physico-theological argument he forced to back, as it were, into the cosmological, and
that into the ontological. After this reluctant
regressus of the three into one, shutting up like a spying-glass, which (with the iron hand of Hercules forcing Cerberus up to daylight) the stern man of Koenigsberg resolutely dragged to the front of the arena, nothing remained, now that he had this pet scholastic argument driven up into a corner, than to break its neck—which he did. Kant took the conceit out of all the three arguments; but, if this is what
Phil. alludes to, he should have added, that these three, after all, were only the arguments of speculating or
theoretic reason. To this faculty Kant peremptorily denied the power of demonstrating the Deity; but then that same
apodeixis, which he had thus inexorably torn from reason under one manifestation, Kant himself restored to the reason in another (the
praktische vernunft.) God he asserts to be a postulate of the human reason, as speaking through the conscience and will, not proved
ostensively, but indirectly proved as being
wanted indispensably, and presupposed in other necessities of our human nature. This, probably, is what
Phil. means by his short-hand expression of 'axiomatic postulates.' But then it should not have been said that the case does not 'admit of formal proof,' since the proof is as 'formal' and rigorous by this new method of Kant as by the old obsolete methods of Sam. Clarke and the schoolmen.[Footnote: The method of Des Cartes was altogether separate and peculiar to himself; it is a mere conjuror's juggle; and yet, what is strange, like some other audacious sophisms, it is capable of being so stated as most of all to baffle the subtle dialectician; and Kant himself, though not cheated, was never so much perplexed in his life as in the effort to make its hollowness apparent.]