Immediately after the suppression of the mutiny, the young Caesar decided to employ the discontented legions, who were themselves anxious for active service. Hostilities against the Germans had been slumbering for the past few years; but no treaty had been made since the defeat of Varus, so that in making a sudden incursion the Romans were formally justified. It has been questioned whether Germanicus was not exceeding his powers in taking the offensive without the express permission of the Emperor. But as he had been entrusted by Augustus with his large command for the purpose of conducting the war and defending the frontier against the Germans, it must clearly have been left to his discretion when he might advance and when he should retire.
In the late autumn (14 A.D.) the legions and cohorts of the Lower province crossed the Rhine, cut their way through the Silva Caesia, and through the rampart which Tiberius had constructed after the Varian disaster, as the limes of Roman territory. Thus they reached the land of the Marsi, who dwelled between the rivers which are now called Lippe and Ruhr. Caecina advanced in front, with some light cohorts to reconnoiter and clear the way. It was discovered that the Marsi were to spend the night in solemn festivities, and when the Romans approached their villages after sunset, the inhabitants, unsuspicious and inebriated, offered an easy prey. The legions were divided into four “wedges” (cunei), which devastated the country for fifty miles with fire and sword, sparing neither sex nor age. The holy places of the Marsi, especially the sacred precinct of the deity Tamfana, were leveled with the ground.
The fate of the Marsi roused to arms the neighboring tribes, the Bructeri, who lived northward, the Tubantes, who dwelled on the Rura (Ruhr), and the Usipetes between the Luppia and the Moenus. They stationed themselves in the woods through which the Romans had to return; but the zeal of the legions and the skill of the commander shook off the enemy, and the winter-quarters were safely reached.
The revolt on the Lower Rhine had caused serious anxiety at Rome, and especially to Tiberius, coming, as it did, in conjunction with the mutiny in Pannonia. The Pannonic army was nearer Italy: on the other hand the Germanic army was far larger; and the Emperor, uncertain in which of the camps his presence was more needful, and afraid of giving the preference to either, ended by remaining in Rome and watching the issue of events. The news that Germanicus had quelled the mutiny was a great relief; but it was suspected that the military success which he gained in his brief campaign was not so agreeable to Tiberius. If so, the Emperor dissembled his jealousy, praised the achievement of his nephew in the presence of the senate, and granted him the honor of a triumph.
The following year was marked by two distinct invasions of Germany, which, however, hung closely together and were parts of a common design. Of all the German tribes, the Cherusci, the tribe of Arminius, were the most formidable and the most hostile. They had been the leaders in the fight for freedom which ended in the Varian disaster. Against them above all others policy and revenge excited the spirit of Germanicus. His plan was to prevent the neighboring peoples from assisting them and then attack them alone. Their most powerful neighbors were the Chatti, and the first expedition was directed against them. (1) In the spring the four legions of the Lower Rhine crossed the river from Castra Vetera under the command of Caecina, who was to prevent the tribes in that quarter, especially the Marsi and the Cherusci, from marching to aid the Chatti. Caecina’s army was augmented by bands of the cis-Rhenane German tribes—Batavians, Ubii and Sugambri. Meanwhile Germanicus himself at the head of the four legions of the Upper Rhine advanced into the territory of Mount Taunus, and attacked the Chatti so suddenly that no serious resistance could be made. Their fortress Mattium was destroyed. By this means the Chatti were prevented from making common cause with the Cherusci. That people was distracted at this time by domestic discords. Segestes was invoking the help of the Romans against his enemy and son-in-law Arminius, the hero of the Teutoburg Forest. The messengers of Segestes reached Germanicus as he was returning to the Rhine, and besought him to relieve their master, who was blockaded by his enemies. The Roman army retraced their steps, entered the borders of the Cherusci, and delivered their ally, who was able, in return, to restore some of the spoils of Varus, and hand over some important hostages, among these his daughter Thusnelda, the wife of Arminius. That warrior, infuriated at the capture of his wife, left nothing undone to stir up the passions of his nation, and he succeeded in winning over Inguiomer, an influential noble, who had hitherto sided with the Romans.
