Another of Barthes’s essays discusses the trial of a semi-literate octogenarian French goatherd for killing an English tourist. The defendant did not possess the culpable mental state that the law’s machinery attributed to him. But, as Barthes observed:
Periodically, some trial, and not necessarily fictitious like the one in Camus’s The Stranger, comes to remind you that the Law is always prepared to lend you a spare brain in order to condemn you without remorse, and that, like Corneille, it depicts you as you should be, and not as you are.
The nineteenth-century French artist Honoré Daumier penned a cartoon of a judge facing a defendant who had stolen food. “You were hungry?” the judge declaims. “You were hungry? I myself am hungry three times a day, and I don’t steal for that!”
Samuel Butler noted that parishioners in his church would be equally horrified at seeing the Christian religion doubted and at seeing it practiced.
In the United States, mythologies based on racial, ethnic, gender, and religious stereotypes drive discussions about social policy. Tom Paxton wrote of mythologies in the song “What Did You Learn in School Today?”: “I learned that Washington never told a lie / I learned that soldiers seldom die …”
We use mental shortcuts to get through our daily lives. We may know how to fry an egg. The routine is semi-automatic. We don’t think about every step. I need not think through all the decisions I make when crossing the street: Am I at the corner, is the WALK sign illuminated, are there cars coming, how high is the curb, and so on. I go through a series of internalized reactions, actions that “go without saying.” In New York City, of course, to hell with all that, I just barge across the street like everybody else.
Some mental shortcuts are stereotypes. We have a bad feeling about certain people based on their race, religious practices, choice of clothes, or any of a hundred different things. If I am in lower Manhattan, near the headquarters of Goldman Sachs, and I see a well-dressed white man coming out of the building, I will cross the street to get away from him. I fear he will rob me of my pension.
Many of these stereotypes are, when viewed rationally, indefensible. Yet, when they are challenged, we are likely to hold on to them more closely. This sort of thing is sometimes called “confirmation bias.” When we hold on to a position or idea in the face of contrary evidence, social science research terms this the “backfire effect.”2
An impression is our “take” on something we see. Claude Monet was an “impressionist” painter. He painted the same scene, for example, the Rouen Cathedral, over and over. Each of those paintings gives us a different impression of the same scene.
All of these terms, which I often use interchangeably, refer to ways of seeing and interpreting the world around us. As I say, most of them are harmless and even useful ways of getting through the day. Some, however, are ways we fool ourselves, or permit ourselves to be fooled, about what is really going on. William James said, “A great many people think they are thinking when they are merely rearranging their prejudices.”
In human rights litigation, and indeed in all law practice, we must deconstruct the myths that have grown up around our clients, the groups to which they belong, and the conduct attributed to them. Based on our client’s race, social class, sexual orientation, or some other characteristic, the state rationalizes its treating our client especially harshly.
When we litigate cases, we confront not only the evidence adduced and the legal principles being argued, but also the socially, culturally, and historically determined attitudes of judges and jurors. In a jury trial, we use voir dire to uncover those. We look up the biographies and prior decisions of judges.
I am a human rights lawyer. My most important task is to expose, analyze, and combat the mythologies that dominate legal ideology. These mythologies form a systematic justification for the way that state power and private economic power is wielded. The essays in this book focus on how mythologies may be understood and exposed. This “myth-busting” lies at the heart of the lawyer’s work. We undertake to represent clients who are marginalized. To borrow a phrase from artist and art critic John Berger, we mediate between what is given and what is desired.
The essays in this collection address five groups of mythologies that help to rationalize the present system of social relations: racism, criminal justice, free expression, worker rights, and human rights. They deconstruct what the state and the wielders of monopoly power tell us, in order to seek out what is really going on.
Throughout these essays, I repeat a theme: the law is not what it says, but what it does. What “it does” is so often based on assumptions that time and the tide of events have shown to be false. Karl Marx wrote, “The law shows its a posteriori to the people, as God to his servant Moses.”3 As Anatole France famously wrote: “‘The majestic equality of the laws, which forbid the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets and to steal bread.”
The “law” is itself an ideology, constructed to define, defend, and enforce a system of social relations. Its mythologies are enshrined as precedents. Jonathan Swift wrote in Gulliver’s Travels:
It is a maxim among these lawyers, that whatever hath been done before may legally be done again: and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions formerly made against common justice and the general reason of mankind. These, under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities, to justify the most iniquitous opinions; and the judges never fail of decreeing accordingly.
If we focus only on what “the law” says, we catch ourselves saying that “the law has evolved,” which is like saying that “the market has crashed,” or “the bank has failed,” or “the car did not stop at the red light.” This formulation reifies and mystifies legal rules, and if accepted leads to alienation and disempowerment. The law is not the juristic incarnation of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.” People operate it. Other people can resist it and change it. And if those people are lawyers steeped in constitutional history and tradition, they have a duty to change it.
To speak of “the law” changing risks mischaracterizing mythology-busting. Several years ago, a lawyer argued in the United States Supreme Court that persons of the same sex have a constitutional right to marry. Justice Scalia asked the lawyer, when did same-sex marriage become a constitutional right? Was it 1789, or when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, or when? The lawyer replied that the Court had never thought such a question required answer.
To see how absurd that question was, one might ask rhetorically—as my wife did when she heard the argument and the justice’s question—when did the earth begin to revolve around the sun. Was it when the Pythagoreans proposed that it did, or when Copernicus confirmed it? When did racial segregation in schools become unconstitutional? Was it not until Brown v. Board of Education, or had it always been at odds with the text and spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment? No, busting mythologies brings hitherto disregarded truths to bear upon outworn structures of words and thought.
Busting mythologies is not only the work of lawyers. Lawyers do it because they confront institutions of state and monopoly power in a particular way and within a determined structure. But the struggle for human liberation makes mythology-busting the business of all of us. As the Nigerian poet Wole Soyinka wrote: “The Truth shall set you free? Maybe. But first the Truth must be set free.”
We will not find “Justice” uniquely in the words and work of lawyers, any more than we would find it in the basket under the guillotine. We will find it in human stories and human experience. The struggle for human liberation can be assisted and protected in some significant ways by what lawyers and their