The ANC Youth League. Clive Glaser

ANCYL branches were established in Natal, to the outrage of A.W.G. Champion, a typical old-school strongman who had dominated ANC politics in Natal for almost two decades. Jordan Ngubane returned to Natal in 1948 to take up the editorship of the vital African-owned newspaper Inkundla ya Bantu. He became a key figure in the Natal ANCYL and also used the newspaper as a mouthpiece to promote the League agenda. Successful new branches were set up in Bloemfontein, a strategically important town because the ANC’s annual congresses were held there and, given transport difficulties, it had always had disproportionately strong representation in the ANC. New branches also sprang up in the Eastern Cape, perhaps most significantly at Fort Hare College.

      A.P. Mda had always seen Fort Hare as a natural recruiting ground for the ANCYL. Generations of young African intellectuals had passed through its gates. On several occasions Mda travelled to Alice to address student audiences at the college. In 1948 he approached Godfrey Pitje, whom he had known through teaching circles on the Rand and who had become a lecturer in anthropology at Fort Hare, to help establish a branch. Though Pitje got the branch off the ground, the leading light at Fort Hare was a charismatic student who became SRC president in 1949, Robert Sobukwe. Mda carefully cultivated Sobukwe through personal meetings and correspondence. Ten years later, Sobukwe would become the first president of the breakaway Pan Africanist Congress.

      The National Party victory in the election of 1948 was an important milestone in the radicalisation of the ANC. Mda and others in the ANCYL, utterly disillusioned with Smuts’s government, were sceptical whether a Nationalist victory would make any real difference to Africans. However, after the shock victory in May it soon became clear that the new regime posed an even greater threat to African advancement. On the other hand, the extremism of the new government also offered opportunities for mobilisation. In response to the National Party government, the ANCYL issued a ‘basic policy’ document, making clear its commitment to African nationalism. Significantly, the final draft toned down an earlier version written by an angry Mda, which had described whites as unwelcome foreigners in South Africa. The second draft rejected what it called ‘extreme’ or ‘Garveyist’ African nationalism and accepted full white citizenship on completely equal terms. This hints at internal debates within the ANCYL and the beginning of the gradual marginalisation of exclusive nationalism. Shortly afterwards, the ANCYL decided to develop a programme of action, something that would go beyond a statement of ideals, to challenge the state. This, Mda hoped, would become a policy guide for the ANCYL and act as a rallying point for change in the ANC.

      The ANCYL raised the idea of a Programme of Action at the December 1948 conference. The senior ANC, in a more confrontational mood after the National Party victory, agreed in principle and appointed a five-man drafting subcommittee, which included Mda and Tambo from the Youth League; two respected old-guard liberals, the Fort Hare professor Z.K. Matthews and the Natal veteran Selby Msimang; and Moses Kotane, the Communist Party general secretary. The draft was circulated to ANC branches around the country for amendments. An amended version was accepted by the Cape ANC at its June 1949 regional conference. Fort Hare Youth Leaguers, especially Sobukwe, played a key role in drawing up the Cape draft, which became, in effect, the final document.

      The Programme explicitly elaborated a set of political tactics. It called for:

      (a) The abolition of all differential political in­stitutions the boycotting of which we accept and to undertake a campaign to educate our people on this issue and, in addition, to employ the following weapons: immediate and active boycott, strike, civil disobedience, and non-cooperation and such other means as may bring about the accomplishment and realisation of our aspirations.

      (b) Preparations and making of plans for a national stoppage of work for one day as a mark of protest against the reactionary policy of the Government.

      Over the next few months the Programme became the focal point for ANCYL agitation within the ANC. Mda and his followers aimed to get the document accepted as official ANC policy at the December national conference. Ironically, they received strong support from communists, who had also been calling for a more militant approach. The Youth Leaguers realised that they did not have enough support to take the presidency itself and so set their mind on ensuring that the president would support the document. Initially, they hoped that Xuma himself would support the Programme. He was still highly respected and could bring most of the old guard with him. And he had, after all, supported the formation of the ANCYL in the first place. In early December, Sisulu, Tambo and Mandela visited Xuma at his home in Sophiatown to explain that they would support his claim to the presidency if he endorsed the Programme. But Xuma reacted angrily. He still thought the NRC and Advisory Boards had a role to play in ANC politics and was reluctant to cede these political spaces to less worthy African candidates. Above all, Xuma’s pride was affronted: he disliked being bullied by these brash young men who had come with their preconditions for support. This created a real dilemma for the ANCYL. Most of the respected and professionally qualified older figures in the party were suspicious of the document and the Youth League’s intentions. At a push Lembede might have been a viable candidate with his Master’s and law degrees, but none of the other Youth Leaguers had the qualifications at that stage, or the authority, even to make a bid for the presidency. In desperation they approached Z.K. Matthews, who, though rejected by Mda as an old-school liberal, had supported the formation of the ANCYL and had helped draw up the first draft of the Programme. But ‘ZK’ rebuffed them on similar grounds. This meant that the Youth Leaguers made their way to Bloemfontein without a clear candidate.

      On the eve of the Bloemfontein conference, the ANCYL delegates caucused separately. Mda, though seriously ill from a persistent ulcer, made a typically impassioned speech, and they then got down to stra­tegy. They needed to maximise their impact with the number of delegates they had available. Their biggest problem was that they still lacked a candidate whom they could back for the presidency. A suggestion was made to approach the Bloemfontein-based physician James Moroka. Oliver Tambo roused Moroka from his bed to ask him if he would be willing to endorse the Programme and stand for the presidency. Moroka, to the ANCYL’s relief, agreed. The choice of Moroka was hasty and problematic in all sorts of ways. For a start, he was not even a paid-up member of the ANC. In addition, Moroka (ironically) was a sitting member of the ‘adjourned’ NRC – which was contrary to a key principle of the Programme. (Though Moroka promised to resign, in fact he remained a member until the NRC’s dissolution.) But the Youth Leaguers were forced to compromise: they could not afford to have a president opposed to the Programme.

      And so the foundations for the ANCYL coup were laid. With the help of communists, as well as a number of older delegates who felt it was time for change, the Programme of Action was endorsed and Moroka narrowly won the presidency. Mda, Tambo and Pitje were among seven Youth Leaguers elected to the National Executive Committee. Mandela would be co-opted onto the executive later in 1950 to replace a disgruntled Xuma, who resigned shortly after the conference. The committee included three com­munists, Kotane, J.B. Marks and Dan Tloome (who was also a Youth League member). The left nominated Tloome for the key secretary-general position but he was outvoted by Sisulu, who had the strong backing of the ANCYL and other anti-communists. In the end, the Youth League achieved more than they could have hoped for: a new era of direct mass action and civil disobedience had begun.

      3

Loyalists and rebels, 1950–1960

      In the traditional struggle narrative, the story of the ANCYL ends with its internal victory in 1949. But the 1950s are equally significant, historically. Without its most prominent leaders at the helm, and without the central task of ratifying the Programme of Action within the ANC, the Youth League struggled to find an identity for itself. The mainstream of the organisation saw its role primarily as establishing a mass base among the youth. But a significant Africanist faction, still loyal to the ideas of Lembede and Mda, continued to agitate against the senior body and eventually broke away in 1958 to form the Pan Africanist Congress. The ANC Youth League was thus the incubator of both the modern ANC and the PAC.

      Between 1949 and 1951 the Youth Leaguers succeeded in transforming the ANC into a more assertive African nationalist movement. The new leadership was able to bring most of the party along with it, especially once it became clear that the era of Smuts paternalism was over. Even in Natal, probably the most conservative branch of the