Privacy in Mobile and Pervasive Computing. Florian Schaub

principles for privacy.

      • Philosophical: A humanistic tradition that values fundamental human rights also recognizes the need to protect an individual’s dignity and autonomy. Protecting a person’s privacy is inherent in a view that values an individual for their own sake.

      • Psychological: Westin [1967] points out the emotional release function of privacy—moments “off stage” where individuals can be themselves, finding relief from the various roles they play on any given day: “stern father, loving husband, car-pool comedian, skilled lathe operator, unions steward, water-cooler flirt, and American Legion committee chairman.”

      • Sociological: Societies do not flourish when they are tightly controlled, as countries such as East Germany have shown. People need room for “minor non-compliance with social norms” and to “give vent to their anger at ‘the system,’ ‘city hall,’ ‘the boss’:”

      The firm expectation of having privacy for permissible deviations is a distinguishing characteristic of life in a free society [Westin, 1967].

      • Economical: Clark notes that “all innovators are, by definition, ‘deviant’ from the norms of the time,” hence having private space to experiment is essential for a competitive economy. Similarly, an individual’s fear of surveillance—from both private companies and the state—will dampen their enthusiasm in participating in the online economy.

      • Political: The sociological need for privacy directly translates into political effects if people are not free to think and discuss outside current norms. Having people actively participate in political debate is a cornerstone of a democratic society—a lack of privacy would quickly produce a “chilling effect” that directly undermines this democratic process.

      As Clarke [2006] points out, many of today’s data protection laws, in particular those drafted around the Fair Information Principles, are far from addressing all of those benefits, and instead rather focus on ensuring that the collected data is correct—not so much as to protect the individual but more so to ensure maximum economic benefits. The idea that privacy is more of an individual right, a right that people should be able to exercise without unnecessary burden, rather than simply an economic necessity (e.g., to make sure collected data is correct), is a relatively recent development. Representative for this paradigm shift was the so-called “census-verdict” of the German federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 1983, which extended the existing right to privacy of the individual (Persönlichkeitsrecht) with the right of self-determination over personal data (informationelle Selbstbestimmung) [Mayer-Schönberger, 1998].²⁸ The judgment reads as follows.²⁹

      If one cannot with sufficient surety be aware of the personal information about oneself that is known in certain part of his social environment, …can be seriously inhibited in one’s freedom of self-determined planning and deciding. A society in which the individual citizen would not be able to find out who knows what when about them, would not be reconcilable with the right of self-determination over personal data. Those who are unsure if differing attitudes and actions are ubiquitously noted and permanently stored, processed, or distributed, will try not to stand out with their behavior. …This would not only limit the chances for individual development, but also affect public welfare, since self-determination is an essential requirement for a democratic society that is built on the participatory powers of its citizens [Reissenberger, 2004].

      The then-president of the federal constitutional court, Ernst Benda, summarized his private thoughts regarding their decision as follows.³⁰