§ 2. In this faculty of repeating and joining together its Ideas, the Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts, infinitely beyond what Sensation or Reflection furnished it with: […]
§ 3. Complex Ideas, however compounded and decompounded, though their number be infinite, and the variety endless, wherewith they fill, and entertain the Thoughts of Men; yet, I think, they may be all reduced under these three Heads.
1. Modes.
2. Substances.
3. Relations.
§ 4. First, Modes I call such complex Ideas, which however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as Dependences on, or Affections of Substances; such are the Ideas signified by the Words Triangle, Gratitude, Murther, etc. […]
§ 5. Of these Modes, there are two sorts, which deserve distinct consideration. First, There are some which are only [176]variations, or different combinations of the same simple Idea, without the mixture of any other, as a dozen, or score; which are nothing but the Ideas of so many distinct Unites added together, and these I call simple Modes, as being contained within the bounds of one simple Idea. Secondly, There are others compounded of simple Ideas of several kinds, put together to make one complex one; v. g. Beauty, consisting of a certain composition of Colour and Figure, causing delight to the Beholder; Theft, which being the concealed change of the possession of any thing, without the consent of the Proprietor, contains, as is visible, a combination of several Ideas of several kinds; and these I call mixed Modes.
§ 6. Secondly, the Ideas of Substances are such combinations of simple Ideas, as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed, or confused Idea of Substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus if to Substance be joined the simple Idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of Weight, Hardness, Ductility, and Fusibility, we have the Idea of Lead; and a combination of the Ideas of a certain sort of Figure, with the powers of Motion, Thought, and Reasoning, joined to Substance, make the ordinary Idea of a Man. Now of Substances also, there are two sorts of Ideas; one of single Substances, as they exist separately, as of a Man, or a Sheep; the other of several of those put together, as an Army of Men, or Flock of Sheep: which collective Ideas of several Substances thus put together, [178]are as much each of them one single Idea, as that of a Man, or an Unite.
§ 7. Thirdly, The last sort of complex Ideas, is that we call Relation, which consists in the consideration and comparing one Idea with another: Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order.
§ 8. […] even large and abstract Ideas are derived from Sensation, or Reflection, being no other than what the Mind, by the ordinary use of its own Faculties, employed about Ideas, received from Objects of Sense, or from the Operations it observes in it self about them, may, and does attain unto. This I shall endeavour to shew in the Ideas we have of Space, Time, and Infinity, and some few other, that seem the most remote from those Originals.
Of simple Modes; and first, of the simple Modes of Space
§ 1. THOUGH in the foregoing part, I have often mentioned simple Ideas, which are truly the Materials of all our Knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the Mind, than as distinguished from others more compounded, it will not be, perhaps, amiss to take a view of some of them again under this Consideration, and examine those different Modifications of the same Idea; which the Mind [180]either finds in things existing, or is able to make within it self, without the help of any extrinsical Object, or any foreign Suggestion.
Those Modifications of any one simple Idea (which, as has been said, I call simple Modes) are as perfectly different and distinct Ideas in the Mind, as those of the greatest distance or contrariety. For the Idea of Two, is as distinct from that of One, as Blueness from Heat, or either of them from any Number: and yet it is made up only of that simple Idea of an Unite repeated; and Repetitions of this kind joined together, make those distinct simple Modes, of a Dozen, a Gross, a Million.
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§ 3. […] Space considered barely in length between any two Beings, without considering any thing else between them, is called Distance: If considered in Length, Breadth, and Thickness, I think, it may be called Capacity: The term Extension is usually applied to it, in what manner soever considered.
§ 4. Each different distance is a different Modification of Space, and each Idea of any different distance, or Space, is a simple Mode of this Idea. Men for the use, and by the custom of measuring, settle in their Minds the Ideas of certain stated lengths, such as are an Inch, Foot, Yard, Fathom, Mile, Diameter of the Earth, etc. which are so many distinct Ideas made up only of Space. […]
§ 5. There is another Modification of this Idea, which is nothing but the Relation which the Parts of the Termination of [182]Extension, or circumscribed Space have amongst themselves. This the Touch discovers in sensible Bodies, whose Extremities come within our reach; and the Eye takes both from Bodies and Colours, whose Boundaries are within its view […]; that Idea we call Figure, which affords to the Mind infinite Variety. […]
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§ 7. Another Idea coming under this Head, and belonging to this Tribe, is that we call Place. As in simple Space, we consider the relation of Distance between any two Bodies, or Points; so in our Idea of Place, we consider the relation of Distance betwixt any thing, and any two or more Points, which are considered, as keeping the same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest; for when we find any thing at the same distance now, which it was Yesterday from any two or more Points, which have not since changed their distance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we say it hath kept the same Place: But if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those Points, we say it hath changed its Place. […]
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§ 11. There are some that would persuade us, that Body and Extension are the same thing; […] If […] they mean by Body and Extension