South-South Migration
Katja Hujo and Nicola Piper point to a “dearth of knowledge on the dynamics of migration between countries in the South” and in general a profound lack of research on the topic.64 Arguably largely responsible for the scarcity of work on South-South migration is the northern bias of academia more widely.65 Susanne Melde and colleagues remind us that most funders are located in the North, resulting in relatively little support for research that examines migration within the global South, given the many northern anxieties surrounding migration flows to the North from the South.66 This is in addition to the more generalized tendency for migration research to focus on short-term projects that will offer solutions to “migration problems,” which leads to a subsequent lack of study of the “nature, causes, and consequences of migration,” as Mohamed Berriane and Hein de Haas maintain.67
Nevertheless, a slow but steady series of attempts have been made to seriously address the flows that conform what is estimated to be nearly half of all international migration.68 Much of this work has focused on the “migration-development nexus,” and there has been a tendency to address the potential for migrants to be “agents of development”—for example, through remittance sending. This focus can be to the neglect of the many other important aspects of the everyday lived experiences of migrants addressed in the transnational studies literature, which looks predominantly at South-North migration.69
Still, there is some research that is beginning to address these lacunae, as in the case of the important, incipient work on migration in Chile and from Bolivia, with which I engage throughout this book. While I agree wholeheartedly with Hujo and Piper and others that there is a severe paucity of research on South-South migration, I suggest that they may potentially fall into one of the traps of northern academic bias through neglect of some research on the subject published in the South, often in languages other than English.70 Additionally, some research that could be considered to address “South-South migration” does not identify itself as such, preferring instead to refer specifically to the countries under study. This is understandable given the problematic nature of the terms “global South” and “global North” and the homogenizing effect they can have.71 However, greater use of the term “South-South migration” as one way of categorizing such studies may assist with knowledge sharing and construction. In doing so, somewhat paradoxically, it may aid in promoting understanding of South-South migration as a heterogeneous phenomenon, but with marked points of difference from South-North migration—as this book endeavors to do.
The Bolivian-Chilean Context
An overview of the particular migration context under study is therefore important to understand both its specificities and the ways it fits within broader trends. In terms of Bolivian migration, it is estimated that around 706,000 Bolivians, or 6.8 percent of the Bolivian population, currently reside outside the country, although some estimates put the figure as high as 14 to 23 percent of the population.72 While historically Bolivia pursued policies of encouraging (white, elite) immigration in order to populate what was portrayed as an “uninhabited country,” for many years now it has been a country of negative net migration. This has been combined with a continuous flow of internal migration from rural to urban areas since the 1952 revolution.
As previously indicated, the effects of the revolution were complex, and its lasting impacts are debated. What is clear, however, is that the processes it set in motion sparked the beginning of a significant increase in rural-urban migration, predominantly from Aymara and Quechua communities in the western altiplano. While the agrarian reform—which was one of the major changes wrought by the revolution—did make most rural indigenous families into landowners, plots of land were not large, and they became further reduced through fragmentation due to inheritance and the population growth that followed the revolution. Combined with the increasing importance of a cash economy, the smaller size of plots made it difficult for rural indigenous inhabitants to make a living. This was particularly the case for young women, who were not necessarily favored in inheritance arrangements. They also had the greatest chance of making an income in the city, often as domestic workers, but in addition as market and street vendors. Many therefore ventured to the city as part of a family livelihood diversification strategy, or sometimes to seek a degree of independence. Thus, although both men and women left their rural communities for urban areas in large numbers from 1953 onward, young women in particular migrated.73
Internal migration increased particularly from 1971 to 1978, during General Hugo Banzer’s dictatorship. Almost one-third of those from the rural altiplano who moved to La Paz between the years 1953 and 1980 did so in this period.74 It was an era of massive modernization of urban areas, not just in the west of Bolivia but notably in the eastern Santa Cruz region as well. While the population had previously been clustered in the west and around the cities of La Paz, Potosí, and Oruro, people began to move eastward, with the importance of the cities of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz growing significantly. Rural-urban migration in Bolivia has continued through the present day. According to the last census in 2012, 67 percent of the population was classified as urban, compared to just 26 percent in 1952.75 These changes in population distribution within the country have been accompanied by mass out-migration beginning in the 1970s during the political upheaval of that decade and continuing into the 1980s following the implementation of neoliberal economic policies under President Paz Estenssoro.
The immediate impact of the measures Paz Estenssoro and his government implemented could be categorized to some degree as short-term “political and fiscal successes.”76 Nonetheless, the longer-term impact was a lack of economic growth and increased social injustice. Unemployment rose to 20 percent, particularly due to the collapse of the tin industry, which also severely impacted organized labor. Working conditions became increasingly precarious for many.77 The economic uncertainty in this period led to a marked increase in out-migration, especially to Argentina.78
During this period, Buenos Aires rose to prominence as a favored destination for Bolivian migrants to Argentina. Here, many migrants—predominantly women—found employment in garment manufacturing, working in small sweatshops that were generally informal and unregulated. They labored sewing precut garments for contractors for around twelve hours per day and sometimes more. Food and board were provided, but living conditions were usually poor. Moreover, workers’ freedom of movement was restricted, and wages were low, particularly in the first few months, when migrants owed “debts” to their employers, who paid for their transport from Bolivia to Argentina in many cases.79
There are still significant numbers of Bolivians residing in Buenos Aires, and many continue to work in garment manufacturing. Following the 2001 Argentinean crisis and the devaluation of the Argentine peso, however, those Bolivians who were compelled to migrate began to look to other destinations as well, and the Bolivian population resident in Argentina declined, although in 2011 there were still approximately 345,272 Bolivians resident in Argentina.80 Outside Latin America, Spain became a popular destination for Bolivian migrants with the resources to leave the continent.81 This was motivated in large part by the fact that it was not necessary for Bolivians to have a visa to move to Spain until 2007. The United States was also an increasingly appealing option for those with the means to get there. From 2001 to 2008—the period during which many Bolivians moved to Spain and the United States as well as other destinations outside Latin America—the amount of money sent back to Bolivia in remittances boomed, reaching 7.4 percent of Bolivian