Slaves, Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar. Abdul Sheriff

to Peter Garlake, only ‘a slow deterioration in the standards of workmanship is discernible’. This occurs not only when cultural links with the motherland weaken, but also when commercial connections are strengthened, permitting new imports to extinguish some indigenous workmanship. Thus increased imports of Chinese porcelain began to replace the exquisitely carved coral decorations on mosques and tombs. The reliance of the coast on the international connection was so complete that when the Portuguese cut the economic lifelines across the ocean, the mercantile civilisation suffered a major setback. Some of the most prosperous city-states, such as Kilwa, never recovered their medieval glory.¹⁰

Portuguese intervention

      In 1497 the Portuguese inaugurated what K.M. Pannikar has described as ‘the Vasco da Gama epoch of history’. It was characterised, first, by the ruthless destruction of the pre-existing system of international trade in the Indian Ocean and its forcible integration into the emerging international economic system dominated by Europe, then in transition from feudalism to capitalism. It was also characterised by the dominance of maritime power over the land masses of Asia, and by the imposition of a foreign commercial economy over social formations originally mainly based on agricultural production and internal trade. In their crusade, ‘commerce and Christianity’ were closely intertwined, the former providing the material motivation, the latter the ideological justification. Royal instructions to Portuguese captains enjoined them ‘to conduct war with the Muslim and trade with the heathen’. Should the infidels prove unwilling either to be converted or to engage in trade, then the spiritual weapon of the cross was to be augmented by the carnal weapon of the sword.¹¹

      The Portuguese objective was to capture the Indian Ocean trade and divert it from its traditional paths across western Asia to their own maritime artery round the Cape of Good Hope, thus outflanking the Italian-Muslim monopoly over the spice trade. Their geopolitical strategy involved the blocking of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf by capturing Aden and Hurmuz, the capture of Malacca and Goa to control and centralise the Far Eastern and Indian trade, and the establishment of a provisioning station at Mozambique. The threatened interests of Venice, Egypt and the Indian Ocean merchant classes combined to thwart Portuguese designs commercially, by attempting to deny them access to spices, and militarily, by trying to defeat Portuguese naval power. The latter strategy failed at Diu in 1509, but the Portuguese, with their limited human and financial resources, failed to supplant the preexisting system in the Indian Ocean completely.

      Along the East African coast, the maritime and mercantile Swahili city-states were vulnerable. Their economic and political foundations were based on the transit trade. By the end of the fifteenth century the coastal mercantile economy was bifocal, dominated in the north by Mombasa as the most convenient port for the northern, especially Indian, dhows and in the south by Kilwa which controlled the gold trade from Sofala; and there was considerable collaboration between the two.¹² But the Swahili merchant class was fragmented, both between and within the competing city-states. This provided the Portuguese intruders with a golden opportunity to divide and rule, allying with the weaker puppet sections to subjugate Mombasa. Despite valiant resistance, the power of Mombasa was broken, and the town was twice razed to the ground, in 1505 and 1528. In the south the Portuguese took advantage of the cleavage within the ruling merchant class in Kilwa to impose a puppet regime in 1505. A couple of years previously they had severed its southern lifeline by establishing a factory at Sofala. Under this double blow Kilwa declined precipitously, never to recover its medieval glory.¹³

      Although the power of the Swahili merchant class was broken, the Portuguese lacked the resources for effective control of the whole coast and monopoly of trade. Their power north of Cape Delgado was restricted to the occasional collection of tribute, and the ‘Captaincy of Malindi’ to serve as a centre of the Indian trade so crucial to Sofala. They tried to control sea traffic with a pass system, and granted a monopoly over certain commodities to the Captain of Malindi. They also tried to cut out Swahili traders from the Sofala trade. All these measures helped to kill the goose that had laid the golden egg. Trade in both gold and ivory declined. Although the Swahili merchant class, legally or otherwise, was able to circumvent these restrictions, it was embittered and felt oppressed, creating a fertile ground for disaffection and revolt.¹⁴

