To some degree “new possibilities” emerge, too, whenever the fictional realities we are studying do not quite run parallel to social science’s image of realities in honor and face cultures. In such cases, we see no reason to assume, without further evidence, that the fiction does not address genuine social phenomena. We should add that in our limited context we cannot always interpret the narrative works as extensively as might be desirable for a full focus on each.
Introduction to honor cultures: Gender-specific, collectivistic honor
The concept of honor is a traditional one, deeply rooted in the ancient culture of desert tribes. We can understand honor generally as “the concept that structures the value of individuals and groups within a wider social context” (Oprisko 31). By linking practices throughout society, and mutually configuring cognitive, libidinal-aesthetic, and ethico-political regions, it is “the axiological total social fact” (Oprisko 48, 146) – as the definite article “the” indicates, not just one among several.36 It also “shaped the formation of both Western and Islamic family law” (Hussain 227). Such an understanding associates value study and the sociology of circular, reciprocal obligation. Especially relevant in our context is the external rather than internal honor system (as in Stewart 32). On this basis, as a social and relational process, honor hinges upon an individual’s “internalization of the identification with the value that the group has so inscribed” (Oprisko 113). Such internalization can occur to individually differing degrees.
Through the centuries, reflections about the significance of honor have accompanied humanity all over the world. However, for our purposes we are less concerned with honor values in connection with military conflicts or male-male insults. Today certain honor-related behavioral codes are of more concern to honor cultures, which include the Middle East, Mediterranean countries, South America, and some North African regions, than they are to so-called dignity cultures such as Europe and North America (according to Leung and Cohen).37 ←31 | 32→In this context we wish to emphasize that the term “culture” is not necessarily co-extensive with any particular nation or country, since within them there are likely to be regions, communities, and individuals not bound by such codes.38 When it comes to the respective manifestations of this virtue, two main dichotomies should be mentioned: while in dignity cultures, honor is perceived as a gender-neutral and individualistic value, in honor cultures it is regarded as gender-specific and largely collectivistic.39
Firstly, in dignity cultures the expression “honor” can include notions of morality, dignity, good reputation, honesty, integrity, or sincerity which, at least ideally, do not necessarily depend on a person’s gender or on an evaluation of one’s self by the outside world (see Leung and Cohen, Üskül et al., Severance et al.): “[…] every person, simply by virtue of his or her humanity, is one whose dignity calls for our respect. Nothing we do or suffer can deprive us of the dignity that belongs to each person” (Meilaender 7). This is a modern formulation of Immanuel Kant’s eloquently presented principles in his 1797 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (6:434–35). In terms of such a concept of dignity, “the notion of comparing or weighing values has no place at all” (Meilaender 86). It would, however, be wrong to assume that in the geographical areas called dignity cultures individuals cannot suffer from a negative moral reputation or will not be rejected by others (Ermers 34–35). Individuals can “attempt” to project their will, but without psychological liberty “do not need to do so successfully” (Oprisko 126). In honor cultures, at any rate, the honor value more often goes hand in hand with explicit, gender-specific behavioral guidelines that must be followed.40
←32 | 33→
As many instances which we are about to discuss will show, an attempt to erase difference actually magnifies it – which becomes evident in the ensuing fear of an overwhelming Otherness, requiring obsessive concern for boundary maintenance. The concept of honor is closely associated with social appearances and external judgement by family members, friends and neighbors: in honor-shame communities, honor concerns “a person’s worth in the eyes of others,” not a private sense of self (Churchill 79). Internal honor all but merges with external honor. Yet their difference per se, which is more than diversity or Otherness, has a prior value, if we can assume that difference is essential to explain real experience with attention to its coming about, its genetic conditions (see for instance Deleuze 36 ff.). Honoring is a “social process,” one that often requires a story, a narration, whereas dignity clearly has a “personal nature” (Oprisko 121). Pierre Bourdieu has offered a microcausal, agent-centered account of honor in relation to gender and to face: inscribed in the body, the ethic of male honor “requires a man to face up to others and look them in the eye”; it signifies “to face, face up to, and in the upright posture” (Masculine 17, 27). This bridges the two types of culture we are analyzing. Honor in this sense is an “investment in the social games” in which men, “the holders of the monopoly of the instruments of production and reproduction of symbolic capital, aim to secure the conservation or expansion of this capital” (Masculine 48).41 Their games are aptly synonymized with a ludic practice, a “fundamental illusio” (Masculine 48, 74).42 The honor ethic is thus “the self-interest ethic of social formations […] in whose patrimony symbolic capital figures prominently” (Outline 48).
The gender-related connotations of honor in honor cultures have been examined by Cihangir, Rodriguez Mosquera et al., King, Sev’er and Yurdakul, and ←33 | 34→Meeker, among others. A woman’s violation of behavioral guidelines has a direct impact on the proper functioning of family life, in the symbolic violence of masculine domination (as diagnosed by Bourdieu). King points out that “namus” is “a term borrowed from Arabic to Kurdish, Farsi, Turkish, and related languages” (King 61), referring to a woman’s sexual honor or female chastity as “a sacred quality, mirrored in communal opinion, modeled on communal convention” (Meeker 268), which needs to be protected by all means. While the honor-specific expressions vary depending on the respective language, it can nevertheless be claimed that there is a tendency to distinguish linguistically between male and female honor in honor cultures (which can sometimes even lead to translation problems because languages of “dignity cultures” mostly lack such linguistic nuances).
Sev’er and Yurdakul state that “şeref” (which is the Turkish equivalent of the Arabic “sharaf”) is “androcentric.” Churchill also describes “sharaf” as mainly used to describe a man’s honor (87): “sharaf is generally not ascribed to women, and certainly never in virtue of feminine traits”; male honor is dynamic, which means that it can “increase or decrease; likewise, it can be lost and then regained.” Being dependent on social judgment, it is equally exposed to competition. In contrast, namus is a type of sexual honor that presupposes physical and moral qualities that women ought to have” (Sev’er and Yurdakul 972–73).43 Reddy argues in a similar vein by underlining the “dualistic notions of male ‘honour’ and female ‘shame’, whereby masculinity is largely constructed in terms of female chastity” (“Gender” 307). Cihangir, Çetin, Glick et al., Sakallı Uğurlu and Akbaş, King, Meeker and others associate “namus” with “female chastity,” and in this context mention gender-specific honor codes in honor cultures.44 As soon as a ←34 | 35→woman’s “namus” is lost, honor immediately turns into a group value since the whole family’s reputation is ruined. The idea of “honor surrounding female chastity and self-restraint” is associated with the expression “ird” (Abu-Rabia 34; see also Rexvid 23 and Awwad, “Virginity” 106), which means “absolute chastity” (Churchill 89; Ermers 42). Churchill nevertheless mainly defines ‘ird as “the core aspect of sharaf-honor” (87), and thus as partaking of a male-related concept. Somewhat like Stewart (143), he treats “ ‘ird” as a part of male honor, while other researchers rather focus on its female connotations. Churchill’s