2. In contrast to other philosophies of experience, phenomenology provides the methodological basis to study the experience of pain by setting aside naturalistic preconceptions, including all the available theoretical accomplishments, which, for the reasons that will have to be clarified in due course, tacitly reconfigure the nature of experience. Here I am referring to the phenomenological methods of the epoché and the reduction, which enable phenomenology to conceptualize pain in the absence of naturalistic bias and manipulation.
3. Phenomenology primarily relies upon a descriptive method, which is also of great importance for pain research: to this day, the phenomenal nature of pain remains unexplored and it can be surveyed only descriptively.
4. Phenomenological descriptions are not focused on the idiosyncratic characteristics of personal experience. Rather, by virtue of the method of eidetic variation, phenomenology strives to offer accounts of the essence of pain experience. In this regard, too, phenomenology promises to fill a serious gap in pain research.
5. Phenomenology has been celebrated for a long time for overcoming the subject/object dichotomy and for disclosing the centrality of the body in thinking, acting, and feeling. In this regard, too, it proves to be remarkably apt for pain research, since pain in its essence is a bodily phenomenon.
6. Phenomenology provides us with some of the richest—if not the richest—analyses of the temporal nature of experience. In this regard, also, it promises to be of great significance for pain research in that it provides the means needed to clarify the temporal structures of pain experience.
7. The groundbreaking distinction in phenomenology between the naturalistic and the personalistic attitudes is of fundamental importance, since pain as experience can be grasped only from the personalistic, and not from a naturalistic, standpoint.
8. Finally, the phenomenological analyses of the life-world are also highly relevant for the philosophy of pain, since these analyses enable us to philosophically conceptualize different ways in which the experience of pain is rooted in cultural worlds.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION
This study will be concerned with three fundamental tasks: it will aim to (1) clarify the fundamental methodological principles that must underlie phenomenologically oriented pain research; (2) develop a new conception of pain on the basis of such methodological principles; and (3) clarify what contribution the phenomenology of pain can make to philosophical anthropology. It is highly important to carry out all these tasks, and for various reasons. As far as the first task is concerned, let us not overlook that in pain research we come across various studies that call themselves phenomenological, even though the exact meaning of this qualification remains unqualified. Various autobiographies, “pain narratives,” and empirically oriented studies, as well as introspectionist accounts, are passed off as though they are phenomenological studies of pain. So as to counteract this tendency and the deep confusions it gives rise to, one must stress that phenomenology is first and foremost a method, which means that only insofar as one subscribes to the distinctly phenomenological methodology can one qualify one’s study as phenomenological (in the above-mentioned sense).
In chapter 1, my goal will be to lay out those methodological principles that are indispensable for any study that wishes to identify itself as phenomenological in the Husserlian sense of the term. I will contend that the methods of the epoché, the phenomenological reduction, and eidetic variation are the fundamental and indispensable principles of the phenomenological method. Besides clarifying the meaning of these principles, I will further argue that especially in the framework of pain research, these three fundamental methods call for a further twofold supplementation. First, the method of eidetic variation must be supplemented with a method of factual variation, conceived not so much as an independent method, but rather as an important extension of the method of eidetic variation. Second, static methodology in general must be supplemented with what in Husserlian phenomenology is identified as genetic methodology. Taking such a methodological orientation into account, I will maintain that phenomenology is not concerned with the idiosyncratic nature of any particular experience, and in this regard, it should be distinguished from the anthropologically and sociologically oriented pain research that we come across in the literature. In contrast to all empirical research on pain, phenomenology is concerned with essential structures of experience, that is, those structures without which experience as such could not be qualified as painful.7
Having clarified the fundamental methodological principles of phenomenological research, we will proceed to the second fundamental task. Our guiding question runs as follows: What is pain, when conceived of as experience and when considered from the phenomenological point of view? Building on the basis of phenomenological descriptions, this manuscript will propose the following answer to this fundamental question: pain is an aversive bodily feeling with a distinct experiential quality, which can be given only in original firsthand experience, either as a feeling-sensation or as an emotion.
I should stress that this conception of pain does not rely either on pain biology or on pain sociology. It does not subscribe to the fundamental methodological commitments of either naturalism or social constructionism. All the qualifications entailed in this definition rely upon phenomenologically oriented reflections on pain experience. This conception is meant to articulate the eidetic features of pain experience. I will maintain that the conception of pain proposed here captures the phenomenological essence of pain experience.
To corroborate such a view, the following study will take seven major steps and answer seven central questions. What does it mean to claim (1) that pain is a bodily feeling; (2) that this feeling is aversive; (3) that it has a distinct experiential quality; (4) that it is an original experience; (5) that it can be given only in firsthand experience; (6) that it is originally lived through as a nonintentional feeling-sensation; and, finally (7), that it can also be given as an intentional feeling? Chapters 2–5 of this study deal with these questions explicitly. Chapter 2 conceptualizes pain both as a nonintentional feeling-sensation and as an emotion; it further shows what it means to claim that pain can be given only in firsthand experience. Chapter 3 supplements this conception by showing that pain must be conceived of as a fundamentally aversive feeling that has a unique experiential quality. Chapter 4 supplements the foregoing analysis with an investigation into what it means to qualify the experience of pain as an original experience. Finally, in chapter 5, I will bring this analysis to its end by inquiring into the fundamentally embodied nature of pain experience. By the end of chapter 5, it will have become clear what it means to claim that pain is an embodied and emotionally stamped bodily feeling, whose fundamentally aversive nature is of a distinct experiential quality.
Phenomenology’s relevance for pain research is not reducible to the conceptual clarification of the nature of pain experience, no matter how important such a task might be. This will bring us to the third fundamental task of this study, which concerns the contribution that the phenomenology of pain could make to philosophical anthropology.8 What can the phenomenology of pain contribute to our philosophical understanding of human existence? This is the central question, to which the final two chapters of this study will aim to offer an answer. Put phenomenologically, what is at stake here are those essential features that make up the core of pain experience, conceived personalistically and not naturalistically. In this regard, it will prove necessary to clarify in detail what it means to claim that the phenomenological category of the person depicts the subject of pain and that the