It is interesting to notice what words, in different periods, are ordinarily distinguished from or contrasted with art. Artless before mC17 meant ‘unskilled’ or ‘devoid of skill’, and this sense has survived. But there was an early regular contrast between art and nature: that is, between the product of human skill and the product of some inherent quality. Artless then acquired, from mC17 but especially from lC18, a positive sense to indicate spontaneity even in ‘art’. While art still meant skill and INDUSTRY (q.v.) diligent skill, they were often closely associated, but when each was abstracted and specialized they were often, from eC19, contrasted as the separate areas of imagination and utility. Until C18 most sciences were arts; the modern distinction between science and art, as contrasted areas of human skill and effort, with fundamentally different methods and purposes, dates effectively from mC19, though the words themselves are sometimes contrasted, much earlier, in the sense of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ (see SCIENCE, THEORY).
This complex set of historical distinctions between various kinds of human skill and between varying basic purposes in the use of such skills is evidently related both to changes in the practical division of labour and to fundamental changes in practical definitions of the purposes of the exercise of skill. It can be primarily related to the changes inherent in capitalist commodity production, with its specialization and reduction of use values to exchange values. There was a consequent defensive specialization of certain skills and purposes to the arts or the humanities where forms of general use and intention which were not determined by immediate exchange could be at least conceptually abstracted. This is the formal basis of the distinction between art and industry, and between fine arts and useful arts (the latter eventually acquiring a new specialized term, in TECHNOLOGY (q.v.)).
The artist is then distinct within this fundamental perspective not only from scientist and technologist – each of whom in earlier periods would have been called artist – but from artisan and craftsman and skilled worker, who are now operatives in terms of a specific definition and organization of WORK (q.v.). As these practical distinctions are pressed, within a given mode of production, art and artist acquire ever more general (and more vague) associations, offering to express a general human (i.e. non-utilitarian) interest, even while, ironically, most works of art are effectively treated as commodities and most artists, even when they justly claim quite other intentions, are effectively treated as a category of independent craftsmen or skilled workers producing a certain kind of marginal commodity.
See AESTHETIC, CREATIVE, CULTURE, GENIUS, INDUSTRY, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY
Behave is a very curious word which still presents difficulties. There was an oE behabban – to contain, from rw be – about, habban – to hold. But the modern word seems to have been introduced in C15 as a form of qualification of the verb have (cf. sich behaben, in G), and especially in the reflexive sense of ‘to have (bear) oneself’. In C16 examples the past tense can be behad. The main sense that came through was one of public conduct or bearing: the nearest modern specialization would perhaps be deportment, or the specialized sense (from C16) of manners (cf. C14 mannerly). In the verb this is still a predominant sense, and to behave (‘yourself’) is still colloquially to behave well, although to behave badly is also immediately understood. In the course of its development from its originally rather limited and dignified sense of public conduct (which Johnson still noted with an emphasis on external), to a term summarizing, in a general moral sense, a whole range of activities, behave has acquired a certain ambivalence, and this has become especially important in the associated development of behaviour. Use of the noun to refer to public conduct or, in a moral sense, to a general range of activities is still common enough; the classic instance is ‘when we are sick in fortune, often the surfeits of our own behaviour’ (King Lear, I, ii). But the critical development is the neutral application of the term, without any moral implications, to describe ways in which someone or something acts (reacts) in some specific situation. This began in scientific description in Cl7 but is not common before C19. The crucial transfer seems to take place in descriptions of material objects, with a strong sense of observation which is probably related to the earlier main sense of observable public conduct. Thus: ‘to watch … the behaviour of the water which drains off a flat coast of mud’ (Huxley, 1878). But the term was also used in relation to plants, lower organisms and animals, and by lC19 was in general use in its still current sense of ‘the externally apparent activity of a whole organism’. (Cf. animal behaviour, and its specialized synonym ethology; ethology had previously been defined as mimicry, Cl7; the science of ethics, C18; the science of character (Mill, 1843). The range from moral to neutral definitions is as evident as in behaviour, and can of course be seen also in character.)
One particular meaning followed from the extension of the methodology of the physical and biological sciences to an influential school of psychology which described itself (Watson, 1913) as behaviourist and (slightly later) behaviourism. Psychology was seen as ‘a purely objective experimental branch of natural science’ (Watson), and data of a ‘mental’ or ‘experiential’ kind were ruled out as unscientific. The key point in this definition was the sense of observable, which was initially confined to ‘objectively physically measurable’ but which later developments, that were still called behaviourist or neo-behaviourist (this use of neo, Gk – new, to indicate a new or revised version of a doctrine is recorded from C17 but is most common from lC19), modified to ‘experimentally measurable’, various kinds of ‘mental’ or ‘experiential’ (cf. SUBJECTIVE) data being admitted under conditions of controlled observation. More important, probably, than the methodological argument within psychology was the extension, from this school and from several associated social and intellectual tendencies, of a sense of behaviour, in its new wide reference to all (? observable) activity, and especially human activity, as ‘interaction’ between ‘an organism’ and ‘its environment’, usually itself specialized to ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’. This had the effect, in a number of areas, of limiting not only the study but the nature of human activity to interactions DETERMINED (q.v.) by an environment, other conceptions of ‘intention’ or ‘purpose’ being rejected or treated as at best secondary, the predominant emphasis being always on (observable) effect: behaviour. In the human sciences, and in many socially applied (and far from neutral) fields such as COMMUNICATIONS (q.v.) and advertising (which developed from its general sense of ‘notification’, from Cl5, to