Catastrophe: Civil War
The Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiated by Michael Collins and the Irish delegation in London in late 1921 and ratified by a majority of 64 to 57 in Dáil Éireann in January 1922 brought the War of Independence to a conclusion but split the Volunteers into opposing factions that were to descend into a civil war that lasted from June 1922 until April 1923.64 Mellows was never going to contemplate supporting any political settlement short of the republic proclaimed at Easter 1916 and no amount of political assurances or bonds of comradeship would induce him to compromise. Mellows remained outwardly convinced that reconciliation was possible between both sides of the divide, while as a member of the negotiating panel of officers from each side of the army and Dáil Éireann, brought together in April and May 1922, he resisted attempts to preserve the unity of the republican army under the control of the National Army leadership.
For the wider community, the debate over the Anglo-Irish Treaty was framed by the Catholic Church and regional and national newspapers as a choice between peace and a return to stability, or a resumption of guerrilla warfare and the return of the Crown Forces. For republicans, the Church hierarchy’s condemnation of the anti-Treaty forces contributed to a political situation in 1922 where it was not simply a choice between Collins or de Valera, or even war or peace, but, as Donegal republican Peadar O’Donnell claimed, ‘God versus the Republic’.65
The Civil War was never simply about the Anglo-Irish Treaty and whether it was a stepping stone to a republic or a compromise unworthy of the sacrifice of the republican dead. From late 1921, the approach of most experienced Volunteers to the emerging split was dictated by their personal allegiances to senior officers. A narrow focus on the rival political analysis of de Valera and Collins obscures the reality that the Treaty split was fundamentally a dispute within the republican army dictated by loyalties to regional commanders. Active republican districts commanded by powerful local leaders, particularly in the west and south, overwhelmingly endorsed the republican stance of senior anti-Treaty officers centred around Liam Lynch and Rory O’Connor in the spring of 1922, and a regional dimension to the conflict was apparent from the beginning. In this respect, the influence on ordinary Volunteers of the political rhetoric of Collins and de Valera was not as significant as one might assume. For Volunteers who had been through the worst of the fighting, in Cork, Tipperary, Mayo and elsewhere, Collins was a distant figure and the republican campaign was a profoundly local war. Rather than a centrally directed campaign, co-ordinated by the Volunteer leadership, the flying columns represented local enterprise and local sacrifice. The intensely parochial nature of the republican struggle was originally an asset but would be brutally exposed by the divisions that emerged in 1922.
Senior army officers opposed to the Anglo-Irish Treaty formed the ‘Military Council’ at the beginning of 1922 and notified the Minister for Defence, Richard Mulcahy, that they intended to hold an army convention representing the entire membership if one was not forthcoming within two months. Republicans intended to use the conference, which was stipulated under the Volunteers’ constitution, to reaffirm the army’s ‘allegiance to the Irish Republic’ under the command of an executive to be appointed by the convention.66 Republican officers believed the army could revert to its original status as a volunteer force and be relieved of its obligations to the Free State leadership, who they maintained, by adhering to the Anglo-Irish Treaty, had reneged on the republic declared at Easter Week.67 Despite tension, however, links between the two sides remained cordial and republican representatives Oscar Traynor and Ernie O’Malley were permitted to attend Free State Army meetings in a bid to foster unity.
Mutual suspicion characterised the republican leadership and anti-Treaty officers were divided by strategy, geography and personal loyalties. Ultimately, three options presented themselves: prioritise unity within the army and endeavour to devise a joint strategy with the Free State Army leadership; commit to a renewed military campaign against the remaining British forces in the hope that former comrades would rally to their support, unifying the army and re-igniting the independence struggle; finally, reject the authority and legitimacy of the Free State and seek to ‘defend’ the republic as declared in 1916 by imposing IRA authority on a democratically elected government. No formal republican strategy was ever agreed, however, and distrust within the anti-Treaty leadership deepened as the first six months of 1922 passed, accounting for the remarkable failure of the republican forces to devise a coherent strategy for war.
A core of experienced Cork officers representing the First Munster Division under Liam Lynch, including Sean Moylan, Liam Deasy and Tom Hales, believed that unity between the opposing sides of the army would be forthcoming and made genuine endeavours towards reconciliation with their Free State counterparts. This group represented by far the largest, best armed and most experienced division in the anti-Treaty Forces and their support would be crucial to any republican strategy. A second group of officers, centred around Rory O’Connor in Dublin, including Mellows, Joe McKelvey of Belfast and Ernie O’Malley of the Second Munster Division, and supported by the Western Divisions under Tom Maguire, Frank Barrett, Liam Pilkington and Michael Kilroy, objected to the peace manoeuvres of the Cork officers and repudiated their attempts at reconciliation. To complicate matters further, the crucial Fourth Northern Division under Frank Aiken, that covered North Louth, South Down and South Armagh, initially declared themselves neutral. In a further sign of fragmentation, Ernie O’Malley was forced to return to Tipperary in February when his division, representing the republican stronghold of Tipperary and parts of surrounding districts, repudiated the authority of both Dáil Éireann and the republican leadership, declaring themselves independent.
Both Mellows and Michael Collins continued to import arms from Germany during the slide into Civil War, and Charlie McGuinness, an experienced seaman and member of the Volunteers from Derry City, had undertaken to bring a shipment of weapons into Ireland under direct orders from Collins while the Truce negotiations were ongoing. With £30,000 provided for the purpose, McGuinness purchased the Anita and a cargo of weapons and ammunition in Hamburg. McGuinness and his crew were almost immediately captured by German customs, however, after they left a dockside public house much the worse for drink. Arrested and fined, yet, characteristically undaunted, McGuinness had the ill-fated vessel returned to him by the German authorities, minus the arms, with the best wishes of the prosecuting judge. Impervious to danger, he purchased a second vessel, the Frieda, along with 1,500 rifles, 2,000 lugers and nearly two million rounds of ammunition. After an eventful passage, the Frieda made land off Hook Head in November 1921 and McGuinness and his German crew transferred their cargo at Cheekpoint, close to Waterford Harbour. With his German crew, McGuinness was placed in Mellows’ care. ‘Liam had given me up for dead and his joy at seeing me was unbounded’, McGuinness recalled.68 In return for his efforts, McGuinness was allowed by Mellows to do as he wished with the Frieda and he happily sold her for £1,000, leaving Mellows with a crew of bewildered, drink-addled German sailors to be housed, fed and returned to the fatherland. The German crew were disbursed to safehouses across the city but ‘under confinement were becoming intractable’.69
McGuinness subsequently delivered a second cargo of arms into Ireland, landing a consignment of weapons purchased in Bremen at Helvick Harbour aboard the Hanna in the first week of April 1922. After McGuinness declared his support for the Four Courts Executive, Mellows provided him with £10,000 for a third shipment of German arms; however, the capture of the Four Courts in July saw the deal fall through, in lieu of a further £40,000 needed to complete the transaction. ‘The deal was off’, McGuinness recalled, ‘I quit the Irish movement then and there. Incompetent meddling had destroyed my gun running organisation.’70
Peace Moves, Setbacks and Army Conventions
The split over the Anglo-Irish Treaty affected the army, Dáil Éireann, the IRB, Sinn Féin and Cumann na mBan, and official and unofficial efforts at maintaining unity were attempted by a range of groups and individuals, including the Church and the Labour Movement. Uniquely among republican organisations, Cumann na mBan came out almost completely against political compromise and at its Ard Fheis, held in the first week of February, members voted 419 to 63 in favour of rejecting the Treaty. A small group of pro-Treaty members