Although Sahnoun’s removal undermined the prospects for a political solution, the matter was not yet settled. The Western NGO community debated whether enhanced UN military involvement would exacerbate or ameliorate the situation. Some opposed foreign military presence of any kind; others resisted the use of troops beyond those needed to protect relief agencies and their supplies; still others called for a full-blown military intervention. Within the US government, leading officials continued to urge caution. By late November, increased media attention along with urging from bipartisan forces in Congress, president-elect Bill Clinton, and a growing chorus of NGOs tipped the balance toward action. Those who stressed the need to “do something”—with an eye to political and publicity concerns—held sway over those who endorsed prudence. Boutros-Ghali outlined several possible courses of action, including one that would allow a member state to undertake a military enforcement operation with UN Security Council authorization. The Bush administration informed the UN secretary-general that the United States was willing to lead such an intervention.
In December 1992, the Security Council authorized the establishment of a US-led multinational military task force, officially called Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and unofficially dubbed Operation Restore Hope. The military force would include nearly 26,000 US troops plus 11,000 more from two dozen other countries. UNITAF was granted a Chapter VII mandate to work with UNOSOM I to secure ports, airports, warehouses, feeding centers, and roads so that humanitarian relief could be delivered. It was not authorized to disarm or demobilize warring parties, confiscate heavy weapons, or intervene to stop fighting between rival groups. Its mandate was solely to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief to the civilian population. The original charge continued to be the public face of the mission even after the US role had changed substantially.
The authorizations for UNITAF and UNOSOM I expired in May 1993, when UNOSOM II, also led by the United States, took over. Composed of 18,000 peacekeepers, including 4,200 Americans, UNOSOM II operated under a broader mandate than its predecessor, and one that was far removed from UNOSOM I’s original peacekeeping role. Arguing that mass starvation could be averted only if local militias were neutralized, the UN Security Council prescribed a Chapter VII mandate and a course of action that included the forcible disarmament of Somali militias, particularly that of Mohammed Farah Aidid, whom the UN leadership was now determined to exclude from power.
Photo 4.1. US Marines participate in UNITAF search for General Mohammed Farah Aidid’s weapons, Mogadishu, January 7, 1993. Photo by PHCM Terry C. Mitchell.
Tension between the UN and Aidid broke to the surface on June 5, when Aidid’s militia ambushed and killed two dozen Pakistani peacekeepers who were attempting to inspect his radio station and weapons depots. The Security Council quickly expanded UNOSOM II’s mandate, authorizing UN forces to arrest, detain, try, and punish those responsible for the killings. Having moved from the original mission of protecting aid convoys and relief workers to capturing, disarming, and punishing one faction in the fighting, the UN crossed the line from humanitarian intervention to choosing sides in a deadly conflict. As the mission’s chief advocate and leader, the United States was now deeply embroiled in Somalia’s civil war. Because US support had been key to Siad Barre’s survival, many Somalis were already hostile to the United States and distrustful of its motives. In their view, the United States and its UN partner had declared war; their soldiers were now perceived as an occupation force.
On June 11–17, 1993, US military forces in AC-130 Spectre gunships and Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters attacked Aidid’s radio station and a number of Mogadishu compounds believed to hold weapons caches. UN troops fired on the angry civilians who poured into the streets, killing and maiming a large number. In July, a similar airborne assault on elders, clan and religious leaders, intellectuals, and businessmen, who were meeting to consider a UN peace initiative, killed sixteen prominent members of Aidid’s party and dozens of others. The massacre intensified anti-UN and anti-American sentiment among the civilian population. Violent retaliation was directed at all foreigners, causing numerous relief organizations to withdraw from Somalia. US troops, in turn, regarded Somali civilians with growing disdain.
Photo 4.2. Children walk past graffiti criticizing Jonathan Howe, the UN special envoy sent to Somalia to oppose Aidid, Mogadishu, June 30, 1993. Photo by Eric Cabanis/AFP/Getty Images.
Although the delivery of food aid was the priority of the US military in early 1993, it was not the objective eight months later. From late August to early October, the US armed forces were bent on capturing or killing Aidid and his top lieutenants. The final raid took place on October 3, 1993, when 120 elite US Army Rangers and Delta Force troops attempted to capture key leaders of Aidid’s militia in one of Mogadishu’s most dangerous neighborhoods. By this time, al-Itihaad had formed an alliance of convenience with Aidid’s militia. Both groups included members who had been trained and armed by al-Qaeda operatives who had fought in the Soviet-Afghan War and who were charged with expelling US and UN forces from Somalia. During the October 3 operation, Aidid’s forces, assisted by al-Itihaad, shot down two Black Hawk helicopters, which crashed into children in the streets below.13 Angry crowds attacked the surviving soldiers and those who came to rescue them. In the fighting that ensued, eighteen US soldiers and some one thousand Somali men, women, and children were killed. Eighty percent of the dead were civilians.
Within days of the debacle, President Bill Clinton announced that all US troops would be withdrawn from Somalia by the end of March 1994. Without US backing, the UN could not impose a political settlement that excluded Aidid. Although the crisis had not been resolved, the UN pulled out of Somalia in early 1995, declaring that UNOSOM II was over.
Islamism, Jihad, and Insurgency (1994–2017)
While the UN and the United States were preoccupied with the secular warlords, Somali Islamists were also building their base. Like many of its secular predecessors, al-Itihaad promoted irredentist claims with the goal of uniting ethnic Somalis from Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Somalia in a single nation. However, in contrast to secular leaders, those in al-Itihaad envisioned Greater Somalia as an Islamic state. Perceiving opportunity in the chaos, al-Qaeda determined that Somalia was ripe for a jihadist insurgency that could serve as a launching pad for similar uprisings in Eritrea, Yemen, and the Muslim holy land of Saudi Arabia. By late 1993, Sudan, Iran, and al-Qaeda were supplying al-Itihaad with money, weapons, military training, and personnel to counter US influence in the region.
As the security situation deteriorated and Western aid organizations withdrew, Muslim charities supported by wealthy patrons in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait filled the void. In a country with virtually no functioning infrastructure or social services, al-Itihaad