From Disarmament to Rearmament. Sheldon A. Goldberg

representatives, was created in December 1943, but agreement on the function of the committee was never really reached. In addition, the perspectives of the state and war departments regarding the tasks to be performed by Allied military forces during the occupation were greatly at odds with one another and began long before the war in Europe ended. In fact, until 1948, the State Department maintained liaison with the War Department on German issues through an “Occupied Areas” office, as it did not have a German division.⁹

      As an example, when the EAC held its first meeting in January 1944, three months after it was formed, Ambassador John G. Winant, the US representative, had yet to receive any guidance from Washington concerning the main task of the meeting (i.e., preparing surrender terms for Germany). Furthermore, according to Winant’s biographer, the ambassador received only one policy directive with authoritative clearances between March and October 1944. During this period, Winant sent his political advisor, George F. Kennan, to Washington to seek guidance, to no avail, and in July 1944, Winant’s military advisor, Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham, also personally appealed to the WSC for policy guidance with little apparent success. Washington’s failure to provide guidance was also felt by Eisenhower, who, following the entry of US combat forces into Germany in September 1944, urgently requested guidance from Washington regarding the control and occupation of Germany.¹⁰ The infighting within the WSC precluded any effective communication or coordination until early March 1944.¹¹

      It appears that the multiplicity of agencies, both military and civilian, in the United States and Great Britain made the posthostilities planning process thorough and extremely broad in its coverage, but also overly bureaucratic, cumbersome and, to some degree, duplicative. From the end of the war in Europe until the USSR walked out of the Allied Control Council (ACC) in 1948, the disarmament and demilitarization process was increasingly encumbered by political obstacles that left many tasks unresolved. Thus, as will be seen, it was left to SHAEF to formulate the plans that would permit Eisenhower to carry out the tasks required to disarm German soldiers, disband and demobilize Germany’s armed forces, dispose of German war matériel, and begin the process of demilitarizing Germany.

       Initial Thoughts on Disarming Germany

      In late November 1943, using the initial posthostilities plan Operation Rankin Case C,¹² COSSAC drafted an initial study that provided suggestions for the composition of the disarmament detachments that would supervise the process to be effected by the German High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres, or OKH). This was, of course, predicated on the belief that German troops remained subject to the discipline of the OKH. The proposed disarmament detachments were to be small and consist only of the personnel needed to communicate the orders of the Allied High Command and supervise their observance. A follow-up study highlighted several areas of concern, such as the guarding of dumps and the responsibility for disarming the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) and Navy (Kriegsmarine). It was also brought up that as the naval ports and facilities were on land, creating points of contact with land forces, they should not be the unilateral responsibility of the Admiralty.¹³

      On 23 December 1943, the first full draft of COSSAC’s disarmament study was forwarded to general staff officers (GSOs 1) for review. Its objective outlined the steps to be taken by the supreme commander to enforce disarmament of the German Army in his area of responsibility (AOR) between the time of the envisioned armistice and the transfer of responsibility to a disarmament commission. The scope of this paper covered German forces outside Germany, German forces in transit over the frontiers of Germany, and German forces in Germany. Contrary to the initial study, it stated that naval disarmament was an Admiralty responsibility and thus would not be considered in the paper.¹⁴

      The draft disarmament study also indicated that the posthostilities subcommittee was drafting a paper on the composition and functions of a European disarmament commission for consideration by the COSSAC and, upon approval by the British government, submission to the EAC. That said, the study postulated that the supreme commander, Allied Forces (SCAF) would be responsible for the complete disarmament of the German armed forces until the transfer of responsibility to the disarmament commission took place—a period expected to be approximately two months. It absolved the SCAF of any responsibility for the disbanding of the German armed forces or the dismantling and destruction of German fortifications and similar works.

      Among the several main considerations in this paper was the admonition that disarmament was to be immediate and that no German should be allowed to enter Germany bearing arms. Citing the circumstances that followed World War I, the paper stated that “after the last war it was possible for the Germans to pretend that the German Army had never been beaten in the field because it returned to Germany still bearing its arms. This is another mistake which must not be repeated.”¹⁵ It also reminded its readers that the German Army had been able to hinder the effectiveness of the Military Control Commission after the last war, which was why total disarmament needed to be carried out immediately after the armistice, without exceptions. By 1 January 1944, the second draft of this study had grown in size and detail, adding sections for action by the air commander in chief as well as ground and air force commanders.

      An unofficial assessment of this disarmament issue by the land forces subcommittee estimated that the British alone would need to provide 270 officers and 1,300 other ranks to man the necessary disarmament detachments, both fixed and mobile. Aside from the security of dumps, depots, and stores of war matériel, two key concerns were that it would prove difficult for Allied forces to enter Germany fast enough to ensure the rapid disarmament of the German forces already inside Germany, and that their ability to supervise the expected millions of disarmed German soldiers found in barracks and camps both inside and outside Germany would be insufficient.¹⁶ That said, the British appear to have believed that creating new staff for disarmament at this time was a waste of already scarce manpower. Instead, it was decided that a number of personnel from the Staff Duties Section would form the nucleus of a disarmament staff until Rankin C conditions were obtained. Colonel Grazebrook was named to undertake this task.¹⁷

      German evasions of the terms of the Versailles Treaty and their protestations that the war had not been lost were themes repeated both in Washington and London. According to the terms of the World War I armistice, the Germans were required to evacuate German-occupied territories on the Western Front within two weeks. Any troops remaining in these areas were to be interned or taken as prisoners of war (POWs). Allied forces were to occupy the left bank of the Rhine within a month, and a neutral zone was to be established on the right bank. In terms of military equipment, the Germans were to turn over to the Allies 5,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 machine guns, 3,000 trench mortars, 2,000 aircraft, 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railway wagons, 5,000 trucks and its entire submarine fleet. The majority of Germany’s surface naval fleet was interned; the remainder was to be disbanded.¹⁸

      A memo by a prominent German lawyer who had fled to the United States and joined the US Army, prepared for Major General John H. Hilldring, chief of the newly formed Civil Affairs Division in the War Department, and written from personal knowledge, stated that when the armistice was signed in 1918, it was signed “at Compiegne at a time when the German armies were holding in Russia, Turkey, the Balkans, Belgium and France. The German soldier did not realize he was defeated. . . . After the proclamation of the Armistice the German troops going back through France and Belgium gave the appearance of well-organized fighting units. They had observed good marching discipline, and were fully equipped with rifles, machine guns and cannons. Their flags were flying and their bands were playing.”¹⁹

      On 14 January 1944, Major General C. A. West (UK), deputy chief of staff (G-3), highlighted in a COSSAC memo the fact that there was a complete lack of UN policy to help deal with problems arising from Operation Rankin. General West specifically addressed the issue of armistice terms and disarmament, stating that there had been considerable guidance from British sources but that they dealt exclusively with long-term policy after the initial occupation of Germany. It was essential now, he wrote, that papers on all these problems be prepared with some urgency. This would allow the SCAF to lay down policy for the first ninety days following the armistice. He then outlined ten issue areas that needed addressing to include armistice terms and disarmament, and assigned both G-3 and G-4 (Logistics) divisions the responsibility