Why, then, does Nyerere’s persona continue to have such a powerful effect on Tanzanian political affairs? One reason has to do with Tanzanians’ discontent about the extent of corruption on the part of the current governing elite. Many Tanzanians believe although Nyerere was surrounded by political leaders he knew to be corrupt, he was personally incorruptible. There is an element of invented memory about the way some Tanzanians describe Nyerere, portraying him in almost saintly terms, as a martyr to social ideals that were ultimately shared by very few of those who surrounded him and that, at the end, were opposed by entrenched and powerful members of his own political elite. Many also insist that although Nyerere may have engaged in political repression, he acted out of benign impulses and not as a means of acquiring personal wealth or protecting a corrupt oligarchy. The crowds that gathered along the funeral route were giving silent expression to their disappointment in a generation of political leaders they perceive as lacking in Nyerere’s personal qualities.
Many Tanzanians insist that there were important differences between the ways Nyerere used his presidential powers and the ways his successors and other African heads of state have abused them. Although he held the reins of power for forty years, he did not accumulate vast personal wealth. Nor did he create a family dynasty that sought to convert the presidency into a family possession by passing the mantle of power from one generation to the next. Indeed, Nyerere’s family members and descendants have been singularly unsuccessful in translating the family name into successful pursuit of higher office. By mourning Nyerere, Tanzanians were also affirming their commitment to his belief in a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multireligious Tanzania.
Respect for Nyerere’s memory is a part of the answer to another of the political puzzles of modern Tanzania, namely, how has the CCM been able to maintain high levels of popular support despite high levels of official corruption and despite the fact that a rich and powerful oligarchy dominates the political system? As with each of Tanzania’s political puzzles, a full answer to this question is complex. A complete inventory of explanations must include such factors as the CCM’s extraordinary organizational and fund-raising advantages, which give it a prominent physical presence throughout the country. The CCM also derives popularity from its status as the lineal descendant of the nationalist movement. Owing to its control of the government, the CCM benefits from its ability to provide jobs and other patronage opportunities to countless supporters and their families. But among the many factors that account for the CCM’s popularity has been its ability to identify itself publicly as the party of Nyerere. The party’s branch offices in even the most remote outposts of Tanzania often display two presidential photographs: one, of current Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete; the other, closely alongside, of Nyerere. His image continues to provide a vital element of credibility for a governing party that has become better known for the corruption and cynicism of its top leaders.
There are traces of a generational divide in the way many Tanzanians view Nyerere. Members of the younger generation, who did not suffer the economic hardships of the socialist period and are seeking an alternative to the acquisitive individualism of the market-based economy Tanzania has pursued since the 1980s, often express admiration for Nyerere’s ideas. His emphasis on the need to succeed or fail as a nation provides a basis for criticizing the conspicuous consumption and growing inequality unleashed by the transition to a market economy. Nyerere’s philosophy also provides a basis for condemning the affluent lifestyle of the country’s political-economic oligarchy, which shows little restraint in its willingness to use political power for material gain. Older Tanzanians, on the other hand, have personal memories of the hardships and scarcities of the post-independence decades, and some remember the oppressive measures that accompanied implementation of the socialist economy. They also recall the way the Nyerere administration virtually eliminated civil society organizations they valued, such as the autonomous trade unions, the primary agricultural cooperatives and the rich array of ethnically or religiously organized welfare organizations. As a result, older Tanzanians tend to offer a mixed appraisal of their first president, citing his economic failures and an unfortunate tendency toward obstinate self-righteousness alongside his idealistic vision and personal incorruptibility.
Finally, however, personality-based explanations of complex political and economic phenomena are inadequate. In the lexicon of social science theories, those that emphasize the influence of individual actors take a distant place in explanatory power to those that emphasize such factors as social class, economic interests, or cultural norms. Nyerere’s personal influence is only the starting point but not the end point of an explanation for the key political and economic features of post-independence Tanzania.
Civil Peace in Tanzania
Much of the scholarship on modern Africa takes ethnicity as its point of departure, using ethnic identity as the major variable in explanations of social cleavage and political conflict. Whatever the merits of this approach in viewing other African countries, its applicability to Tanzania is limited. Ethnic theories of African politics do not apply in Tanzania simply because ethnicity plays such a limited role in the political process. In a continent where ethnic identity often provides an important point of entry for understanding a country’s political patterns, Tanzania presents a different reality: much of its stability derives from the low political salience of this factor. Although it is arguably as multi-ethnic and multicultural as any country on the African continent, Tanzania, with approximately 120 distinct ethnic groups, has enjoyed a tradition of ethnic peace that is the envy of many sister nations and an object of global admiration.
This is not to say that Tanzanians are unaware of their ethnic differences or that ethnic differences have not begun to assume a larger place in the country’s political life. It is to say that Tanzania differs from many other African countries in that ethnicity does not provide the principal wedge between the major parties. It does not describe the differences between the supporters of the major political parties, nor does it provide the principal basis of party identification. Furthermore, ethnic appeals do not provide the candidates who use them with an assured political following. Göran Hydén, widely regarded as the most authoritative political scientist writing on contemporary Tanzania, states:
Tanzania is especially intriguing as a case study of democratization because it is one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa that have erased tribalism and ethnicity as a factor in politics. Of course, people often elect representatives from their own communities, but appeals to tribal or ethnic values do not work in Tanzanian politics. Candidates have to use other grounds to demonstrate why voters should prefer them to their opponents.7
Tanzanians do not organize their political parties based on ethnically defined pools of supporters; they do not form their party preferences based on their perceived grievances with members of other ethnic groups. Many recoil against political leaders or political organizations that do so. Most importantly, Tanzanians do not perceive or describe their political process as one in which ethnic communities are pitted in win-lose adversarial relationships against one another.
The CCM is the best example. In Tanzania’s four multiparty elections since 1995, the CCM candidate for president has regularly received between 60 and 80 percent of the popular vote, and the CCM candidates for the National Assembly have regularly gained about 65 to 70 percent. The CCM is a genuinely national party with a support base that includes Tanzanians from all regions of the country and all ethnicities and religious groups. Much the same is true for the principal opposition party, the Party for Democracy and Progress (Chadema), which