crowning achievement of Philopoemen’s career had been the uniting of Sparta to the Achaean league, after the murder of the tyrant Nabis by the Aetolians who had come to Sparta as his allies (B.C. 192). In B.C. 191 the Achaeans were allowed to add Messene and Elis to their league, as a reward for their services to Rome in the war against Antiochus. The Aetolian league, the chief enemy and opponent of Achaia, was reduced to a state of humble dependence on Rome in B.C. 189, after the defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylae (B.C. 191) and the Aetolian war (B.C. 191-189). From B.C. 190 then begins the time during which Polybius says that the “name of the Achaeans became the universal one for all the inhabitants of the Peloponnese” (
2,
42). But though Sparta was included in the league she was always a restive and dissatisfied member; and the people of Elis and Messene, who were not very willing members either, were told by Flamininus that if they had any reason to complain of the federal government they were to appeal to him.11 Now, by a treaty of alliance with Rome, decreed at Sikyon in B.C. 198, it was provided that Rome should receive no envoys from separate states of the league, but only from the league itself.12 Flamininus, therefore, if he said what Livy reports him to have said, was violating this treaty. And this will be a good instance to illustrate the divisions of parties existing during the period of Polybius’s active political life (B.C. 181-169). We have seen that in B.C. 198 the Achaean league became an ally of Rome as a complete and independent state; that this state was consolidated by the addition of Sparta (192) and Elis and Messene (191) so as to embrace the whole of the Peloponnese; that its chief enemy in Greece, the Aetolian league, was rendered powerless in B.C. 189. The Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese had been abolished after the battle of Cynoscephalae (197) by the proclamation of Greek freedom by Flamininus (196). But all this seeming liberty and growth in power really depended upon the favour of Rome, and was continually endangered not only by the appeals to the Senate from separate states in the league, who conceived themselves wronged, but by treasonable representations of her own envoys, who preferred a party triumph to the welfare and independence of their country13. In these circumstances, there were naturally differences of opinion as to the proper attitude for the league government to assume towards a state, which was nominally an equal ally, but really an absolute master. There was one party who were for submissively carrying out the will of the Roman officers who from time to time visited the Peloponnese; and for conciliating the Senate by displaying a perpetual readiness to carry out its wishes, without putting forward in any way the rights which the treaty of 198 had secured to them. The leaders of this party, in the time of Philopoemen, were Aristaenos and Diophanes. The other party, headed till his death by Philopoemen, equally admitting that the Roman government could not be safely defied, were yet for aiming at preserving their country’s independence by strictly carrying out the terms of the Roman alliance, and respectfully but firmly resisting any encroachment upon those terms by the officers representing the Roman government. On Philopoemen’s death (B.C. 183) Lycortas, who had been his most devoted follower, took, along with Archon, the lead of the party which were for carrying out his policy; while Callicrates became the most prominent of the Romanising party. Lycortas was supported by his son Polybius when about B.C. 181 he began to take part in politics. Polybius seems always to have consistently maintained this policy. His view seems to have been that Rome, having crushed Philip and Antiochus, was necessarily the supreme power. The Greeks must recognise facts; must avoid offending Rome; but must do so by keeping to a position of strict legality, maintaining their rights, and neither flattering nor defying the victorious Commonwealth. He believed that the Romans meant fairly by Greece, and that Greek freedom was safe in their hands14. But the straightforward policy of the Senate, if it was ever sincere, was altered by the traitor Callicrates in B.C. 179; who, being sent to Rome to oppose what the league thought the unconstitutional restitution of certain Spartan exiles, advised the Senate to use the Romanising party in each state to secure a direct control in Achaia15. Acting on this insidious advice, the Roman government began to view with suspicion the legal and independent attitude of the other party, and to believe or affect to believe that they were enemies of the Roman supremacy. Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius, finding themselves the objects of suspicion, not less dangerous because undeserved, to the Roman government, appear to have adopted an attitude of reserve, abstaining from taking an active or prominent part in the business of the assemblies. This, however, did not succeed in averting Roman jealousy; and the commissioners, Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius, who visited the Peloponnese in B.C. 169, gave out that those who held aloof were as displeasing to the Senate as those who openly opposed it. They were said to have resolved on formally impeaching the three statesmen before the Achaean assembly as being enemies of Rome; but when the assembly met at Aegium, they had failed to obtain any reasonable handle against them, and contented themselves with a speech of general exhortation.16 This was during the war with Perseus, when the Romans kept a vigilant eye on all parts of Greece, and closely inquired which politicians in the several states ventured to display the least sympathy with the Macedonian king, or were believed to secretly nourish any wish for his success. It speaks strongly both for the independent spirit still surviving in the league, as well as for the character of Archon and Polybius, that they were elected, apparently in the same assembly, the one Strategus and the other Hipparch for the year B.C. 169-168.17 In this office Polybius doubtless hoped to carry out the principles and discipline of Philopoemen, under whom he had probably served in the cavalry, and whose management of this branch of the service he had at any rate minutely studied.18 But there was little occasion for the use of the Achaean cavalry in his year. Being sent on a mission to Q. Marcius Philippus at Heracleia to offer the league’s assistance in the war with Perseus, when their help was declined, he remained behind after the other ambassadors had returned, to witness the campaign.19 After spending some time in the Roman camp, he was sent by Q. Marcius to prevent the Achaeans from consenting to supply five thousand men to Appius Claudius Cento in Epirus. This was a matter of considerable delicacy. He had to choose between offending one or the other powerful Roman. But he conducted the affair with prudence, and on the lines he had always laid down, those, namely, of strict legality. He found the Achaean assembly in session at Sicyon; and he carried his point by representing that the demand of Appius Claudius did not bear on the face of it the order of the Senate, without which they were prohibited from supplying the requisitions of Roman commanders.20 He thus did not betray that he was acting on the instigation of Quintus Marcius, and put himself and the league in an attitude of loyalty toward the Senate.21 In the same cautious spirit he avoided another complication. Certain complimentary statues or inscriptions had been put up in various cities of the league in honour of Eumenes, king of Pergamus, and on some offence arising had been taken down. This seems to have annoyed Eumenes exceedingly; and Polybius persuaded the people that it had been ordered by Sosigenes and Diopeithes, as judges, from feelings of personal spite, and without any act of Eumenes unfriendly to the league. He carried his point, and thus avoided offending a king who at that time was on very friendly terms with Rome.22 But while thus minded to avoid unnecessary offence, Polybius and his party were in favour of strengthening the league by alliances which could be entered upon with safety. Egypt at this time was under the joint government of two Ptolemies, Philometor and Physcon, who were being threatened with an invasion by Antiochus Epiphanes. The friendship of the league with the kings of Egypt had been of long standing, as far back as the time of Aratus; and though that friendship had been afterwards interrupted by the Macedonian policy of Aratus, just before his death the father of these kings had presented the league with ten ships and a sum of money. The two kings now sent to beg for aid; and asked that Lycortas should come as commander-in-chief, and Polybius as hipparch. Lycortas and Polybius were in favour of supplying the assistance asked.23 But the measure was opposed by Callicrates and his partisans, on the specious ground that their whole efforts should be directed to aid the Romans against Perseus. Lycortas and Polybius replied that the Romans did not require their help; and that they were bound, by gratitude, as well as by treaty, to help the Ptolemies. They carried with them the popular feeling: but Callicrates outwitted them by obtaining a dispatch from Q. Marcius, urging the league to join the senate in effecting a reconciliation between Antiochus and the kings of Egypt. Polybius gave in, and advised compliance. Ambassadors were appointed to aid in the pacification; and the envoys from Alexandria were obliged to depart without effecting their object. They contented themselves with handing in to the magistrates the Royal letters, in which Lycortas and Polybius were invited by name to come to Alexandria.24
B.C.
