Whatever the power which Solon gave to the people, and however great their subsequent encroachments, it cannot be doubted that he was the first to lay the foundations of constitutional government,–that is, one in which the people took part in legislation and in the election of rulers. The greatest benefit which he conferred on the State was in the laws which gave relief to poor debtors, those which enabled people to protect themselves by constitutional means, and those which prohibited fathers from selling their daughters and sisters for slaves,–an abomination which had long disgraced the Athenian republic.
Some of Solon's laws were of questionable utility. He prohibited the exportation of the fruits of the soil in Attica, with the exception of olive-oil alone,–a regulation difficult to be enforced in a mercantile State. Neither would he grant citizenship to immigrants; and he released sons from supporting their parents in old age if the parents had neglected to give them a trade. He encouraged all developments of national industries, knowing that the wealth of the State depended on them. Solon was the first Athenian legislator who granted the power of testamentary bequests when a man had no legitimate children. Sons succeeded to the property of their parents, with the obligation of giving a marriage dowry to their sisters. If there were no sons, the daughters inherited the property of their parents; but a person who had no children could bequeath his property to whom he pleased. Solon prohibited costly sacrifices at funerals; he forbade evil-speaking of the dead, and indeed of all persons before judges and archons; he pronounced a man infamous who took part in a sedition.
When this enlightened and disinterested man had finished his work of legislation, 494 B.C, he visited Egypt and Cyprus, and devoted his leisure to the composition of poems. He also, it is said, when a prisoner in the hands of the Persians, visited Croesus, the rich king of Lydia, and gave to him an admonitory lesson on the vicissitudes of life. After a prolonged absence, Solon returned to Athens about the time of the usurpation of his kinsman Peisistratus (560 B.C.), who, however, suffered the aged legislator and patriot to go unharmed, and even allowed most of his laws to remain in force.
The constitution and laws of Athens continued substantially for about a hundred years after the archonship of Solon, when the democratic party under Cleisthenes gained complete ascendency. Some modification of the laws was then made. The political franchise was extended to all free native Athenians. The command of the military forces was given to ten generals, one from each tribe, instead of being intrusted to one of the archons. The Ecclesia, a formal assembly of the citizens, met more frequently. The people were called into direct action as dikasts, or jurors; all citizens were eligible to the magistracy, even to the archonship; ostracism,–which virtually was exile without disgrace,–became a political necessity to check the ascendency of demagogues.
Such were the main features of the constitution and jurisprudence of Athens when the struggle between the patricians and plebeians of Rome began, to which we now give our attention. It was the real beginning of constitutional liberty in Rome. Before this time the government was in the hands either of kings or aristocrats. The patricians were descendants of the original Latin, Sabine, and Etruscan families; the plebeians were the throng of common folk brought in by conquest or later immigration,–mostly of Latin origin. The senate was the ruling power after the expulsion of the kings, and senators were selected from the great patrician families, who controlled by their wealth and influence the popular elections, the army and navy, and all foreign relations. Consuls, the highest magistrates, who commanded the armies, were annually elected by the people; but for several centuries the consuls belonged to great families. The constitution was essentially aristocratic, and the aristocracy was based on wealth. Power was in the hands of nobles, whether their ancestors were patricians or plebeians, although in the early ages of the Republic they were mostly patricians by birth. But with the growth of Rome new families that were not descended from the ancient tribes became prominent,–like the Claudii, the Julii, and the Servilii,–and were incorporated with the nobility. There are very few names in Roman history before the time of Marius which did not belong to this noble class. The plebs, or common people, had at first no political privileges whatever, not even the right of suffrage, and were not allowed to marry into patrician rank. Indeed, they were politically and socially oppressed.
The first great event which gave the plebs protection and political importance was the appointment of representatives called "tribunes of the people,"–a privilege extorted from the patricians. The tribunes had the right to be present at the deliberations of the senate; their persons were inviolable, and they had the power of veto over obnoxious laws. Their power continually increased, until they were finally elected from the senatorial body. In 421 B.C. the plebs had gained sufficient influence to establish the connubium, by which they were allowed to intermarry with patricians. In the same year they were admitted to the quaestorship, which office entitled the possessor to a seat in the senate. The quaestors had charge of the public money. In 336 B.C. the plebeians obtained the praetorship, a judicial office.
In the year 286 B.C. the distinctions vanished between plebeians and patricians, and the term populus instead of plebs, was applied to all Roman people alike. Originally the populus comprised strictly Roman citizens, those who belonged to the original tribes, and who had the right of suffrage. When the plebeians obtained access to the great offices of the state, the senate represented the whole people as it formerly represented the populus, and the term populus was enlarged to embrace the entire community.
The senate was an august body, and was very powerful. It was both judicial and legislative, and for several centuries was composed of patricians alone. Its members always belonged to the aristocracy, whether of patrician or plebeian descent, and were supposed to be rich. Under Augustus it required one million two hundred thousand sesterces annually to support the senatorial dignity. The senate, the members of which were chosen for life, had the superintendence of matters of religion and foreign relations; it commanded the levies of troops; it regulated duties and taxes; it gave audience to ambassadors; it determined upon the way that war should be conducted; it decreed to what provinces governors should be sent; it declared martial law in the appointment of dictators; and it decreed triumphs to fortunate generals. The senators, as a badge of distinction, wore upon their tunics a broad purple stripe, and they had the privilege of the best seats in the theatres. Their decisions were laws (leges). A large part of them had held curule offices, which entitled them to a seat in the senate for life. The curule officers were the consuls, the praetors, the aediles, the quaestors, the tribunes; so that an able senator was sure of a great office in the course of his life. A man could scarcely be a senator unless he had held a great office, nor could he often have held a great office unless he were a senator. Thus it would seem that the Roman constitution for three hundred years after the expulsion of the kings was essentially aristocratic. The plebs had but small consideration till the time of the Gracchi.
But after the institution of tribunes a change in the constitution gradually took place, so that it was neither aristocratic nor popular exclusively, but was composed of both elements, and was a system of balance of power between the various classes. The more complete the balance of power, the closer is the resemblance to a constitutional government. When one class acted as a check against another class, as gradually came to pass, until the subversion of liberties by successful generals, the senate, the magistrates, and the people in their assemblies shared between them the political power, but the senate had a preponderating influence. The judicial, the legislative, and the executive authority was as well defined in Roman legislation as it is in English or American. No person was above the authority of the laws; no one class could subvert the liberties and prerogatives of another class,–even