      By the 1580s the Portuguese empire had already embarked upon its century of decline, caused by both internal decay and external attacks. Portugal proved unable to make the transition from feudalism: high birth and connection with the court remained the main qualifications for high office; and the corrupt monopolistic system of administration and trade in the East hindered the development of mercantile capitalism. Portugal proved no match for the burgeoning English and Dutch mercantile bourgeoisies which began to carve their spheres out of its preserve. It was also unable to resist the revitalised and expansive Iran and the Ottoman empire.¹⁵

      Turkish incursions in 1585–8 and the instantaneous Swahili revolts shook the foundation of Portuguese rule in East Africa, and led to the building of Fort Jesus at Mombasa to guard Portuguese possessions there. But the oppression of the Swahili merchant class continued, culminating in the alienation of the closest ally of the Portuguese, the Malindi dynasty, which had been transferred to Mombasa. Swahili resistance was fuelled by the revolt of Sultan Yusuf of Mombasa, despite his Portuguese and Christian upbringing. Pate emerged as the standard-bearer of Swahili resistance. It had developed as a centre of Arab and Indian shipping, and had successfully forged commercial links with the interior. The consequent prosperity of Pate seemed to threaten Portuguese hegemony. The closing of the custom house in 1645 converted Pate into a centre of anti-Portuguese insurrection all along the coast. However, the spineless Swahili merchant class was unable to overthrow the Portuguese yoke on its own.

      The external ally to whom it turned had a similar history of Portuguese domination over its coastline and of participation in oceanic trade. Omani raids into the Portuguese domains in East Africa may have encouraged Pate’s insurrection, and Omani dhows became an annual feature in East African waters during the second half of the seventeenth century, trading and raiding. By 1652 the whole region was infested with Omani raiders and in open rebellion against the Portuguese. The chronicle of Mombasa specifically states that the Swahili called on the Imam of Oman to relieve them from Portuguese bondage. The rulers of Zanzibar, Pemba and Utondwe repudiated their allegiance to the Portuguese in 1653, though they were soon re-subjugated. In 1661 the Omanis and their Swahili allies briefly occupied Mombasa town, though not the impregnable Fort Jesus. In 1670 they went so far as to attack Mozambique and pillage the town.¹⁶

      In this struggle between the Portuguese and the Omanis for dominion over the East African coast, different factions of the Swahili merchant class appeared merely as junior partners of the two combatants. For many of the smaller potentates the only practical policy was to remain on friendly terms with both, swaying with the shifting political winds, and sometimes getting flattened by the whirlwind. It is quite clear from the various engagements during the second half of the seventeenth century that the Swahili ruling classes were themselves unable to stand up to the Portuguese on their own. In 1678 Pate, Siu, Lamu and Manda were reconquered by the Portuguese and their rulers beheaded, but with the appearance of an Omani fleet the Portuguese and their Swahili allies abandoned their positions precipitously, though they took with them considerable loot. In 1687 Pate was again conquered and the captive king prepared to renew his allegiance to the Portuguese and exclude the Omanis, but his country was soon to be liberated without him with the mere appearance of the Omani fleet. The end of the Portuguese era in East Africa came with the capture of Mombasa. In 1694 Pemba, the granary of Mombasa, had rebelled against the Portuguese. In 1696 an Omani fleet, supported by the Swahili of Pate and Lamu, began a three-year siege of Fort Jesus. The less than a hundred Portuguese in the garrison were supported by at least fifteen hundred well-armed Swahili refugees from Faza, Malindi and elsewhere, led by the compradorial Prince of Faza who ‘wished to show the world that even the Muslim vassals of your Majesty have Portuguese loyalty’. When the Portuguese relief expedition arrived in December 1698 it found the red flag of Oman flying over the fort.¹⁷

      Oman, however, was undergoing a fundamental socio-economic revolution and consequent civil war. This external drive could therefore not be sustained. The Swahili ruling class, so soon after being relieved of the Portuguese