Inasmuch as ‘same’ and ‘different’ are terms used in several senses, it is a job to render to a sophistical questioner a property that belongs to one thing and that only. For an attribute that belongs to something qualified by an accident will also belong to the accident taken along with the subject which it qualifies; e.g. an attribute that belongs to ‘man’ will belong also to ‘white man’, if there be a white man, and one that belongs to ‘white man’ will belong also to ‘man’. One might, then, bring captious criticism against the majority of properties, by representing the subject as being one thing in itself, and another thing when combined with its accident, saying, for example, that ‘man’ is one thing, and white man’ another, and moreover by representing as different a certain state and what is called after that state. For an attribute that belongs to the state will belong also to what is called after that state, and one that belongs to what is called after a state will belong also to the state: e.g. inasmuch as the condition of the scientist is called after his science, it could not be a property of ‘science’ that it is ‘incontrovertible by argument’; for then the scientist also will be incontrovertible by argument. For constructive purposes, however, you should say that the subject of an accident is not absolutely different from the accident taken along with its subject; though it is called ‘another’ thing because the mode of being of the two is different: for it is not the same thing for a man to be a man and for a white man to be a white man. Moreover, you should take a look along at the inflections, and say that the description of the man of science is wrong: one should say not ‘it’ but ‘he is incontrovertible by argument’; while the description of Science is wrong too: one should say not ‘it’ but ‘she is incontrovertible by argument’. For against an objector who sticks at nothing the defence should stick at nothing.
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5
Next, for destructive purposes, see if, while intending to render an attribute that naturally belongs, he states it in his language in such a way as to indicate one that invariably belongs: for then it would be generally agreed that what has been stated to be a property is upset. Thus (e.g.) the man who has said that ‘biped’ is a property of man intends to render the attribute that naturally belongs, but his expression actually indicates one that invariably belongs: accordingly, ‘biped’ could not be a property of man: for not every man is possessed of two feet. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he intends to render the property that naturally belongs, and indicates it in that way in his language: for then the property will not be upset in this respect. Thus (e.g.) he who renders as a property of ‘man’ the phrase ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ both intends, and by his language indicates, the property that belongs by nature, and so ‘an animal capable of receiving knowledge’ would not be upset or shown in that respect not to be a property of man.
Moreover, as regards all the things that are called as they are primarily after something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a job to render the property of such things. For if you render a property as belonging to the subject that is so called after something else, then it will be true of its primary subject as well; whereas if you state it of its primary subject, then it will be predicated also of the thing that is so called after this other. Thus (e.g.) if any one renders , coloured’ as the property of ‘surface’, ‘coloured’ will be true of body as well; whereas if he render it of ‘body’, it will be predicated also of ‘surface’. Hence the name as well will not be true of that of which the description is true.
In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some error is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what things the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to render as the property of a thing something that belongs to it either naturally, as ‘biped’ belongs to ‘man’, or actually, as ‘having four fingers’ belongs to a particular man, or specifically, as ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ belongs to ‘fire’, or absolutely, as ‘life’ to ‘living being’, or one that belongs to a thing only as called after something else, as ‘wisdom’ to the ‘soul’, or on the other hand primarily, as ‘wisdom’ to the ‘rational faculty’, or because the thing is in a certain state, as ‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs to a ‘scientist’ (for simply and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be ‘incontrovertible by argument’), or because it is the state possessed by something, as ‘incontrovertible by argument’ belongs to ‘science’, or because it is partaken of, as ‘sensation’ belongs to ‘animal’ (for other things as well have sensation, e.g. man, but they have it because they already partake of ‘animal’), or because it partakes of something else, as ‘life’ belongs to a particular kind of ‘living being’. Accordingly he makes a mistake if he has failed to add the word ‘naturally’, because what belongs naturally may fail to belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs, as (e.g.) it belongs to a man to have two feet: so too he errs if he does not make a definite proviso that he is rendering what actually belongs, because one day that attribute will not be what it now is, e.g. the man’s possession of four fingers. So he errs if he has not shown that he states a thing to be such and such primarily, or that he calls it so after something else, because then its name too will not be true of that of which the description is true, as is the case with ‘coloured’, whether rendered as a property of ‘surface’ or of ‘body’. So he errs if he has not said beforehand that he has rendered a property to a thing either because that thing possesses a state, or because it is a state possessed by something; because then it will not be a property. For, supposing he renders the property to something as being a state possessed, it will belong to what possesses that state; while supposing he renders it to what possesses the state, it will belong to the state possessed, as did ‘incontrovertible by argument’ when stated as a property of ‘science’ or of the ‘scientist’. So he errs if he has not indicated beforehand that the property belongs because the thing partakes of, or is partaken of by, something; because then the property will belong to certain other things as well. For if he renders it because its subject is partaken of, it will belong to the things which partake of it; whereas if he renders it because its subject partakes of something else, it will belong to the things partaken of, as (e.g.) if he were to state ‘life’ to be a property of a ‘particular kind of living being’, or just of ‘living being. So he errs if he has not expressly distinguished the property that belongs specifically, because then it will belong only to one of the things that fall under the term of which he states the property: for the superlative belongs only to one of them, e.g. ‘lightest’ as applied to ‘fire’. Sometimes, too, a man may even add the word ‘specifically’, and still make a mistake. For the things in question should all be of one species, whenever the word ‘specifically’ is added: and in some cases this does not occur, as it does not, in fact, in the case of fire. For fire is not all of one species; for live coals and flame and light are each of them ‘fire’, but are of different species. The reason why, whenever ‘specifically’ is added, there should not be any species other than the one mentioned, is this, that if there be, then the property in question will belong to some of them in a greater and to others in a less degree, as happens with ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ in the case of fire: for ‘light’ consists of more rarefied particles than live coals and flame. And this should not happen unless the name too be predicated in a greater degree of that of which the description is truer; otherwise the rule that where the description is truer the name too should be truer is not fulfilled. Moreover, in addition to this, the same attribute will be the property both of the term which has it absolutely and of that element therein which has it in the highest degree, as is the condition of the property ‘consisting of most rarefied particles’ in the case of ‘fire’: for this same attribute will be the property of ‘light’ as well: for it is ‘light’ that ‘consists of the most rarefied particles’. If, then, any one else renders a property in this way one should attack it; for oneself, one should not give occasion for this objection, but should define in what manner one states the property at the actual time of making the statement.