Germanicus and Caecina, who had signally defeated the Marsi, having returned to the Rhine, prepared for a grand expedition against the enemy, conceived on the same plan which Drusus had formerly adopted with success. The army was divided in three parts. Caecina led his legions through the land of the Bructeri to the banks of the upper Amisia; Germanicus and the four legions of the Upper province embarked, to coast along the shore of the North Sea and enter the river at its mouth; while the cavalry, tinder Pedo Albinovanus, the poet, marched to the same goal through the land of the Frisii. Successfully united, the combined army laid waste far and wide the land between the Amisia and the Luppia. Here they were near the Saltuus Teutoburgiensis, where the remains of Varus and his legions lay unburied, and Germanicus could not resist the desire of visiting the spot, erecting a mound over the white bones, and honoring with funeral rites the slaughtered Romans. The lonely and melancholy scene produced a deep impression on the legions, but they were soon required to extricate themselves from a trip similar to that which had ensnared the Varian army. Arminius had hidden his forces in the forest and the Romans had not secured themselves sufficiently against surprise. But Germanicus and Caecina were more skillful than Varus, and though he did not defeat the enemy he retreated to the Amisia with some difficulty. The return to the Rhine was not easy. The cavalry of Pedo reached their quarters without mischance. But the country through which the way of Caecina lay was heavy and marshy, and the Germans of Arminius and Inguiomer sought to surround him as they had surrounded Varus. The experienced Caecina was cool and collected in these perils, and knew how to maintain discipline, but he might have failed to extricate his army but for a false move of the foe. The Germans had made a successful attack on the cavalry and baggage of the Romans, and elated by their luck proceeded, contrary to the counsels of Arminius, to assault the Roman camp. Waiting until they had reached the rampart, Caecina suddenly threw open the gates and poured out his troops on the besiegers. The Germans suffered a decisive defeat; Inguiomer was severely wounded; and the Romans were able to proceed on their way. A false rumor of their destruction had gone before them to Castra Vetera; and it was proposed there to break down the Rhine bridge. But the humanity and courage of Agrippina saved the means of retreat for the fugitive army. She stood at the head of the bridge and would not move until the remnant should reach it; and she was repaid by seeing the arrival of the four legions safe and whole.
The return of Germanicus himself was attended with ill-luck and serious losses. He found it necessary to lighten his ships amid the shallow waters of the Frisian coast, and disembarked two legions, directing them to march along the shore. The treacherous equinoctial tides swept away a large number of the soldiers, and much of their baggage. On the whole the campaign could hardly he regarded as a success. The dangers and losses of the return march threw a cloud over the expedition, and Tiberius had some reason to murmur at the little results obtained at such expense. The advantages won by Germanicus were only momentary; for he had done nothing to effect a permanent occupation of the country which he had laid waste. He had built no fort, and established no lines of communication. His wisdom in visiting the battlefield of Varus was open to question. Tiberius, naturally distrustful, nourished some jealousy and perhaps fear of his popular nephew, and there were enemies of Germanicus at Rome who were eager to encourage such feelings. But the Emperor had not yet decided to interfere with the plans of Germanicus for the subjugation of Germany; and he professed to regard the achievements of the year as worthy of a triumph. He seems not to have fully made up his mind yet, whether the conquest of Germany was really desirable or its permanent occupation possible.
The next, and last campaign of Germanicus (16 A.D.) was planned on a larger scale. This time he hoped to reach the Albis, and break the last resistance of the Cherusci. A fleet of one thousand ships was collected where the Rhine broadens and branches into the Vahalis; and the whole army embarked and sailed down the Fossa Drusiana, where Germanicus invoked the spirit and recalled