Kant’s political philosophy reflects upon how ‘pure’ principles of right can be put into practice. It advocates ‘reform from above’, where the state ‘will reform itself from time to time, pursuing evolution instead of revolution and will thus make continuous progress’ (VII, 93, 8–9). These are the roots of Kant’s love affair with enlightened absolutism. Frederick seemed to fulfil Kant’s demands, pursuing reform while at the same time avoiding the threats of revolution and anarchy.
Domestic policy III: the process and progress of Enlightenment
For Kant, successful domestic reform was the result of a creative interplay between an enlightened ruler like Frederick and the public. Citizens established a public sphere or civil society among each other, discussed ideas and proposed reforms, hoping that the ruler respected their ‘freedom of the pen’. Kant wrote his essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (1784) when the Prussian reforms of the eighteenth century reached their climax. Frederick’s reputation had suffered in 1779 when he intervened in the Miller-Arnold dispute. Beginning with his order of 1780, his prestige improved again and reached a peak in 1784. After Frederick’s death in August 1786, and particularly after the outbreak of the French Revolution, reforms in Prussia virtually came to a standstill. We should understand these developments and the ‘climate’ of reform and the discussions among citizens to understand Kant’s enthusiasm in the 1784 essay.26
Perhaps Kant was also influenced by developments in the Habsburg monarchy. Joseph II ascended to the throne in 1780, after the death of his mother Maria Theresa. He went much further than Frederick, attempting to reduce the privileges of the nobility and the clergy, abolishing serfdom (Leibeigenschaft) from 1781 onwards, establishing equality before the law and religious toleration.27 Joseph actively pursued fundamental changes in the social structure and the constitution. He claimed in August 1789 that the decision of the French National Assembly to abolish feudalism and to create a bill of rights was plagiarism of his own policies; and he was not too far away from the truth.28 This assessment was echoed by August Ludwig von Schlözer, who wrote that the positive accomplishments of the French Revolution had partly (and peacefully) been achieved by enlightened absolutism, and that the rest would be realized in a ‘revolution from above’.29 Many Enlightenment authors seem to have agreed. Klopstock, Lessing, Wieland, Herder and Pestalozzi were initially enthusiastic about the prospect of Joseph’s rule (although many changed their minds after 1785).30 Joseph’s brother, Leopold II, was probably the most revolutionary of these three rulers (Frederick II, Joseph II and Leopold II). In 1783, he advocated constitutional monarchy in the preparatory work for a draft of a constitution for Tuscany. Influenced by the American Revolution, he argued that ‘a limited monarchy in which the executive power is freely placed in the hands of an individual and the legislative power in those of a nation’s representatives, is of all governments the best’.31 Leopold’s political ideas indeed anticipated classical nineteenth-century liberalism, advocating popular sovereignty, the rule of law, the separation of powers, inalienable natural rights and even the right of revolution.32
Of course, Kant had no access to these unpublished letters and written statements. On the other hand, he was well informed about developments and events in European countries, partly through newspapers, partly through his practice of encouraging lengthy lunchtime discussions over the years. Kant avoided discussing his own critical philosophy and encouraged general topics, with current political affairs and religious matters predominating.33 Communicating with friends over lunch was part of the Enlightenment culture of eighteenth-century Königsberg. Kant calls the ‘freedom of the pen … the only safeguard of the rights of the people’ (VIII, 304, 15–20). As the people have no right of revolution, they should have the non-coercive right to criticize publicly what seems to be an injustice on the part of the ruler. The process of Enlightenment depends largely on the freedom ‘to make public use of one’s reason in all matters’. The public can only enlighten itself if it is allowed to communicate freely (VIII, 36–7; VIII, 144–7).
Did Frederick grant freedom of the press? Kant’s essay gives us the impression that he did. Kant describes the essence of his rule as ‘Argue as much as you like and about whatever you like, but obey!’ (VIII, 37, 3–4). Kant’s assessment is too flattering. Frederick granted freedom of the press, but only to some extent;34 censorship was never completely abolished under his rule. There was a division of labour between the king and his censors, and this arrangement contributed to the impression (and later the legend) that there was freedom of the press under Frederick. Whereas the censors had to follow strict regulations, Frederick conveyed the impression of being tolerant and permissive by allowing exceptions. He allowed free publication in the fields of philosophy and religion, but never permitted criticism of the state. Crantz, the editor of the Berlinische Correspondenz, was imprisoned for criticizing Prussian censorship and Joseph II. Johann Erich Biester and Friedrich Gedike, the editors of the Berlinische Monatsschrift, were rebuked for furtively insulting the aristocracy. Editors thereafter practised self-censorship and refrained from discussing political issues. In addition, the relative backwardness of Prussian society helped Frederick: ‘If he did not suppress political opposition it was because none existed.’35 A political doctrine effectively challenging his own was not formulated during his rule. Despite Kant’s contention, intellectuals were not allowed to argue ‘about whatever’ they liked (VIII, 37, 4). Frederick, who had a personal contempt for religion, did not object to criticism of religion. As Gotthold Ephraim Lessing put it in 1769, the ‘Berlinese freedom of thought and writing’ was nothing more than ‘the freedom to make as much fun as you like of religion’. Other countries allowed criticism in the field of politics. Lessing concluded that, compared with Austria, France and Denmark, Prussia was ‘to this day the most slavish in Europe’.36 Kant’s essay on Enlightenment almost exclusively deals with religious affairs. At the end of the essay, he ‘excuses’ himself for that. After all, he argues, rulers usually do not interfere in matters of the arts and the sciences. What about politics? Kant does not give a direct answer. Instead, he refers to Frederick’s willingness to allow ‘his subjects to make public use of their own reason’ in terms of legislation. They may ‘put before the public their thoughts on better ways of drawing up laws, even if this entails forthright criticism of the current legislation’ (VIII, 41, 17–21). Kant alluded to the public discussion on the Allgemeines Landrecht, which began in spring 1784 (he finished his article in September). Lawyers, legal philosophers, and writers in general were encouraged to present their views (this ‘freedom of the pen’ was later reaffirmed in Allgemeines Landrecht § 156, II, 20). Sixty-two proposals on how to change the legal document were received. Some criticized the acceptance of serfdom and absolutism. The Berlinische Monatsschrift published several anonymous articles on the new constitution.37 The discussion was public in a limited sense. Most of the population did not participate and remained unaffected. Frederick’s intellectuals only communicated with each other. A broader public discourse might have challenged the status quo.
Frederick was apparently convinced that philosophical disputes about abstract topics did not harm the state, even if their implications were political. Frederick’s successors, however, became more cautious and realized the possible impact of philosophical discourses on society and politics. It is revealing that Kant consistently tried to convince his readers, including of course his censors, that the process of Enlightenment was, as he put it in 1798, nothing more than ‘innocuous political gossip’ and by no means a ‘menace to the state’ (VII, 86, 28–9). In 1798,