Politics also intruded into the committee’s deliberations. Chairman William Kennon, a Democrat, complained that “it seems from the statement of the gentleman from Trumbull, [Mr. RANNEY] the whigs have over-reached us—the democrats of the committee have been over-reached by their whig associates. We—that is—a part of us have had our sagacity discredited.” While Ranney argued for his minority report in Jacksonian terms, he did not, at least in the reported debates, accuse the committee’s Democrats of knuckling under to the Whigs. Perhaps he leveled such charges during committee meetings or out of session; he insinuated as much in the convention’s second session. Or Kennon may have attributed to Ranney the comments of Democrat Daniel A. Robertson, a vociferous opponent of the majority plan. Robertson in essence accused the committee majority of gerrymandering in its proposal for judicial districts. “The gentlemen of the whig party in the Convention,” avowed Robertson, “could not have devised a better plan than this, to control the judicial system of Ohio” (1:631, 627).
The majority report proposed a judicial system that Ranney portrayed as too complex, too expensive, and too distant from the people. On one key point, though, everyone agreed: the judges would all be chosen by popular vote instead of by the legislature. The committee took this for granted from the start.8 On the lowest rung of the judicial ladder, as recommended in the majority report, stood the township justices of the peace, whose powers and duties would be established by the General Assembly. Then came a county court in each county, with jurisdiction over probate matters and with jurisdiction over such civil appeals and such original and appellate criminal matters as the legislature might provide. Above the county courts were the courts of common pleas. The committee left their jurisdiction entirely up to the legislature, although it apparently contemplated that these would continue to be the trial courts of general jurisdiction. The report called for the state to be divided into nine common pleas districts, in each of which the voters would elect three judges, one or more of whom would hold court in every county in the district as often as the legislature might require (1:586, 51, 431).
The majority report created a new intermediate appellate court called the district court. Each of the nine common pleas districts would have a district court consisting of the three common pleas judges and one justice of the supreme court, with any three of the judges making up a quorum. The district courts would have the same limited original jurisdiction as the supreme court, but their chief purpose would be to hear appeals. In a sentence that would provoke Ranney’s criticism and intense debate in the committee of the whole, the report required that district courts “shall be held in and for each district . . . as often in each year, and at such places in said district as may be prescribed by law” (1:431).
At the apex of the judicial hierarchy envisioned by the majority report stood the supreme court, with a chief justice and three associates. Any three of the justices would constitute a quorum. The report limited the court’s original jurisdiction to special writs and left its appellate jurisdiction up to the General Assembly. The court would hold at least one term annually in the capital and other terms whenever and wherever the legislature might require by law. The electors of the whole state would choose the chief justice. For the election of the associates the nine common pleas districts would be combined into three districts “of compact territory,” each of which would elect one justice. Every additional justice that the legislature might create in the future would be elected by the voters of the entire state (1:430–31).
Ranney’s plan differed radically from the majority proposal. His judicial system consisted of township justices of the peace; a county court in each county having jurisdiction over probate matters and both original and appellate jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases in which the amount in controversy did not exceed three hundred dollars; and a twenty-member supreme court whose original and appellate jurisdiction would be established by law. The General Assembly would be able to create a separate probate judgeship in any county having forty thousand or more people as well as other courts inferior to the supreme court (1:551).
Ranney recommended that the state be divided into ten judicial districts bounded by county lines. Each district would elect two supreme court judges, at least one of whom would hold court in each county in the district two or more times each year. The state would also be divided into a minimum of three “convenient districts” in each of which the supreme court in bank would hold session at least once annually for the sole purpose of hearing appeals. Under Ranney’s scheme, five judges would make up the court in bank. The judge in each of five alternating judicial districts with the shortest time to serve would sit in bank one year, and a judge from each of the other districts would serve the next. The chief judge would be chosen from among the members serving as provided by law (1:551).
On June 26, 1850, the committee of the whole took up the majority report. After the committee agreed to have all supreme court judges elected on a statewide basis, Ranney moved to require every district court to meet annually in each county in the district. The motion touched off a strenuous, ill-tempered debate. In an extended defense of the majority’s position, which did not have the district court meeting in each county, Swan observed that the district court, as an appellate body, would be a “mere paper court,” a “lawyer’s court,” at which there would be no need for parties, witnesses, or jurors. It would be a waste of time and money to have this court traipse around from county to county. Swan then made it clear that the biggest problem with the existing judicial system was the workload of the supreme court. That tribunal, he said, was “emphatically a stirrup court, chasing from county to county,” and forced “to decide promptly and without careful deliberation” in order to avoid “deny[ing] justice by delay.” Under the majority proposal, the district courts would be a “breakwater to prevent the flow of business into the supreme court.” Indeed, the only reason for the supreme court to meet in bank would be to settle differences among the circuits (1:586, 590–92).
Stanbery and fellow Whig Simeon Nash also assailed Ranney’s proposed amendment. It would, they said, leave no discretion to the legislature to make adjustments to suit the needs of different districts. It would encumber the supreme and common pleas judges who made up the district court with impossible schedules. The amendment would in effect restore the old system that had caused all the problems in the first place and led to the calling of the constitutional convention. Even Peter Hitchcock, who sympathized with Ranney’s insistence that the court remain close to the people, opposed the amendment. Noting that the district and supreme courts were chiefly courts of appeal, Hitchcock denied that the judges would be too pressed for time to travel to every county in the district. However, he objected to fixing the meeting times and places in the constitution. He preferred to leave those matters to legislative discretion (1:595–97).
The debate ranged well beyond Ranney’s proposed amendment to embrace the cost of the majority plan, the need to attract competent lawyers to the bench, and other issues. With the discussion covering so much ground, Ranney reentered the fray, insisting that his constituents had sent him to the convention to represent their opinions and that he would do so “without fear, favor or affection,” notwithstanding the eminence of his opponents on the judiciary committee. The people demanded reform of the judiciary. Before defending the specific proposals of his report, Ranney laid out its animating principles. “[T]he practical operation of the law through the Judiciary,” he declaimed, “is the most important of all the operations of our government.” Without it, the other branches of government “can do nothing towards carrying justice home to the people.” Justice delayed was justice denied and fostered disrespect for the law. “Delay in the administration of justice to those who are seeking to recover their rights,” he said, “is calculated to destroy their peace of mind, diminish their regard for, and confidence in, the judicial tribunals, and to keep convulsed whole neighborhoods, embittering the fountains of social life” (1:604–5).
Ranney