant supporter of the Persatuan Perjuangan. (Colonel A. H. Nasution provides considerable information on the perjuangan perspectives of the army high command in his history of the revolution, Sekitar perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia.)
While continuing the negotiations right up until the end, the government did make some preparations for the contingency of a second Dutch attack. In November, Minister of Finance Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was dispatched to Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra, carrying with him the authority to head the republican government from there, should the president and vice president be unable to function.28 (Although the surat warisan [testament] had not formally been revoked, no one regarded it as still in effect in 1948.)29 Further, several days before the actual attack, the republican representative in Washington, Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, was quoted by the Dutch newspaper Algemeen Handelsblad as saying that the republic was prepared to establish a government-in-exile in the event of an attack.30
Tan Malaka decided to leave Yogyakarta, both in the interest of self-defense and of following his own prescription to build up a resistance and an infrastructure outside the capital. He had been pressed, ever since he had been released from jail in September, to retreat to the security of West Java under the protection of the Lasykar Rakyat Jawa Barat (West Java People’s Militia), which had long been one of the strongest supporters of his policies of perjuangan.31 Pressures came from many sides, however, and eventually he decided to go to East Java—to the Solo River Valley, which he had identified in 1924 as the center of the revolution, necessary for its survival.32 On 12 November he left Tugu station, Yogyakarta, bound for Kediri. He was accompanied by thirty-five guerrilla fighters—twenty from the Lasykar Rakyat Jawa Barat and fifteen from the Barisan Banteng (Wild Buffalo Force).33 The group was escorted by his old PARI comrade, Djamaluddin Tamim, and Abdul Muluk Djalil from West Java, who had been close to him since September 1945. The group’s military commander was Captain Dimin, from Serang, West Java. They set up headquarters in Kediri and began discussing coordination of regular and irregular troops sympathetic to their politics.34
This small group, which considered itself a personal bodyguard for Tan Malaka, was attached to Battalion 38/Sabaruddin, which had on 25 October 1948 been made part of the Kediri-based Brigade S/Surachmad of the East Java Brawijaya Division.35 Evidently, it was this offer of protection by a part of the regular military forces that swayed Tan Malaka in deciding exactly where to go on leaving Yogyakarta. Sabaruddin, an Acehnese who had grown up in East Java, had a reputation for ferocity, some say brutality. Known as “the lion of Sidoarjo” in the early days of the revolution, he was dismissed from the military police in early 1946 for insubordination. He was readmitted, together with his militia, into the regular army only after “proving himself” in the rout of Madiun.36 One source has it that he met Tan Malaka in 1946 in Wirogunan jail, Yogyakarta,37 while others say they met only in the period leading up to the foundation congress of Partai Murba.38 In any event, Sabaruddin apparently admired Tan Malaka, agreed with his politics of perjuangan, and offered him protection. On Tan Malaka’s part, while association with such a man may not have been politically advantageous, after the experience of the 1946 arrests and in the certainty of a Dutch attack,