In light of episodes such as this, in March 1946, after insisting “for the dozenth time” that “he was no special friend of Argentina,” Villarroel explained to U.S. chargé Adam that he had to give his “avaricious and more powerful” neighbor “every courtesy because of Bolivia’s dependence on it for food.” Although the peronistas may have shared some ideological sympathies with Villarroel and the MNR, there was little hope for long-term cooperation. Paz Estenssoro tried to explain that, because his program for economic diversification was directly aimed at reducing Bolivian dependence on Argentine food imports, Argentina was “not disposed to assist” in his quest for “self-sufficiency.” Indeed, should the MNR achieve its goals of radically increasing the agricultural production of Bolivia, it would be directly at the expense of Argentine exporters.37 In the end, peronistas certainly hoped for some sort of anti-U.S. solidarity with their Bolivian counterparts, but there was little basis for it, despite Braden’s fervent belief that there was.
The Bolivian ambassador in Washington, Victor Andrade, showed a remarkable understanding of Assistant Secretary Braden, the Blue Book, and the strange persistence of the myth of Argentine complicity in Bolivia’s 1943 revolution. Because President Truman and Secretary of State James Byrnes were preoccupied with reconversion and the European Cold War, Andrade argued that Braden had an “unprecedented” free hand in assailing Perón’s Argentina. Bolivia had been drawn into Braden’s campaign by faulty evidence (which could, of course, never be refuted) and his need to “convince the American people of the danger” posed by the Argentine government. “It was not sufficient to tell of [Argentina’s] supposed totalitarian ideology or speak of its failure to take action against subjects of Axis nations,” Ambassador Andrade explained, so Braden needed to find or fabricate an example of Argentine “imperialism” that would “constitute an immediate international threat.” Accusing the Argentines of fomenting the Bolivian revolution accomplished that goal, but, the ambassador was quick to point out, the Blue Book had never really been intended to influence events in Bolivia. Indeed, Andrade believed that Braden had been extremely supportive of Bolivian arguments regarding the tin contract, and he noted that State Department officers had barely mentioned the Blue Book to him. Although silence was part of the State Department’s calculated strategy to let the Bolivians “stew” over the accusations, Andrade was essentially correct in his analysis.38
Still, State Department officials did initially hold out some small hope that, when the Blue Book fell “like a bombshell on Bolivian politics,” it might inspire a revolution against Villarroel. It would give both the FDA and anti-MNR officers “powerful ammunition” to use against Paz Estenssoro and possibly bring about a formal split. Even if this did not occur, U.S. diplomats hoped it might also provide an impetus or a pretext for Villarroel to remove the MNR from his government and to invite the FDA in, providing for an “orderly transition” of power back to the traditional parties and the “moneyed class.” Foreign Minister Pinto was rumored to support that option, and at least one other cabinet member told U.S. chargé Adam that he very much wanted to do just that but could not yet act on his desires. The third and most undesirable possibility was that Villarroel and Paz Estenssoro would retrench, mend their differences, and “hang together” in the face of Braden’s and the FDA’s uncompromising assaults.39
Within days after the release of the Blue Book in February 1946, that third possibility had come to pass. “By strengthening and solidifying the opposition,” Adam explained, “the Blue [Book] has postponed the possibility of the military members of the Government throwing out the MNR and substituting some other civilian group.” Prior to the release, Villarroel and Pinto had shown clear signs that they were “ready to throw all those accused to the wolves,” with the exception of Paz Estenssoro, who, Villarroel assured embassy personnel, was innocent of the charges against him. However, the Blue Book spawned “resentment that [sprang] from patriotic motives,” apparently across the political spectrum as Bolivians believed that their “honor and dignity [had] been impugned” by foreign intervention. It did not help that the MNR and RADEPA were able to preemptively refute much of the evidence against them even before the Blue Book had been made public.40 Rather than weakening Villarroel and the MNR, Braden’s assault had apparently bolstered their nationalist appeal.
The Argentines agreed with U.S. diplomats that the Blue Book had shifted Bolivian public opinion in favor of Perón and “against foreign interference.” Indeed, Argentine diplomats now believed that Bolivian “men of Government and general opinion look upon Argentina with special sympathy” as fellow victims of U.S. aggression. That reaction seemed to be fairly pervasive across Latin America: the Blue Book generated more complaints about U.S. interventionism than alleged Argentine or Bolivian fascism. Because Braden’s efforts lacked international support, Ambassador Andrade argued, they were no longer of any “importance or danger” to either the Bolivian government or the MNR, although Braden’s “state of mind and position” remained a cause for concern.41 There was, in short, “no likelihood at all of any governmental change being effected in Bolivia” as a result of the Blue Book revelations. Although the Blue Book did not fail as miserably in Bolivia as it did in Argentina, like the FDA’s assaults, it only furthered the “fortress” mentality that now pervaded the Villarroel regime.42
Duly chastised, the State Department declined to take further opportunities to influence events, in part out of fear that more overt U.S. opposition might drive Villarroel completely into the “camp of Argentina.” Evidently speaking for the Frente Democrático Antifascista and anticipating that the Blue Book augured a more aggressive U.S. position, a Liberal leader approached the U.S. Embassy in May, requesting a pledge of U.S. aid should his party succeed in toppling Villarroel from power. The Liberals sought to guarantee wheat and meat supplies should Perón cut off shipments in retaliation for the removal of his supposed ally. Despite the U.S. Embassy’s support for a measure that would “counteract Perón’s victory in Argentina,” Secretary Acheson bluntly warned Adam that, to preserve the policy of nonintervention, “you should refrain from any discussion whatever of the matter.” Wanting to pursue a policy of “discreet and patient pressure,” some State Department officials hoped to use the tin contract to obtain a quid pro quo should Villarroel “go ahead with his undemocratic Nazi-Fascist totalitarian program in league with the Perón Government and against all the principles and tenets of the Inter-American System.” But this was not to be.43
The 1946 Tin Contract
Had Assistant Secretary Braden truly sought the fall of the Villarroel government, the tin contract would have been his best means to bring it about. In late 1945, Ambassador Andrade, Mauricio Hochschild, State Department officers, and representatives of the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) assembled in Washington to negotiate the first postwar contract. Although the intrigue that permeated these negotiations gave Braden the perfect opportunity to deal a significant blow to the Villarroel government, to the surprise of many, he remained largely neutral and, at times, even supported Ambassador Andrade. The Bolivian government needed all the support it could get as it faced off with the technocrats of the FEA and found itself under assault by Hochschild as well.
The Bolivians had initially hoped that the end of the war would lead to a relaxation of the wartime controls and a three-year tin contract that started at 63½¢ per pound. Instead, the FEA opted to deploy a “revolver to the head” policy, as Hochschild called it. Arguing that, with the end of hostilities in the Pacific, Malay Straits tin would soon become available and depress the market price, the FEA’s “sharks of Wall Street” demanded a price decrease over six months from 63½ to 55¢ per pound. This phased reduction, they claimed, would allow the Bolivian economy time to adjust to the lower prices they believed would prevail in the postwar period. That said, the FEA