The term ‘pet’ has developed negative connotations of ownership in recent years, suggesting the animal is owned as an object for the benefit of the human and consequently its rights are not necessarily taken into consideration. As a result, we have seen the emergence of terms such as ‘companion animal’ and ‘pet guardian’. The notion that an animal can be the companion of a human suggests that both actors are in a relationship where if there is not equality there is at least recognition of the rights of both and as such both are empowered. In this sense the relation between dog and human may, in Goffman’s words, be seen as a ‘with’ (Sanders, 1999): a coming together of two sentient beings in a way that in its ideal is mutually beneficial. The problem, as Herzog (2010: 74) saw it is that many pets are not true companions and that really ‘The terms companion animal and pet guardian are linguistic illusions that enable us to pretend we do not own the animals we live with.’
That not all dogs are treated or viewed in the same way is as apparent today as it has been historically. The medieval royals of Europe who were keeping dogs as emotional confidantes were also keeping dogs for hunting and baiting. Today, we see farmers who keep dogs as tools of work and at the same time have a pet dog who is treated in much the same manner as a huge number of the urban dogs of North America and Western Europe. This inconsistency and how it is justified or explained away will be discussed later in the book.
Current and Historic Scale of the Dog Population
While we may consider the mass ownership of dogs for non-work specific reasons as a relatively modern phenomenon this is not actually the case. Indeed, it has been estimated that by the late 1700s in England approximately 1 million dogs were being kept for reasons other than work (Kalof, 2007). More recent figures regarding dog ownership in the UK are noted in Fig. 1.1, which demonstrates a significant rise in the dog population over the last 50 years to 8.5 million in 2013. The figures for the UK indicate that in 2009 the dog population was spread across 23% of the nation’s households (Australian Companion Animal Council, 2010). There is difficulty in attempting to closely analyse trends in the number of dogs in the UK and elsewhere over time, as the methods employed to estimate the population size have altered. However, it is fair to say that we have witnessed a large increase in the dog population throughout the second half of the 20th century and into the 21st century.
Fig. 1.1. Number of dogs in the UK. (From: Godwin, 1975 (for 1963); Carding, 1975 (for 1966–1973); Pet Food Manufacturers Association, 2010a (for 1965 and 1975–2004); Pet Food Manufacturers Association, 2010b (for 2009–2012) and Pet Food Manufacturers Association, 2010c (for 2013).)
In 2009, 36% of Australian households were estimated to own at least one dog, with 3.41 million dogs living in the country. It is worth noting, however, that this number has been declining in recent years from a peak of 4 million in 1998. In comparison, in the USA an estimated 40% of households owned one or more dogs in 2009 and there were 77.5 million dogs in the country. These figures were reported to have declined slightly by 2011 when it was estimated that 36.5% of American households owned at least one dog and the total population in the country was approximately 70 million (American Veterinary Medical Association, 2012). Whether these differences represent a decline in dog ownership or are due to differences in the methods used to estimate them is, unfortunately, impossible to say. North of the border in Canada, there are an estimated 84 million dogs; they are now more common than children in Canadian households (Anonymous, 2013b). The number of dogs living in New Zealand is also significant, standing at 700,000 in 2011 and spread across 29% of the nation’s households (New Zealand Companion Animal Council, 2011).
Dogs as Sentient, Self-aware Beings and Their ‘Rights’
‘Sentience’ is a term that is inherently biased and as a consequence somewhat limiting when attempts are made to apply it to non-human animals. The reason for this is simply that the term has been constructed by humans and from a human perspective where humans are always at the top of the tree: the hegemonic power. It refers to the ability of animals (human and non-human) to think and undertake reasoned action, and their level of self-awareness. With these concepts comes the view that if something has them then it also must have agency; an ability to self-determine. Implicit to the notion of sentience is that creatures that have it are more than automatons that exist at the behest of biological processes. This suggests there is more to a sentient being than an agglomeration of atoms and chemical reactions. This has been referred to as a consciousness but can, in decidedly non-scientific language, also be referred to as a ‘soul’ (for want of a better word, and not implying any religious affiliation, of which I have none). The debate about whether non-human animals can be considered to be sentient is a highly emotive one where science, religion, politics and law, and personal belief collide. The balance of this debate is prone to change over time and is a culturally and therefore spatially specific issue.
How we, as individuals and societies, view the sentience of dogs has a profound impact on how we use and treat them and is, as a result, crucial to understanding the position and utilization of dogs in the leisure experience. From a scientific perspective the dominant position of the 20th century was that dogs, like most animals, are not capable of conscious thought and, therefore, are not sentient beings (Masson, 1997; Thomas, 2000). It is within this context that Griffin (2001: 29) has stated that: ‘Behavioralists have been insisting for decades that the only appropriate scientific view of animal behavior is one that treats the animals as nearly as possible like mindless robots.’ This view is supported by Boakes (1992 in McConnell, 2005: 271), who has said that: ‘Attributing conscious thought to animals should be strenuously avoided in any serious attempt to understand their behavior, since it is untestable, empty, obstructionist and based on a false dichotomy.’ Boakes’ view of animals is underlain by the notion that unless it can be proved that they are sentient beings then we should continue to view them as lacking sentience. Thio (1983: 18) identified this view as a modernist one, whose proponents claim: ‘there is a world of difference between humans (as active subjects) and nonhuman beings and things (as passive objects). Humans can feel and reflect, but animals, plants, things and forces in nature cannot. Furthermore, humans have sacred worth and dignity, but the others do not.’ Consequently, while humans are self-defined as being sentient and therefore deserving of inherent rights concerning their freedom and welfare that encapsulate both their physical and mental wellness, it is clear, as MacFarland and Hediger (2009: 1) claimed that: ‘Many have contended that other animals deserve no such opportunities because they lack the abilities, particularly the cognitive abilities, to make use of them.’ Yet even something as apparently concrete as this perspective needs to be set against the